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Abstract
In this thesis, we present a quantitative approach using probabilistic verification tech-
niques for the analysis of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS)
properties of satellite systems. The subject of our research is satellites used in mission
critical industrial applications. A strong case for using probabilistic model check-
ing to support RAMS analysis of satellite systems is made by our verification results.
This study is intended to build a foundation to help reliability engineers with a basic
background in model checking to apply probabilistic model checking to small satellite
systems.
We make two major contributions. One of these is the approach of RAMS analysis
to satellite systems. In the past, RAMS analysis has been extensively applied to the
field of electrical and electronics engineering. It allows system designers and reliability
engineers to predict the likelihood of failures from the indication of historical or cur-
rent operational data. There is a high potential for the application of RAMS analysis
in the field of space science and engineering. However, there is a lack of standardisa-
tion and suitable procedures for the correct study of RAMS characteristics for satellite
systems. This thesis considers the promising application of RAMS analysis to the case
of satellite design, use, and maintenance, focusing on its system segments. Data col-
lection and verification procedures are discussed, and a number of considerations are
also presented on how to predict the probability of failure.
Our second contribution is leveraging the power of probabilistic model checking
to analyse satellite systems. We present techniques for analysing satellite systems that
differ from the more common quantitative approaches based on traditional simulation
and testing. These techniques have not been applied in this context before. We present
the use of probabilistic techniques via a suite of detailed examples, together with their
analysis. Our presentation is done in an incremental manner: in terms of complexity of
application domains and systemmodels, and a detailed PRISMmodel of each scenario.
We also provide results from practical work together with a discussion about future
improvements.
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Background and Preliminaries
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Satellite based systems appear in almost all aspects of our daily lives. In industry, satel-
lites are already in operational use as part of commercial and non-critical applications
such as fleet management, customer information, and selective door operation. They
promise to form a core component for national and international critical infrastruc-
tures. Satellite constellations, such as GPS in the US, Galileo in Europe, and BeiDou
in China, provide key information (e.g., location, timing, and pictures) for a variety of
mission critical applications from guidance and navigation of unmanned vehicles, to
space surveillance for disaster areas. The European Commission has recently certified
Galileo-based extensions to GPS for railways, maritime, and aviation sectors. There-
fore, a wide range of mission critical applications are completely dependent on satellite
based infrastructures. However, satellites are vulnerable to physical and cyber attacks
as well as accidental faults. System designers, engineers, and end users are typically
not aware of these possible failures identified to satellite based infrastructures and this
will affect the successfulness of the underlying missions.
Because of the mission critical nature of satellite systems, it is essential to guaran-
tee not just qualitative correctness but also a variety of quantitative characteristics, such
as reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS), and to check if these
systems meet the design requirements. Typically, RAMS properties are of paramount
importance in the analysis of whether and how well satellite systems are capable of
completing a particular mission. In general, reliability denotes a system’s ability to
continue to comply with its specification over its useful life; availability denotes the
ability of the system to remain in that functioning state; maintainability is a design
2
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property of the system and is determined by the ease at which the system can be re-
paired or maintained; finally Safety denotes the system does not cause harm to people,
the environment, or any other assets during its life cycle - during normal use and also
for foreseeable misuse. RAMS analysis has been indispensable in the design phase
of satellites in order to achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between
failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintainability strategies, optimise reliability and
maximise availability.
There are a number of quantitative approaches for RAMS analysis of systems,
including but not limited to failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) [8, 101], reli-
ability block diagram (RBD analysis [37, 102], fault tree analysis (FTA) [116, 102],
and state space method [131, 124]. In particular, probabilistic model checking is a
state space method, involving an exhaustive exploration of states and their transition
of components of a repairable system, or interacting subsystems in the system. In
general, this technique is based on the study of Markov models, and is appropriate to
be applied to satellite systems and can be used to support some of other quantitative
approaches. For probabilistic model checking, non-Markov models can also be mod-
elled, but calculation is non-trivial unless a semi-Markov model can be established. A
semi-Markov chain is a model in which state holding times are governed by general
distributions, which is a natural extension of CTMCs. So, we have also considered the
problem of an approximation to semi-Markov models using Markov models.
Verification is a process of analysing whether a system satisfies its specifications.
Verification of RAMS requirements for computerised systems has been an active re-
search area of Computer Science, Systems Engineering, and Software Engineering for
decades. In the context of satellite systems, the verification problem appears to be
difficult and not one that can be tackled completely by the current state of art veri-
fication techniques. This is due to the fact that modelling and reasoning about such
systems involves a combination of multiple dimensions that must be formalised and
verified simultaneously, and requires specifying and proving new and more complex
system properties which are often too subtle to be expressed. Generally, verification
techniques for space and satellite systems include testing, simulation, theorem proving,
and model checking.
Testing is performed on an actual system, whereas simulation is performed on an
abstract model of the system. Testing and simulation both involve checking whether
the outputs are as expected based on certain inputs. These techniques are a cost-
effective method to find system errors. But, checking all possible interactions, exe-
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cutions, and faults is almost impossible due to the fact that no amount of testing and
simulation is completely exhaustive. Thus, they can only show the presence of sys-
tem errors, not their absence, and also only ensure that the system works for the given
inputs.
Formal verification involves the use of mathematical techniques to ensure that a
design conforms to some precisely expressed notion of functional correctness. It aims
at providing a rigid and thorough means of evaluating the correctness of a system via
techniques such as theorem proving, deductive reasoning, and model checking. Model
checking is an automatic technique that can establish, via exhaustive analysis of the
model of a system, whether its behaviour is correct with respect to a given specifica-
tion. This involves exploring the underlying state space of the model, and specifying
properties via some formal logic such as temporal logic. It has been successfully ap-
plied to numerous computer systems and their applications, including both software
and hardware systems. Model checking is considered to be a powerful extension of tra-
ditional verification techniques. Satellite based systems raise numerous new research
challenges, such as:
• The need for formal verification has to be initiated from design time for devel-
oping satellite systems. However, formal specification of such systems is more
difficult than non-formal techniques such as simulation and fault trees.
• Satellite systems have a dynamically changing communication topology due to
their physical mobility, which affects both energy usage and reliability of com-
munication. Model checking techniques must accommodate these features.
• Satellites operate in an unpredictable, unreliable, and dynamic environment and
sometimes need to respond quickly. Stochastic models must be developed to
capture the impact of uncertainty and the probabilistic behaviour of underlying
systems and external environment.
• Quantitative analysis techniques are required to predict the likelihood of failures
as well as the energy cost of satellite operations over time and to select the best
operation strategies given certain constraints.
• How can we ensure that our approaches are flexible and scalable to realistic
space and satellite systems?
Some simple properties of a typical satellite have been verified using a single veri-
fication tool SPIN) [54]. However, a single formal approach cannot be used to specify
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and verify more complex properties involving several dimensions. These dimensions
include real-time aspects, environmental uncertainty, communication uncertainty, path
planing, obstacle avoidance behaviours of small satellites, etc.
The correctness of a satellite system is fundamentally critical. Simulation is com-
monly considered to be the most successful verification technique for analysing the
system?s behaviour. However, simulation alone is not sufficient to verify the RAMS
requirements that are expressed in formal logic such as: “property P1 will be true for
all experiments”, or “is property P2 true whenever property P3 is true”. The disadvan-
tages of simulation are basically due to 2 reasons: (1) the analysis are not exhaustive,
because only a part of the whole available cases will be dealt with by software simu-
lations; (2) the outcome is basically simple information which is infeasible to verify
complex cases.
This issue practically needs feasible approaches to the problem of analysing com-
plex satellite system behaviour. Nowadays, model checking can be an extremely ad-
vantageous alternative technique to simulation. This is due to that model checking is
not just complete in logic and rigorous in mathematics but flexible for the modelling
and specification of complex behaviours. Besides, attempting to verifying RAMS
properties of satellite systems has not been in a systematic manner. Simulation is
unable to deal with the fast development in the design complexity of satellite systems
alone, therefore we consider that model checking is the right tool and it is timely to
apply model checking to this domain.
1.2 Aims and Benefits
Our aims are to apply formal methods in satellite for mission-critical applications for
practical and complex scenarios so as to achieve decision support of design for satellite
systems. This is done by verifying reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
properties relevant to a system’s specification. Model checking, which is a formal
method and a tool for decision support, enables us check logical properties for all
states that relate to the specification, and thus allows us to achieve our aims.
We also aim to help the space and reliability community by providing a more for-
mal and rigorous assessment of these systems, in particular, by using probabilistic
model checking to assess the likelihood and consequences of failures to their opera-
tions. Probabilistic model checking, also known as stochastic model checking, is a
generalisation of model checking for verifying quantitative properties of systems that
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exhibit stochastic behaviours. Models obtained by this technique are normally ex-
tensions or variants of Markov processes or timed automata, extended with costs and
rewards that estimate resources and their usage during operation.
There several benefits of the work to users. First, it sought to represent RAMS
properties using appropriate formal logic in order to understand what it is that makes
each successful in predicting likelihood of failures, and how they might achieve min-
imum failures or to increase mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan
maintainability strategies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. Second, it
provided novel RAMS analysis for satellite systems that nowadays form a core compo-
nent for national and international critical infrastructures. Third, it developed efficient
approaches to a representative configuration of satellite systems and the underlying
practical environment, rather than expensive experimental simulation and testing. It
was expected that the outcome would be close to actual scenario, and informative to
system engineers.
Probabilistic model checking that has focused on computerised systems has not
been conducted in practical satellite for mission-critical applications, and with such
a complex behaviour. The techniques have been successfully applied to a variety of
application domains, both to ensure correctness and to find optimal configurations of
systems. Several popular areas of application include: safety-critical applications, per-
formance analysis, and scheduling and optimisation. Through a number of industrial
case studies, we demonstrate that it is possible to use the technique to mission critical
applications. In this context, the effects of proposed changes to a satellite system can
be first checked via a model, rather than via expensive prototypes. Reliability, avail-
ability, maintainability, and safety properties of satellite systems can be expressed in
probabilistic temporal logic, and proved via probabilistic model checking.
1.3 Contributions
Current state-of-the-art verification techniques (e.g., testing, simulation, and qualita-
tive model checking) appear to be unable to cope with the verification demand intro-
duced by satellite based systems for mission critical applications, because reasoning
about such systems requires combinations of multiple dimensions such as required for
quantitative, continuous and stochastic behaviour to be considered, and requires prov-
ing properties which are subtle to express.
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS 7
1.3.1 Thesis Statement
It is feasible, useful, and efficient to apply probabilistic verification, particularly prob-
abilisitic model checking, during the design phase, to perform predictive analysis of
reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) properties of mission crit-
ical systems that are reliant on satellites. Our main contribution is applying a range
of probabilisitic verification techniques to various RAMS properties to satellite-based
systems. These techniques have not been applied in this context before, and are demon-
strated via a series of examples.
1.3.2 Considerations of Formal Models
In order to demonstrate this, we have investigated and dealt with several dimensions as
follows:
• Mobility: Components of satellite systems are mobile. The formalism of process
algebras allows mobility to be expressed by the transmission of names or terms.
For instance, probabilisitic p-calculus is a good candidate, and can input directly
into PRISM.
• Concurrency: all components of satellite systems exist and operate simulta-
neously. It is natural to model concurrency via parallel composition and non-
determinism in many models. We demonstrate this approach via reactive mod-
ules in PRISM.
• Uncertainty: satellites commonly have to work in uncertain circumstances, such
as in a dynamic environment and with unreliable communication. Various prob-
abilistic models exist to capture uncertain behaviours of systems and environ-
ments, and we use technically mature ones that are supported in PRISM.
• Real time: precise constraints on the timing of events are needed for the correct
modelling satellite systems. (Probabilistic) timed automata allows us to specify
delays that occur during transitions between states.
• Cost of energy: Models can be extended in PRISM with costs and rewards by
associating real values with certain states or transitions, so allowing energy use
to be measured and compared.
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1.3.3 Results of the work
Formal verification of RAMS properties is difficult due to the complexity of the sys-
tems, and it is an useful alternative to, and a powerful extension of simulation and test-
ing. There are two major contributions of the work. The first one is formalising and
analysing RAMS properties of satellite systems for mission-critical applications, the
other is analysing satellite systems via probabilistic model checking. We summarise
the detailed results of our research as follows:
• The likelihood of failures from the indication of historical or current operational
data have be predicted;
• System RAMS properties to satellite design, use, and maintenance, based on its
system segments have been formalised and analysed;
• Mission RAMS properties considering different missions that are reliant on satel-
lites have been analysed and verified;
• How such an approach can provide a useful tool for designers and reliability
engineers of satellites has been demonstrated.
Overall, we have shown the ways in which probabilistic model checking can be
applied to satellite systems. Previous work has also been reported in this thesis on
analysing the reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety properties of satellite
systems using non-formal techniques such as simulation and fault trees. We have il-
lustrated our work by detailing several complete end-to-end design-time verification
process including all models and specifications. In this thesis, each scenario is in-
spired by the real-world problem. By modelling existing scenarios, we have learnt to
make abstraction of realistic satellite systems. Our verification results for our proba-
bilistic models showed that the state space of our different models can be tractable and
verification on them can be feasible.
The starting point of our probabilistic verification technique is a collection of mod-
els of satellite systems under consideration. Our system models obtained some exper-
tise in finding appropriate abstractions to obtain smaller system models and to state
RAMS properties in the logical formalism used. More specifically, our probabilistic
models have been analysed and validated statically via peer review carried out by a
couple of reliability and space professionals before being formally verified. Empiri-
cal studies indicate that peer review provides an effective technique for the validation.
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Although peer review is almost complete manual, it is a rather useful technique. We
believe that the results from the formal methods conform to reality.
Given the fact that verification using model-based techniques is only as good as
the model of the system [12], we believe that it is difficult to achieve absolute guaran-
teed correctness for realistic systems. Our technique verifies a satellite system model,
and not the actual system itself, therefore our approach is preferred to be used as a
complementary technique. Despite the above limitations we conclude that our results
can provide a significant level of insight into a system design in terms of reliability,
availability, maintainability, and safety that are relevant to formalise the requirements
for realistic satellite systems.
Specification validation has received little attention in verification in practice. To
ensure our model checking results are meaningful, we have to ensure that both the
model and specifications unambiguously fulfill the intentions of the system designers
and reliability engineers. We have employed model and property validation techniques
such as peer review. We carefully construct each model and property due to that there is
no systematic approach. Nevertheless, it provided us with valuable insights in practice.
Furthermore, we may consider other specification validation and debugging techniques
in real applications for our future research.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
This thesis is divided into two parts. The introductory part is Part I, which covers back-
ground information on satellite systems and verification techniques. Part II presents
the main work done, and discussion and conclusions. In Figure 1.1, we present an
overview of the chapters and their relational structure.
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, we provide a background on satellite based
systems and probabilistic model checking respectively and highlight that no previous
research has been conducted on the application of (probabilistic) model checking to
explicitly specify and verify reliability, availability, maintainability, safety properties
of systems, particularly space and satellite systems. In addition, we summarise the
main issues and challenges that have arisen from the research in the area of modelling
and verification of satellite systems for mission critical applications. A short review
of the traditional and quantitative verification techniques and work done on space and
satellite systems and their RAMS properties is also presented.
The space segment of a satellite system is the most important operational compo-
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(References [115, 117])
Chapter 7: Safety Analysis of Surveillance Missions ()
(Reference [114])
 Chapter 3: Background on Probabilistic Model Checking 
and PRISM
Semantics ModelsMission Critical Applications
Figure 1.1: Structure of chapters of the thesis.
nent of an artificial satellite system. In Chapter 4, CTMC based formal models are
constructed for two different kinds of space segment: a single satellite and a constel-
lation of satellites, in an uncertain dynamic environment. Associated logical proper-
ties are developed, which allow us to generate time-dependent probability curves for
the reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety characteristics in PRISM model
checker.
Furthermore, the space segment is complex due to the fact that it consists of a large
number of subsystems. Each subsystem may itself have complex and different failure
modes. In addition, when analysing multi-state failure modes for satellite subsystems,
the failure rates follow a general distribution such as Weibull distributions. Weibull
distributions can be modelled as semi-Markov chains, which do not exhibit the expo-
nentially distributed sojourn time. As a result, the CTMCs of Chapter 4 are not suitable
for modelling systems that exhibit Weibull failures. In Chapter 5, we analyse multi-
state failure modes for satellite subsystems. We define novel semi-Markov models that
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characterise failure behaviours, based on Weibull failure modes inferred from realistic
data sources. We approximate and encode these models using CTMCs in PRISM by
using both hyper exponential distributions and Erlang distributions in order to answer
meaningful questions about the reliability of these subsystems.
In Chapter 6, we consider not just the space segment but also the case of a particular
mission that involves all three operational components, including a control segment
and a user segment. The mission uses satellite based positioning systems in aviation
sectors for aircraft guidance and navigation. We construct a formal model of the GNSS
based positioning system for this application in the probabilistic p-calculus, a process
algebra which supports modelling of concurrency, uncertainty, and mobility. We then
encode our model using Markov decision processes (MDPs), and specify and analyse
logical properties relating to system reliability and availability. We discuss how this
approach can be successfully extended to the maritime and railway sectors for guiding
and navigating ships and trains in an uncertain environment.
Another important and successful application of satellite systems is to provide
surveillance information (e.g., images) in disaster areas. In Chapter 7, we demonstrate
a case study involving path planning of a satellite within a limited time period for an
emergency like the Wenchuan earthquake. The existing satellites have to be effectively
and efficiently employed to rapidly and continuously cover and monitor the affected
area during a short time period. In this chapter, we construct different probabilistic
timed automata (PTAs) models of a single satellite in both cases of global and local
path planning, and use PRISM to verify real-time and safety properties related to three
essential parameters which have to be taken into consideration simultaneously for con-
trolling the satellite. These parameters are: (1) the minimum time (2) the maximum
observation coverage time, and (3) the minimum fuel cost, into the logical specification
of the requirements.
In Chapter 8, we give a summary and our conclusions. We also emphasise our
contributions, and outline the key challenges in the area, and suggest several ideas
for related future work. Following the last chapter we present several appendices,
which contain a list of abbreviations, all PRISM reactive modules of the formal models
presented in the thesis.
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1.5 List of Publications
Some of the material presented within this thesis has previously been published in the
following joint authored papers. The majority of the technical content of these papers
was carried out by myself.
1.5.1 Journal Articles
• Yu Lu, Alice A. Miller, and Christopher W. Johnson, “Towards the PRISM En-
coding of Weibull Models for Satellite Subsystems, In Preparation. (Chapter
5)
• Yu Lu, Zhaoguang Peng, Alice A. Miller, Tingdi Zhao, and Christopher W.
Johnson, “How reliable is satellite navigation for aviation? Checking availabil-
ity properties with probabilistic verification”, Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, Volume 144, December 2015, pages 95-116, Elsevier. (Chapter 6)
• Zhaoguang Peng, Yu Lu, Alice A. Miller, Tingdi Zhao, and ChristopherW. John-
son, “Formal Specification and Quantitative Analysis of a Constellation of Navi-
gation Satellites”, Quality and Reliability Engineering International, Volume 32,
Issue 2, pages 345-361, March 2016, Wiley. (Chapter 4)
1.5.2 Conference Proceedings
• Yu Lu, Alice A. Miller, Ruth Hoffmann, and Christopher W. Johnson, “Towards
the Automated Verification of Weibull Distributions for Systems Failure Rates”,
in Proceedings of the Joint 21st International Workshop on Formal Methods for
Industrial Critical Systems and 16th International Workshop on Automated Ver-
ification of Critical Systems (FMICS-AVoCS 2016), Lecture Notes of Computer
Science, Volume 9933, Springer, September 2016. (Chapter 5)
• Yu Lu, Zhaoguang Peng, and Alice Miller, “Uncertainty Analysis of Phased
Mission Systems with Probabilistic Timed Automata”, in Proceedings of the 7th
IEEE International Conference on Prognostics and Health Management (PHM
2016), pages 1-8, IEEE, June 2016. (Chapter 7)
• Yu Lu, Alice A. Miller, Christopher W. Johnson, Zhaoguang Peng, and Tingdi
Zhao, “Availability Analysis of Satellite Positioning Systems for Aviation using
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the PRISM Model Checker”, in Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Con-
ference on Computational Science and Engineering (CSE 2014), pages 704-713,
IEEE, December 2014. (Chapter 6)
• Zhaoguang Peng, Yu Lu, Alice A. Miller, Christopher W. Johnson, and Tingdi
Zhao, “A Probabilistic Model Checking Approach to Analysing Reliability, Avail-
ability, and Maintainability of a Single Satellite System”, in Proceedings of
the 7th European Modelling Symposium (EMS 2013), pages 611-616, IEEE,
November 2013. (Chapter 4)
Chapter 2
Satellite Based Systems
Some materials in this chapter are included in the papers [93, 117]. We introduce some
background material related to satellite based systems. Specifically, the components
of target satellite systems that we model are described in detail, as well as the related
desired systems characteristics that need to be specified and verified.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.1, we give an overview of the un-
derlying satellite systems, especially the global navigation satellite systems (GNSS),
which is one of the most important satellite systems. In Section 2.2, we explain dif-
ferent components of satellite systems, which we focus on in the thesis. In Section
2.3, the usage of satellite based infrastructures for industrial critical systems, espe-
cially mission critical applications, and its RAMS characteristics are covered. Finally,
in Section 2.4 we discuss available verification techniques and analyse related work in
the area of verification of satellite and space systems.
2.1 Introduction
With the emergence of efficient, high-performance, and low cost satellites, earth orbit-
ing satellites are often deployed in satellite constellations and space systems to ensure
reliable and dependable missions. These kinds of satellites have played an essential
part in both civil and military contexts, and support a wide range of applications rang-
ing from navigation of ground, air, and marine assets to surveillance of disaster areas.
Most of these applications are both safety-critical and mission-critical, thus they heav-
ily depend on these satellite based infrastructures. A group of artificial satellites which
work in concert is known as a satellite constellation. A satellite constellation is a num-
ber of satellites with coordinated ground coverage, operating together under shared
14
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control, synchronised so that they overlap in coverage and complement rather than
interfere with other’s satellites coverage.
A satellite based navigation system is a satellite constellation consisting of a num-
ber of artificial satellites that provide autonomous geospatial positioning or monitoring
with global or regional coverage. They have been developed since the 1970s and are
one of the most successful applications of satellites. In particular, a navigation satel-
lite system with global coverage is referred to as a global navigation satellite system
(GNSS). Leading international projects include the United States’ Global Position Sys-
tem (GPS) and Russia’s GLObal NAvigation Satellite System (GLONASS), both of
which are fully operational. In addition, China is expanding its regional BeiDou nav-
igation system into the global compass navigation system, and the European Union’s
Galileo positioning system is a GNSS in the initial deployment phase. Both of these
systems are expected to be fully operational in the next decade. Other countries such as
India, France, and Japan are in the process of developing their own regional navigation
systems. See [61] for a good overview of navigation satellite systems.
A satellite is designed to a functional requirement and it is important that it satisfies
this requirement. However it is also desirable that the satellite should be predictably
available and this depends upon its reliability and availability. We aim to help the mil-
itary or civil end users of satellites to assess the likelihood and consequences of fault
or failure of satellite components in their operations. Reliability, availability, main-
tainability, and safety (RAMS) analysis has been indispensable in the design phase of
navigation satellite systems. It is required to achieve minimum failures or to increase
mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintenance strategies, optimise
reliability and maximise availability. The question of how to select optimal configura-
tions and maintenance plans and underlying resources in order to satisfy requirements
and improve efficiency is a key research question. This concern calls for effective
solutions to the challenges of verifying large and complex navigation systems.
2.2 Components of Systems
Generally, a satellite based system consists of three major parts: the space segment,
control segment and user segment. Recent theoretical research and standards have
added a fourth segment to the satellite navigation system, which is the environment.
The Galileo navigation system includes an environment segment in the composition
of its navigation system. Although not an explicit part of the navigation system, the
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environment segment is implied in the GPS system. To be conservative, the three
traditional segments are used in this thesis as the components of the study, and the
environmental segment is treated as an influencing factor on the system. Failure of any
subsystem will lead to errors in final positioning of the user segment. Figure 2.1 is a
schematic diagram of the segments of satellite systems.
Figure 2.1: Three segments of a typical satellite system.
The monitor stations measure the pseudorange 1 of visible satellites every 6 sec-
onds, correct them with ionospheric and meteorological data, smooth the measurement
to generate data with a time interval of 15 seconds, perform smoothing again to gener-
ate data with a 15 minutes’ time interval, and finally send the data to the master control
station. The master control station is responsible for collecting and tracking data from
each monitor station and calculating the satellite orbit and clock parameters using a
Kalman estimator [52]. The results are transmitted to ground antennas and then to
the satellite. Under the control of the master control station, the clock error, satellite
1pseudorange: the pseudo distance between a satellite and a navigation satellite receiver, which can
be obtained by multiplying the speed of light by the time the signal has taken from the satellite to the
receiver. There are accuracy errors in the time measured, thus the term “pseudorange” is used instead of
“range”[133].
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ephemeris, navigation data, etc., are calculated and then transmitted to the correspond-
ing satellite, and at the same time, the information is verified. The satellites transmit
data associated with their current states to the users. The users need to use the location
information provided by the satellites for positioning during navigation. According to
[84], in general, at least four satellites are required to determine the user’s position.
The flow of information between segments of the system is shown in Figure 2.2.
In this process, the accuracy of the information that each segment provides is critical
and depends directly on the accuracy errors in the time measured. From the monitor
station to the master control station, from the master control station to the ground
antenna, from the ground antenna to the satellite, and from the satellite to the user, the
entire process is implemented by information transmission. Errors may exist in the
process of information transmission, and if these errors are passed on all the way to
the user, the position provided by the navigation system is incorrect.
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Figure 2.2: Flow of information between segments.
2.2.1 Space Segment
The space segment of a standard satellite based system is composed of a constellation
of satellites, as shown in Figure 2.3 (e.g., GPS comprises 24 satellites). The arrange-
ment of the satellite constellation can guarantee that four or more satellites can be
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observed at the same time from any location on earth at any time and ensure that the
propagation of the satellite signal will not be disturbed by the environment. Therefore,
a GNSS-based navigation system should be a global and around-the-clock navigation
system that continuously provides uninterrupted real-time navigation.
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Figure 2.3: Space segment: a constellation of 24 satellites in GPS.
The role of the space segment is described by the functional specification as fol-
lows: (1) continuously transmit navigation signals to users worldwide with carrier
radio waves at a specific band, including the pseudo-range for satellite navigation, the
exact time for users, the distance measurement and a navigation message that con-
tains the spatial location and current health status of the satellite; (2) receive messages,
ephemeris and other related information from the ground antenna via a specific band
when the satellite passes above a ground antenna; (3) transmit and receive satellite
commands from the master control station through the ground antenna, including acti-
vating redundant satellites, correcting on-orbit satellite errors and adjusting the spatial
attitude of satellites at the appropriate time; (4) adjust the direction of the pair of solar
panels on both sides of the navigation satellite according to the position of the sun to
ensure a stable power supply.
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The satellite transmits signals at a specific frequency, providing a high-standard
timing service to users worldwide. This function is implemented primarily by the
atomic clock onboard the satellite.
2.2.2 Control Segment
The control segment consists of three parts: monitor stations, master control stations
(MCS) and ground antennas. This segment is implemented in the form of a number
of detecting and measuring systems distributed across various locations in the world.
The control segment continuously monitors and tracks the satellites. The role of the
control segment components includes: (1) monitor the satellite’s operation and orbit
states; (2) track and compute the orbit parameters of satellites and send them to the
satellites to be retransmitted to the users via a navigation message; (3) synchronise
the clocks of satellites; (4) perform scheduling for satellites when necessary. In the
control segment of the satellite constellation, the monitor stations and ground antennas
are unmanned, and the master control station is staffed. The unattended intelligent
schema and information transmission among advanced communication networks is
implemented through coordination between computers and atomic clocks.
2.2.2.1 Master Control Station
The master control station acts as the brain of the control segment. It is responsible
for processing the information received by the receiving station and feeding the correct
information to the ground antenna. The main functions of the master control station
are summarised as follows.
First, it provides satellites with the accurate time. The atomic clocks onboard the
satellites and the atomic clock of the monitor stations are synchronised by the master
station, or, if a time difference between them is observed, the master control station
will include it in the navigation data and send it to the ground antenna. Second, it cor-
rects the environmental parameters of the atmosphere, satellite ephemeris 2, satellite
clock correction, etc., by a calculation based on the data of satellites in the constel-
lation system that are monitored by various monitor stations and then transmits this
information to the ground antennas to update the satellites. Third, it controls and sends
commands to the satellites, and coordinates backup satellites to replace failed satellites
2ephemeris: the positions of artificial satellites in the space at a given time or times
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once satellites under normal operation fail to receive and transmit. Finally, it controls
satellites that deviate from their orbit and returns them to their planned orbit.
2.2.2.2 Monitor Stations
Monitor stations are centres that measure and examine data under the control of the
master control station. These stations consist of computers, high-precision atomic
clocks, receivers, and some environmental data detection sensors. The receivers con-
tinuously monitor the status of the satellites, measure the on-orbit state of the satellites
and collect environmental data to ensure the standards required for mission accuracy.
The environmental sensors acquire data on the local environment, and the atomic
clock ensures an accurate time. The computer processes these measurements and stores
the data, then transmits the data to the master control station for calculating the satellite
orbit. The control segment of the GPS is made up of five Monitor Stations located at
Hawaii, Kwajalein, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and Colorado Springs.
2.2.2.3 Ground Antennas
The functions of ground antennas under the control of the master control station are
to receive clock errors, ephemeris, mission data and other commands, which are all
calculated and determined by the master control station; transmit this information to
the system; and check the correctness of the transmitted information. There are also
three Ground Antennas located at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and Kwajalein.
Ground antennas consist primarily of a computer, a transmitter at a specific band, and
a transmitting antenna.
2.2.3 User Segment
The user segment of the satellite system consists of multiple parts, generally including
system software, a system receiver, a computer and meteorological equipment. The
receiver hardware mainly consists of several parts: the controller, host, power supply
and antennae.
The main roles of the receiver are as follows: (1) Receive signals from satellites
in the system, capture the signals selected by the satellite’s cut-off angle, check the
operating orbits of the satellites and calculate the user’s position information and the
measurements of the satellites; (2) Perform data conversion, expansion and calcula-
tion on the signals received from the system to calculate the transmission time of the
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signal from the satellite to the receiver antennae; (3) Calculate the user’s position, ve-
locity and time (PVT) based on the data transmitted from the satellite; (4) Present the
processed data to the user through the data display.
2.2.4 Environment Segment as an Influencing Factor
In Europe, the arrival of satellite systems based on Galileo, which is interoperable
with the existing GPS, will provide localisation support to aircrafts, trains, and ships,
etc. However, the reception of satellite signals can be sensitive, and depends on the
environment around the antenna, in the air, and on the ground. Thus it may degrade
the typical reliability and availability of the underlying satellite systems.
The environment segments for aircrafts, trains, and ships are very different. Re-
garding trains, the main environmental influence factor is mountain or tunnel. Whereas,
the environmental influence factors for aircrafts are unknown external disturbances
such as solar radiation and magnetic effect. Although environment segment is treated
differently for various user segments, we will the same way that is to assign different
probabilities for various levels of reception of satellite signal when we model the com-
munication between space segment and user segment. In the following example, we
use trains to illustrate the approach to assigning probabilities.
Satellite systems have the potential to greatly enhance the efficiency and perfor-
mance of rail transport operations. A number of satellites are available as a function
of the position of a train on its journey and the environment (e.g., obstacles, tunnels,
mountains) that surround it. The immediate environment have different effect on the
quality of the signal strength of the satellite measurements made along the different
routes of trains. For instance, the satellite signal cannot be tracked reliably below the
predefined signal levels.
Since the reception of a satellite signal is directly related to the environment around
the antenna, we can distinguish 3 levels as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The best level of
reception occurs when the satellite is directly visible. We call this level as “visible”(or
Line of Sight (LOS) state). When the optical link between the receiver (user segment)
and the satellite (space segment) is not available, the signal can be received by an
alternate path if it can reflect on a surrounding obstacle, otherwise, it will be blocked
and not received. As the train runs, since the environment is not uniform along the
track, the satellite reception states will vary function of time from “visible”, “alternate
path”, and “blocked”.
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Figure 2.4: Satellite reception in a particular environment.
2.3 RAMS Requirements for Mission Critical Space In-
dustry
Recently, there has been an increasing amount of research in the application of Re-
liability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS) techniques to space and
satellite industry. The key focus of RAMS research is to look at interactions between
reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety.
RAMS studies provide system designers and satellite infrastructure engineers with
the metrics to assess the impact of design and maintenance decisions over particular
periods of time. As a result, modelling and analysis are able to help to determine
whether changes in the resources allocated to achieve particular reliability or availabil-
ity requirements will have significant knock-on effects for other operating parameters.
2.3.1 Failure Characteristics
As shown in Figure 2.5, satellite operation constitutes a cycle of information trans-
mission between components. A satellite transmits a signal to the monitor station, the
monitor station transmits the signal to the master control station, the master control
station then transmits the signal to the ground antenna, and finally, the ground antenna
uploads the information to the satellite.
Due to various factors, the monitor station, master control station, or ground an-
tenna may fail during the operation of the system, resulting in a temporary interruption
of the operation, which will resume after repair. Similarly, the satellite can also fail
during operation and not transmit signals properly. In this thesis, failures due to satel-
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Figure 2.5: Signal transmission in satellite systems.
lite ageing are considered in the satellite analysis. Once failure occurs, new satellites
must be launched to replace the failed satellites.
During signal transmission from the monitor station to the master control station
and from the master control station to the ground antenna, abnormal signal transmis-
sion may occur, resulting in errors in information and corresponding anomalies in the
subsequent update information for the satellites. This can affect the mission if the sit-
uation is severe. If anomalies occur in signal transmission, the master control station
can correct the signal after a certain period of time.
Based on a preliminary investigation, it is assumed in our analysis that the informa-
tion exchange among the satellites, monitor station and ground antenna does not itself
generate information anomalies, but its reliability is a direct consequence of the relia-
bility of the satellites and ground antenna. It is additionally assumed that information
anomalies can only occur in the signal transmission between the master control station
and the monitor station.
2.3.2 RAMS Requirements
Over the past decade, Europe’s space and satellite industry is being challenged by in-
creased competition and by the adjustments of EU rules and regulations to improve
interoperability. The current situation forces developers to reduce costs, improve re-
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liability, regularity, and maintain or improve operational safety. These developments
brought an urgent need on the formal specification of RAMS requirements.
A host of standards and regulatory documents provide the background for the
RAMS requirements in mission-critical applications. In Europe, they depend on the
support and approval of the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisa-
tion (CENELEC). In the United States, American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
brought into correspondence the European CENELEC’s RAMS requirements by their
own International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards. Therefore, EN50126
has a counter-part IEC 62278 dealing with RAMS requirements while the specification
requirements in EN50128 are parallelised in IEC 622279.
For instance, the standard EN 50126 defines RAMS in terms of long-term system
characteristics as follows:
• Reliability: the probability that a system can perform a required function under
given conditions for a given time interval.
• Availability: the ability of a system to be in a state to perform a required function
under given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval,
assuming that the required external resources are provided.
• Maintainability: the probability that a given active maintenance action, for a
system under given conditions of use, can be carried out within a stated time
interval when the maintenance is performed under stated conditions and using
stated procedures and resources.
• Safety: a system is said to have an adequate safety if does not cause harm to
people, the environment, or any other assets during its life cycle - during normal
use and also for foreseeable misuse.
In this thesis, we quantify these attributes and calculate them using probabilities.
This integrated perspective is particularly important for satellite operations when, for
example, reliability can typically be assured by maintaining the satellites but only at
the cost of availability. Alternatively, pressure to increase availability through reduced
maintenance cycles may reduce reliability and also undermine safety.
2.3.3 Relationship between RAMS Properties
Although the accuracy of satellite positioning in the aviation environment is in general
sufficient, it is its availability that limits the system dependability and overall perfor-
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mance. Availability properties relate to the reliability and maintainability of satellite
systems. Traditionally, it is the probability that the system is operating at a satisfactory
level and can be committed at the start of a navigation mission when the mission is
called for at an unknown and random point in time.
Reliability
Maintainability Availability
reliability
MTBF
MTBM
MTTR
Safety
Figure 2.6: Overview of RAMS analysis.
The relationship between availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety is de-
picted in Figure 2.6. In general, availability heavily depends on reliability and main-
tainability. For repairable satellites, the term Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) has
been commonly used. MTBF denotes the average length of time from one failure to
the next, and also includes the repair time. The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), is the
average length of time taken to repair a failed satellite. System designers should aim
to allow for a high MTTR value and still achieve the reliability requirements.
Availability is a mathematical function of MTBF and MTTR. We assume that there
is negligible delay before the repair commences on a failed satellite begins. The avail-
ability factor can be computed using the following formula, and clearly a satellite
system that can offer high availability is more desirable than one that offers lower
availability.
Availability=
MTBF
MTBF+MTTR
(2.1)
Availability can range from 0% (never available) to 100% (always available). Satel-
lite systems that can offer high availability are more desirable than ones that offer lower
availability. As a result, the availability requirement for a system is that it should pro-
vide a sufficient guarantee that the system is in an operable state at any time. Infor-
mally, availability properties can be classified as the following five types:
1. How often do failures occur that require corrective maintenance?
2. How often is preventative maintenance performed?
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3. How quickly can indicated failures be isolated and repaired?
4. How quickly can preventive maintenance tasks be performed?
5. How much do logistics support delays contribute to down time?
In this thesis we propose a modified and unambiguous concept for satellite system
availability properties associated with the underlying specification. The current ap-
proach involves prediction of the “mean” availability over the system lifetime, assum-
ing that the system is in a steady state. This approach is not suited to the specification
of GNSS based positioning systems, where the objective is to guarantee what can be
obtained from the system during short periods of time that are meaningful to users, and
that this short term availability will be maintained during the lifetime of the system.
This requires a modification of the availability concept, as it is currently understood.
2.4 Towards Verification of Satellite and Space Systems
In this section, we give some background on related work on verification of satellite
and space systems.
2.4.1 Traditional Verification Techniques
Predictive verification of satellite availability is useful for numerous applications such
as airplane navigation missions and in-car navigation systems. Simulation is nowadays
widely used, and there have been a number of notable attempts to use this technique
to address the problem of design exploration for satellite systems [31, 139]. In [139],
software simulation based on a Markov model of a GPS constellation of 24 satellites
is used to obtain availability estimates of GNSS in Taiwan. The primary input data for
the availability model is the MTBF and failure rate of the GPS satellites.
In [132], an automated method for predicting the number of satellites available to
a GPS receiver, at any point on the Earth’s surface at any time, is described. Avail-
ability analysis between a GPS receiver and each potentially visible GPS satellite is
performed using a number of different surface models and satellite orbit calculations.
In [72], the availability of an Navigation-Communication Satellite System (NCSS) is
studied to examine the feasibility of using an NCSS constellation in Australia. A per-
formance model was proposed in [70] to evaluate the availability of satellite systems
over geographic grid averaging areas over a given period of time. The corresponding
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cost model and performance model are designed in such a way as to minimise cost and
maximise performance of the systems.
In [41], a method for determining the availability of three different GPS services
(positioning, supplemental navigation, and sole means navigation) is described for both
two-dimensional and three-dimensional applications. A 21-satellite and a 24-satellite
constellation are considered. In the companion paper [40], state probability analyses
of 21- and 24-satellite constellations based on a Markov chain model are discussed.
Availability characteristics for GPS and GPS augmented by geostationary satellites
(GSs) are compared in [119]. Availability is determined for users in the contiguous
zone3 in the United States, based on the planned operational GPS constellation and
various GS deployments.
2.4.2 Formal Verification Techniques
Formal methods have significantly impacted aerospace systems engineering, and have
successfully been applied to the verification and validation of many aspects of satellite
and space systems.
A small aircraft transportation system consisting of a number of approaching air-
craft has been formally modelled and its safety properties analysed in [112] using the
interactive theorem prover PVS. PVS [113] was also used to verify desired properties
in system models of Ariane 5 rocket where the cost of failure is high. In the PICGAL
project [35], ground-based software for launch vehicles similar to Ariane 5 were anal-
ysed. In a NASA report [127], formal methods and their application to critical systems
are explained to stakeholders from the aerospace domain. In [71] Markov models are
used to evaluate the cost of availability of coverage of satellite constellation. The po-
tential role of formal methods in the analysis of software failures in space missions is
discussed in [66], .
Similarly, in [20], the use of or the potential to use verification techniques, such
as static analysis, model checking, and compositional verification, can be used to
gain trust in space-based systems is discussed. Model checking has proved to be
a suitable formal technique for exposing errors in satellites, mainly due to classical
concurrency errors. Unforeseen interleaving between processes may cause undesired
events to occur. In [54], the SPIN model checker [63] was used to formally analyse
a multi-threaded plan execution module, which is a component of NASA’s artificial
3Contiguous zone: the zone of the ocean extending 3-12 nautical miles (nms) from the US coastline.
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intelligence-based spacecraft control system as a part of the Deep Space 1 mission.
Five previously undiscovered errors were identified in the spacecraft controller, in one
case representing a major design flaw.
The model checker Mury [36] has been used in [130] to model the Entry, Descent
and Landing phase of the Mars Polar Lander. It was then used to search for sequences
of states that led to the violation of a Mury invariant. This stated that the thrust of
the pulse-width modulation, which controls the thrust of the descent engines, should
always be above a certain altitude. In [48] the model checker NuSMV [25] is used to
model and verify the implementation of a mission and safety critical embedded satellite
software control system. The control system is responsible for maintaining the altitude
of the satellite and for performing fault detection, isolation, and recovery decisions, at
a detailed level.
Furthermore, model checking is used in [24] to simulate satellite operational pro-
cedures, and it exploits a simulator of a satellite as a black box in order to formally
verify operational procedures. In [24, 49], exhaustive search of all possible simulation
scenarios is performed, using the simulator as a model. Thus the verification is au-
tomated and complete. Moreover, the approach of system level formal verification to
exploit a simulator in order to carry out formal verification has been further developed
in [95, 96] and applied to biological contexts. Finally, all these approaches use the
explicit model checker CMurphi [118].
Chapter 3
Probabilistic Model Checking
Some materials in this chapter are included in the papers [93, 117, 91, 114]. We pro-
vide a background on basic concepts of probabilistic model checking, which is the
main approach used for the verification of satellite systems for critical applications
throughout this thesis.
3.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods can be regarded as different concepts to different people. The term
“formal methods” originates in formal logic, but now is mainly used in the area of
Computer Science to refer to a wide range of mathematically based approaches for
the analysis of computerised systems. In this section, we investigate the role of for-
mal methods both in the system development life cycle and in the critical aerospace
engineering context.
3.1.1 Formal Methods in System Life Cycle
From the perspective of a system life cycle, one relevant and widely recognised defi-
nition to this thesis of formal methods is that a formal method is a collection of syntax
and formal semantics associated with automatic verification tools. They can be used
to precisely model the requirements of a system design, and to prove properties of the
underlying model, and to prove correctness of an eventual implementation with respect
to that model [60]. Thus, formal methods can loosely be defined as either specification,
theorem proving, or model checking. In this thesis, we concentrate on the latter.
As shown in Figure 3.1, in order to apply model checking to a level of system
29
3.1. FORMAL METHODS 30
Modelling
Modelling
System 
model
System
Specification
Formalising
Requirements
Property 
specification
Verification
Satisfied Violated + counterexample errorSimulation
Model checking
Figure 3.1: Three parts of model checking (adapted from [12]).
design and development, the tasks to be performed are logically divided into three
phases:
• Modelling: in the first phase, the system design or mission scenario is formally
represented in a formalism that is acceptable to automatic verification tools,
known as model checkers. For some cases, abstraction may be used to remove
or hide less important or unnecessary details of the system design.
• Specification: the next phase is to state and express the important and necessary
properties that the system must satisfy. Again, it is essential to use a formalism
that is acceptable to the model checker. In this phase, a formal temporal logic is
usually used for hardware and software systems.
• Verification: model checkers then are used to verify the validity of the speci-
fication against the proposed model exhaustively. The most common mode of
operation is for these tools to verify the state space of a system for satisfaction
of the specifications and to generate verification results. For negative results pro-
duced by the model checker, the counter example is available to be analysed, and
then the problem can be traced back either to the model or specification due to
such incorrectness. After that, suitable modification actions can be subsequently
taken.
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3.1.2 Formal Methods for Aerospace Engineering
There are three key application domains to which formal methods have been applied
extensively and successfully. The first domain is safety critical systems where failure
may endanger human life, such as fly-by-wire control systems and railway signalling
systems. The second domain is security critical systems, involving security protocols
and applications where failure means unauthorised access to sensitive information,
such as medical records. The third is standardisation and certification: where systems
are designed to meet specific, internationally recognised, standards or regulations. In
this case, it is important that the standards can be interpreted uniformly.
In addition, as underlying formal verification techniques have matured, and a num-
ber of automatic tools have become available as well, formal methods have had an
increasingly significant impact on aerospace engineering. Formal methods are mainly
used in the design time of system development for various aerospace and space mis-
sions. They also have been recommended in the DO-178B1 standard for certification,
and successfully applied in many aerospace contexts. Figure 3.2 illustrates a typical
system development process in aerospace engineering that integrates formal methods
as a fundamental approach to the early design of satellite and space systems.
Model checking is a formal method for verifying finite state systems, such as
analysing sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. During the de-
1DO-178B: a guideline that deals with the safety of safety-critical applications used in certain air-
borne systems.
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velopment of traditional satellite and space systems, model checking methods have
been used effectively to validate onboard software [19, 48]. Model checking based
design tools enable the early validation of software requirements. Examples of model
checkers for this purpose includes NASA’s JavaPathfinder [55], Cadence SMV [62],
Carnegie Mellon’s NuSMV [26], and Bell Lab’s SPIN [63], etc. Model checkers can
be used to detect dead code, integer overflow, division by zero, and violations of system
design properties. Modelling approaches vary to some extent in the way that systems
are represented and the associated model checking can be categorised accordingly as:
referred to as: explicit state, bounded, symbolic, approximate, or probabilistic. In
general, most model checkers analyse and operate on discretised models of systems.
Model checking and probabilistic model checking have been extensively applied to
aerospace systems in the area of safety-critical applications. In [50], authors propose
an approach to quantitatively assessing safety properties using the PRISM probabil-
isitic model checker, and illustrate the approach with a representative system design
from the airborne industry. A verification technique is developed in [33] for analysing
the decision-making component in agent-based hybrid systems. In [59], authors devel-
oped a model checker called ETMCC, which has been used in several non-trivial case
studies to support the automated verification of performability properties. The paper
[3] provides a review of the usage of formal methods and model checking for relia-
bility, availability, maintainability, safety analysis for safety-critical applications in the
area of aerospace and transportation. The paper [127] describes the advantages, dis-
advantages, and challenges in applying formal methods and model checking to safety-
critical applications. In [144], the authors performed formal specification, verification,
and model validation of a coordination protocol for an automated air traffic control
system for safety-critical applications using NuSMV and Cadence SMV.
Explicit state model checking refers to the way that the state space is represented
when checking properties. Here, states are represented explicitly and not abstracted
or merged. Conversely, in symbolic state model checking the state space is stored
in a reduced form, which is represented symbolically as a binary decision diagram
(BDD). Probabilistic model checking is an effective approach to analysing systems
exhibiting stochastic behaviours, and is a highly suitable approach for use in the design,
analysis, and implementation of satellite systems and their missions. Within the theory
of computation, model checking is essentially rooted in automata and temporal logic.
In the next section we introduce important preliminaries of model checking, with a
focus on labelled transition systems and temporal logic.
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3.2 Model Checking
Modelling and verification of computerised systems has been one of the major research
topics of the last 25 years of computer science. Nowadays, the challenges are becoming
increasingly harder, mainly because the scenarios we are dealing with often exhibit a
complexity that is intractable. Computerised systems are now less structured due to
their underlying mobility and concurrency. Another crucial element to consider is
that classical computerised systems are closely integrated within satellite and space
systems. This means that applications dependant on satellites are everywhere and the
results of their computations affect lives and missions. Therefore, the guarantee that
systems are working correctly, reliably, and dependably is becoming vital.
Accordingly, three dimensions must to be tackled. First, model checking methods:
various methods and tools have been applied to verify reliability, availability, maintain-
ability and safety by employing tools based on calculi for mobile processes [58, 9, 2].
However, these methods lack generality and are not applicable to complex and uncer-
tain environments. Thus, it is necessary to revisit current model checking methods and
to use appropriate model checking techniques which can be applied to a wide range
of uncertain characteristics. Second, dynamic analysis methods: some static methods
and tools have already been successful for protocol analysis in the static case. But for
real-time and time-sensitive applications of satellites, dynamic analysis methods are
also crucial, because they are closer to the real world and user behaviours. Therefore,
using a representation language for handling mobility is also important. Finally, the
validation of methods presented in this thesis has to be evaluated within a realistic
application domain of satellite systems.
3.2.1 Labelled Transition Systems
Transition systems are often used in Computer Science as models to describe the be-
haviour of systems. They are directed graphs where nodes represent states, and edges
model transitions. A labelled transition system (LTS) comprises some number of
states, with arcs between them labelled by actions of the system. We consider labelled
transition systems with action names for state changes and atomic propositions for
the states. Action names are used for describing communication mechanisms between
processes. Labels consist of atomic propositions (representing properties of interest)
that are true at each state. A formal definition of LTSs is as follows:
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Figure 3.3: An example of a labelled transition system.
Definition 1. Formally, a labelled transition system (LTS) C is a tuple (S,I,Act,!,L)
where:
• S= {s0,s1, ...,sn} is a finite set of states.
• I ✓ S is a set of initial states.
• Act is a set of actions.
• !✓ S⇥Act⇥S is the transition relation.
Traditionally, si
a ! si+1 is instead denoted as (s,a,s0) 2!. The fundamental be-
haviour of an LTS can be described as follows. The LTS starts in some initial state
s0 2 I and evolves based on the transition relation !. If si(0  i  n) is the current
state, a transition si
a ! si+1 that originates from si is then enabled in a nondeterminis-
tic manner. Thus, the action a is performed, the LTS evolves from state si to the state
si+1. This process is repeated in state si+1 until a state is reached at which that there is
no outgoing transitions. Thus, an LTS has an important property that if a state has more
than one outgoing transition, the next transition is selected according to nondetermin-
ism. This causes the successor of the chosen state to be unknown until the choice is
made. As a result, no statement can be made about the likelihood with which a certain
transition is chosen.
LTSs are suitable for modelling discrete state systems that evolve through actions.
Generally, we distinguish certain states: a start state and perhaps one or more final
states. Figure 3.3 gives a labelled transition system that models a simple communica-
tion protocol from the perspective of a sender. The state space is S = {s0,s1,s2,s3}.
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The set of initial states is I = {s0}. The sender’s action “try” denotes the transmission
of a message along the communication channel, while the actions “succ” and “fail”
denote the successful delivery of the message and failure of transmission, respectively.
Then we have: Act = {try,succ, f ail}.
3.2.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal logic can be used to describe the behaviours of systems over time. Pnueli
[120] suggested a unified approach to program verification of sequential and parallel
systems. The main proof method suggested involved temporal reasoning about sys-
tems. Further, the use of temporal logic for reasoning about properties of reactive
systems was proposed [55]. This logic uses a set of atomic properties, Boolean con-
nectives, and four temporal operators. The temporal operators normally mean future
operators: invariant, eventually, next, and until.
There are two views of time: linear time and branching time, in which time is
perceived as an ordered set and a tree respectively (see Figure 3.4). Logics which
allow us to reason upon these notions of time are Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL)
[64] and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [43].
S2 S0 S1 S2 …
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Figure 3.4: Comparison between two views in temporal logics.
3.2.3 Linear-Time Temporal Logic (LTL)
Linear-time temporal logic (LTL) is a rich specification language that can express many
desired properties, such as reachability, safety, invariance. Linear temporal logic for-
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mulas consist of temporal operators, Boolean operators, and atomic propositions con-
nected in any sensible way. In this subsection, we formally describe linear temporal
logic by giving its syntax and semantics. Specifications based on LTL formulas are
built from a finite set of atomic propositions (AP ). The LTL formulas are recursively
defined according to the following grammer:
• true, false, and a are LTL formulas for all a 2 AP ;
• if f is a LTL formula, then ¬f is a LTL formula;
• if f1 and f2 are LTL formulas, then j1^f2 and f1_j2 are LTL formulas;
• if j1 and j2 are LTL formulas, then f1 and f1Uf2 are LTL formulas.
The operator   is called “next”, and the formula  f is true if f will be true in
the next time step. The other operator U is called “until”, and the formula f1Uf2 is
true if f1 is true until f2 is true (f1 must hold until f2 holds). The additional classical
temporal operators “exists” (⌃) and “always” (⇤) can be derived as follows:
• ⌃f= trueUf;
• ⇤f= ¬⌃¬f.
LTL formulas are interpreted over the observed sequences of the transition system
from the initial state. The set of observations O is defined by AP [{t} for some ele-
ment t /2AP . The special symbol t is used to represent observations not corresponding
to any atomic proposition. This allows us to use LTL formulas to specify sequences of
observations. LTL formulas are interpreted over sequences of observations g : N! O
as follows:
• g(i) |= p iff p= g(i);
• g(i) |= f1^f2 iff g(i) |= j1 and g(i) |= j2;
• g(i) |= f1_f2 iff g(i) |= j1 or g(i) |= f2;
• g(i) |= f1 iff g(i+1) |= f1;
• g(i) |= f1Uf2 iff 9 j   i such that for all k, 0 k < j, g(k) |= f1 and g( j) |= f2.
where p 2 AP , f1 and f2 are LTL formulas, and i 2 N. We say that a sequence g
satisfies formula f iff g(0) |= f.
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3.3 Probabilistic Models
Table 3.1: Classification of probabilistic models.
Discrete Time Continuous Time
Fully Probabilistic DTMCs CTMCs
Nondeterministic
Probabilistic Automata (PAs)
PTAs
MDPs
Probabilistic model checking has been applied to numerous systems based on dif-
ferent types of probabilistic models. Some of these models incorporate a discrete
notion of time, while others incorporate a continuous notion of time. Further clas-
sification can be added based on how to specify uncertainty of systems that involve
aspects of control or concurrency. We distinguish probabilistic models that exhibit
nondeterministic behaviours with those that exhibit completely stochastic behaviours.
Popular and useful models with mature verification algorithms and tools based on these
classification can be shown in Table 3.1. In this section, we define 4 types of proba-
bilistic models relevant to our work, namely Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMCs),
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs), Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), and
Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTAs).
3.3.1 (Discrete-Time and Continuous-Time) Markov Chains
3.3.1.1 Discrete-Time Markov Chains
The basics of discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) can be shown considering the
example in Figure 3.5, showing a DTMC that models a very simple probabilistic com-
munication protocol. After one step, the sender starts trying to transmit a message
through the communication channel. Then, a random choice is made among 3 proba-
bilities: (1) with probability 0.01, the sender waits a time step due to that the channel is
not ready; (2) with probability 0.01, the process of sending message fails due to the un-
reliable channel or transmission collision, and the process restarts; (3) with probability
0.98, the sender successfully transmits the message and finally stops.
Definition 2. Let AP be a fixed, finite set of atomic propositions. Formally, a discrete-
time Markov chain (DTMC) D is a tuple (S,sinit ,P,L) where:
• S= {s1,s2, ...,sn} is a finite set of states.
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Figure 3.5: An example of an DTMC.
• sinit 2 S is the initial state.
• P : S⇥S! [0,1] is the transition probability matrix where Ss02SP(s,s0) = 1 for
all s 2 S
• L : S! 2AP is a labelling function which assigns to each state si 2 S the set L(si)
of atomic propositions a 2 AP that are valid in si.
In a DTMC, the underlying labelled transition system is augmented with probabili-
ties, and the discrete set of states of a DTMC representing possible configuration of the
system being modelled. Transitions between these states occur in discrete steps due to
the discrete nature of time in this paragigm.
3.3.1.2 Continuous-Time Markov Chains
For continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), the time variable associated with the
system evolution is continuous, and state changes can occur at any arbitrary time.
Figure 3.7 illustrates a simple CTMC for a machine availability which includes only
two states: working and failed. The state of the machine is checked continuously. It
can be captured that the average time to failure of a working machine is 50 days, and
the average time for repair of a failed machine is 2 days.
When the machine is in state working, it is vulnerable to failures, which transition
the machine to failed state. This transition rate is modelled as R(working,failed)=
1/50= 0.02. When the machine is in state failed, it can be repaired, and the machine
transitions back to the working state at the rate R(failed,working)= 1/2 = 0.5. In
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Figure 3.6: Formal representation of the DTMC in Figure 3.5.
working failed
R(failed,working) = 0.5
R(working,failed) = 0.02
Pworking Pfailed
Figure 3.7: An example of an CTMC.
addition, if we assume Pworking is the probability of the machine being in the working
state, while Pfailed denotes the probability of the machine being in the failed state.
Thus, the sum of both probabilities is obviously 1: Pworking+Pfailed = 1.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the approach adopted is event based because of the fault and
failure events that can be sensed and monitored in the satellite systems. Rates are
assigned to events and our underlying semantics is continuous-time Markov chains
(CTMCs): the state space is discrete but time is continuous. In this section, we briefly
review the basic concept of CTMCs.
Definition 3. LetAP be a fixed, finite set of atomic propositions. Formally, a continuous-
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time Markov chain (CTMC) C is a tuple (S,sinit ,R,L) where:
• S= {s1,s2, ...,sn} is a finite set of states.
• sinit 2 S is the initial state.
• R : S⇥S! R 0 is the transition rate matrix.
• L : S! 2AP is a labelling function which assigns to each state si 2 S the set
L(si) of atomic propositions a 2 AP that are valid in si.
Intuitively, R(si,s j) > 0 if and only if there is a transition from state si to state s j.
Furthermore, 1  e R(si,s j)·t specifies the probability of moving from si to s j within t
time units, which is an exponential distribution with rate R(si,s j). If R(si,s j) > 0 for
more than one state s j, a competition between the transitions originating in si exists,
known as the race condition.
The probability to move from a non-absorbing state si to a particular state s j within
t time units, i.e., the transition si! s j wins the race, is given by:
P(si,s j, t) =
R(si,s j)
E(si)
· (1  e E(Si)·t), (3.1)
where E(si) = Âs j2S R(si,s j) denotes the total rate at which any transition outgoing
from state si is taken. More precisely, E(si) specifies that the probability of taking
a transition outgoing from the state si within t time units is 1  e E(Si)·t , since the
minimum of two exponentially distributed random variables is an exponentially dis-
tributed random variable with rate the sum of their rates. Consequently, the probability
of moving from a non-absorbing state si to s j by a single transition, denoted P(si,s j),
is determined by the probability that the delay of going from si to s j finishes before
the delays of other outgoing edges from si; formally, P(si,s j) = R(si,s j)/E(s). For an
absorbing state si, the total rate is E(si). In that case, we have P(si,s j) = 0 for any state
s j.
3.3.2 Markov Decision Processes
In this subsection, we briefly review the basic concepts of Markov Decision Processes
(MDPs). For the purpose of this thesis, we consider the number of states are finite,
together with a description of the possible transitions among the states. In MDPs,
the choice as to which transition to take from a particular state s is made according
to two stages: the first stage comprises a nondeterministic choice among a number of
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Figure 3.8: An example of an MDP.
actions available in the state s; whereas the second stage involves a probabilistic choice
between the possible target states of the transition. During the the second stage, the
probability distribution used to choose the next state of the MDP is determined by the
choice of action made in the first stage.
The integration of nondeterministic and probabilistic choice in MDPs can be useful
in numerous application scenarios. In the context of the formal modelling of systems,
“nondeterministic choice can be used to represent such factors as interleaving between
concurrent processes, unknown implementation details, and (automatic or manual) ab-
straction” [14]. In Chapter 6, we consider a more high-level formalism for the descrip-
tion of satellite based aviation systems which are based on MDPs (more precisely,
MDPs provide the underlying semantics of the high-level formalism).
The concepts are illustrated based on the example MDP in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. We
model a very simple probabilistic communication protocol using anMDP in Figure 3.8.
Our MDP comprises a set of states: {s0,s1,s2,s3}. There is a single process. After one
step, the process starts trying to send a message. Then, a nondeterministic choice is
made between: (a) waiting because the channel is not ready; (b) sending the message.
If the latter choice is made, with probability 0.99 the message is sent successfully and
stops, and with probability 0.01, message sending fails, and the process restarts.
Definition 4. Let Act be a set of actions, and AP a fixed, finite set of atomic propo-
sitions. Formally, a Markov decision process (MDP) M is a tuple (S,sinit ,Steps,L)
where:
• S= {s1,s2, ...,sn} is a finite set of states;
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• sinit 2 S is the initial state;
• Steps : S! 2Act⇥Dist(S) is the transition probability function where Act is a set
of actions and Dist(s) is the set of discrete probability distributions over the set
S;
• L : S! 2AP is a labelling function with atomic propositions.
M = (S,sinit,Steps,L)
S = {s0, s1, s2, s3} 
sinit = s0
VWDUW
ZDLW  VHQG    
UHVWDUW
VWRS 
AP = {init,try,fail,succ}
L(s0)={init}, 
L(s1)=^WU\`,
L(s2)={heads}, 
L(s3)={tails}
Steps(s0) = { (VWDUW, s1֏1) }
Steps(s1) = { (ZDLW, s֏ ), (VHQG, [s2֏.,s3֏.]) }
Steps(s3) = { (VWRS, s3֏) }
WU\ IDLOVXFF
^WU\`
Figure 3.9: Formal representation of the MDP in Figure 3.8.
Unlike DTMCs, deterministic probability cannot be measured in an MDP, but a
countably infinite number of probabilities is measured in the MDP. In general, each
probability corresponds to a different way of resolving the nondeterministic choice
during the execution of the system [14].
An execution path of an MDP requires both non-deterministic and probabilistic
transitions to be resolved. Non-deterministic choices are made by an adversary where
the decision is determined by the choices made in all previous runs. An adversary
A can be defined formally as a function that maps every finite path p f in in an MDP
onto a distribution A(p f in) 2 Steps(last(p f in)) where last(p f in) is the final state of the
finite path. For convenience the subset of Path(s) which corresponds to adversary A is
denoted PathA(s).
3.3.3 Probabilistic Timed Automata
Full details about probabilistic timed automata (PTAs) can be found in [79, 111]. We
outline the important aspects in this section. PTAs allow us to use the real-valued
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clocks of timed automata [5], which is one of the most popular and powerful for-
malisms for the formal verification of real-time systems, together with the discrete
probabilistic choice of MDPs. PTAs have real-valued clocks and, like MDPs [39] and
therefore allow us to model systems with a range of different characteristics (non-
determinism, probability, and real time).
Figure 3.10: An example of a PTA.
In this subsection, we illustrate a number of basic PTA concepts using the exam-
ple in Fig. 3.10. The Figure illustrates a probabilistic timed automaton, with clock
t and integer variable try, modelling a simple probabilistic communication protocol.
In the protocol, a sender repeatedly attempts to transmit a message over an unreliable
channel. The probability that the sender’s transmission fails due to that the channel
is unreliable is 0.05, and the sender successfully transmit the message to the receiver
with probability 0.95. If message data from the sender is lost, the sender suspends its
activity, and there is a delay (of between 4 and 6 time units) before the sender tries to
resend its message (up toM 1 times).
The control states of the automaton model, “state = 0”, “state = 1”, “state = 2”,
“state= 3”, have the meaning of “transmit”, “wait”, “quit”, and “finish” respectively.
They are depicted as the nodes (circles) of the underlying graph, and the available
transmissions between these control states are indicated as the edges (with arrow) of
the graph. In the initial state, “state= 0”, shown as the extra border, a communication
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is being initialised by the sender along the transmission channel. After between 2 and 3
time units, the sender attempts to send the message, and with probability 0.95 message
is sent correctly, meantime with probability 0.05 message is lost. In “state= 2”, when
4 to 6 time units have elapsed from whenever the message is lost, the sender tries to
re-transmit the message.
Definition 5. A probabilistic timed automaton PTA P is a tuple of the form
(L, l0,S, inv, prob) where:
• L= {l0, l1, l2, ..., ln} is a finite set of locations;
• l0 2 L is the initial location;
• c= {x,y,z, ...} is a finite set of clocks;
• S = {a,b,c, ...} is a finite set of events, of which Su ✓ S are declared as being
urgent;
• the function inv : L!CC(c) is the invariant condition;
• the finite set prob✓ L⇥CC(c)⇥S⇥Dist(2c⇥L) is the probabilistic edge rela-
tion.
Note that clocks are real-valued. The values of the clocks synchronise and increase
together over time. Transitions and states may have guards and invariants over clock
variables and other variables which indicate when transitions can occur and how long
can be spent in a state. In our example, the transition between states state = 0 and
state = 1 (or state = 2) has the clock guard t   2. The state state = 0 and state = 3
have the invariant t< 3 and t< 6 respectively.
The semantics of PTAs are formally defined as an infinite state MDP. As clocks are
real-valued the MDP will have an infinite state-space (both in terms of set of states,
and the set of transitions). Since model-checking algorithms are designed to work on
finite state spaces, the analysis of PTAs requires some form of abstraction, to a finite
state representation. PTAs have been used to verify a variety of protocols, e.g. the
CSMA/CD back-off protocol [38], the FireWire root contention protocol [81], and the
IPv4 Zeroconf protocol [79].
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3.4 Probabilistic Model Checking
All probabilistic models in previous sections include a notation of probability by la-
belling transition with likelihood that it will occur. Thus, it allows us to make quanti-
tative description of the system, in addition to the qualitative description made by con-
ventional model checking approaches. In recent years, many researchers are working
on applying probabilistic model checking for design and implementation of satellite
and space systems [42, 44, 145, 137]. The focus of such work is on both theoretical
foundations and industrial applications of probabilistic model checking.
Probabilistic model checking is a variant of model checking. Model checking not
only requires formal model of a system, but also requires a formal specification of the
system requirements that the system model should guarantee. These system require-
ments are typically represented in temporal logic, and refer to sequences of system
events, such as “a target state is reached within 50 execution steps” or “a response
always follows a request”.
A model checking algorithm is executed to establish automatically whether the
system model satisfies the property. Model checking has been extended to the case of
probabilistic systems. In this case, properties “are specified in a probabilistic exten-
sions of classical temporal logic, and refer to the maximum or minimum probability
of temporal logic properties over execution sequences ” [14]. For instance, a system
may be regarded as correct if the maximum probability of reaching a target state within
50 steps is greater than 0.8. Model checking for probabilistic models depends on the
combination of different techniques for computing optimal rewards and costs together
with theory from the field of qualitative model checking.
Unlike the traditional approaches described above, the probabilistic analysis per-
formed in our thesis is applicable to address desired properties based on temporal logic,
returning quantities computed by model checking rather than a true or false answer.
Moreover, probabilistic model checking is based on Markov models and timed au-
tomata, and considers continuos time in a natural way, this has overcome the problem
such as the lack of time factors in the traditional system model, or discrete time when
time is included in the system model. Moreover, since probabilistic model checking
involves the exhaustive exploration of all possible paths of the model, it can also sup-
ply significant information about the system. For example, the optimal path and cost,
average rewards, the maximal or minimal probability, time bound, and so on.
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3.4.1 Selection of Model Checking Tool: PRISM
Numerous scientists and engineers have used model checking to help design and anal-
yse finite state concurrent systems. In particular, model checking is able to verify
hardware and software systems such as complex sequential circuit designs and com-
munication protocols [30]. Further, a number of automated verification tools based
on model checking, which are known as model checkers, have been developed for
many years. There are many examples of earlier model checkers, such as SPIN,
SMV/NuSMV/NuSMV 2, KRONOS.
SPIN [62] is a qualitative model checker for linear temporal logic (LTL), and was
developed for the verification of communication protocols and software systems in the
1980s. Users need to translate the system of interest into the PROcess Meta LAn-
guage (PROMELA), which is the underlying modelling language of SPIN. The SPIN
is popular and successful, but it is difficult to model unbounded data variables.
SMV [100, 29] is another popular qualitative model checker for computation tree
logic (CTL) and uses binary decision diagrams (BDD), which is a mainstream ver-
ification technique. NuSMV [26] and NuSMV 2 [25] are symbolic model checkers
originated from the re-engineering, re-implementation and extension of SMV. Both
model checkers apply the bounded model checking methods for LTL in addition to the
BDD for the CTL. Similar to SPIN, SMV and NuSMV/NuSMV 2 need to translate the
system into their own input modelling languages. In general, such translations require
abstraction and refinement of the underlying systems, due to which false counterexam-
ples may exist.
KRONOS [143, 18] is a real-time model checker based on timed automata. Proper-
ties of interest in KRONOS are specified using timed computation tree logic (TCTL).
The timed automata can be given in a textual form which is constructed based on a sys-
tem consisting of a number of components. It then generates the product automaton
based on the synchronisation of automata .
There are also several popular quantitative model checking tools for probabilistic
verification of systems, each of which offers and supports one or a number of models.
Support and availability are generally the key factors for us to consider selecting the
most appropriate verification tool. Thus, we choose the state of the art probabilistic
symbolic model checker PRISM since not only it supports various different probabilis-
tic models, but also it is currently available for free and still actively developed. We
then summarise some of most well-known and successful probabilisitic model check-
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ers.
UPPAAL [15, 83] is a real-time model checker for for automatic verification of
safety and bounded liveness properties of real-time systems modelled as networks of
timed automata. UPPAAL was developed in collaboration between Uppsala Univer-
sity in Sweden and Aalborg University in Denmark. It is free for noncommercial ap-
plications in academia only, and for commercial applications a commercial license is
required. An extension of UPPAAL has been made for considering cost optimal reach-
ability, which is known as UPPAAL CORA. Recently, another extension of UPPAAL
(known as UPPAAL SMC) is adding probability to timed automata using statistical
model checking techniques, which is a computationally efficient verification approach
based on selective system sampling [57]. UPPAAL SMC has been used extensively in
various research areas for industrial applications, such as systems biology and software
engineering.
The Markov Reward Model Checker (MRMC) [68, 69] is a probabilistic model
checker with a particular focus on systems modelled as CTMCs and DTMCs. It sup-
ports model checking of PCTL and CSL, and their reward extensions. MRMC also
supports to calculate both time bounded and reward bounded reachability probabili-
ties. MRMC is also freely available.
PRISM is a probabilistic model checker, which can be used to model, analyse and
verify systems that exhibit random or probabilistic behaviour based on different types
of probabilistic models, such as DTMCs, CTMCs, MDPs, and PAs. PRISM recently
starts to support for analysing probabilistic real-time systems, using PTAs. PRISM was
developed and is maintained by researchers from University of Oxford, University of
Birmingham, and University of Glasgow in UK.
In Fig. 3.11, we show the graphical user interface for PRISM in which the results
of a model checking experiment are displayed. In this example a reachability property
is being verified and the graph shows how the maximum expected number of steps
varies with a defined property defined as Reliability. It is free and open source, and
it runs on several operating systems such as Mac OS X, Windows, and Linux. It
has also been used to analyse systems from many different industrial applications,
such as communication and multimedia protocols, security protocols, dynamic power
management, biological systems, and autonomous systems.
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Figure 3.11: A screenshot of the PRISM probabilisitic model checker.
3.4.2 Reactive Modules
PRISM supports the analysis of several types of probabilistic models: discrete-time
Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs), Markov decision
processes (MDPs), probabilistic automata (PAs), and also probabilistic timed automata
(PTAs), with optional extensions of costs and rewards [77]. Moreover, PRISM allows
us to verify properties specified in the temporal logics PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs
and CSL for CTMCs and PTAs. Models are described using the PRISM language, a
simple, state based language.
Markov models to be verified in PRISM are specified using the PRISM modelling
language which is based on the Reactive Modules formalism [6]. A fundamental com-
ponent of this language is a module. A system is constructed as the parallel composi-
tion of a number of modules. A module is specified as:
module name ... endmodule
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Amodule definition consists of two parts: one containing variable declarations, and
the other commands. At any time, the state of a model is determined by the current
value of all of the variables of all of the components (modules). A variable declaration
has the form:
x : [0..2] init 0;
In this example, variable x is declared, with range [0..2] and initial value 0. The
behaviour of each module is specified using commands, comprising a guard and one
or more updates of the form:
[action] guard ! rate : update
or,
[action] guard ! rate1 : update1+ rate2 : update2+ ...
The (action) label is optional, and is used to force two or more modules to synchro-
nise. Updates in commands are labelled with positive-valued rates [77] for CTMCs.
The + indicates the usual non-deterministic choice. Within a module, multiple transi-
tions can be specified either as several different updates in a command, or as multiple
commands with overlapping guards. The following examples:
[ ] x= 0 ! 0.05 : (x0 = 0);
[ ] x= 0 ! 0.2 : (x0 = 1);
and
[ ] x= 0! 0.05 : (x0 = 0) + 0.2 : (x0 = 1);
are equivalent. The guard x= 0 indicates that command is only executed when variable
x has value 0. The updates (x0 = 0) and (x0 = 1) and their associated rates indicate that
the value of x will remain at 0 with rate 0.05 and change to 1 with rate 0.2. In a CTMC,
when multiple possible transitions are available in a state, a race condition occurs [75].
The rate of the synchronised transition is the product of all the individual rates.
3.5 Property Specification
3.5.1 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL)
3.5.1.1 Syntax and Semantics of PCTL
We use Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) to specify various availability
properties. PCTL allows us to express properties to do with probabilistic models; i.e.,
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models with probabilities associated with transitions. The following definitions are
taken from [104] (for a more explicit definition of PCTL see [76]).
Definition 6. Let a 2 AP be an atomic proposition, p 2 [0,1] be a real number, ./ 2
{,<,>, } be a comparison operator, and I ✓ R 0 be a non-empty interval. The
syntax of PCTL formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is defined inductively
as follows:
• f :=> | a | ¬f | f^f | P./p[y]
• y := Xf | fUkf | fUf
In the syntax of PCTL a state s satisfies the probabilistic path formula P./p[y] if the
probability of leaving s via a path satisfying y is in the interval I. The path formulae
Xf is true if f is satisfied in the next state; f1Uf2 is true if f2 is satisfied at some point
in the future and f1 is true until that point. Finally, f1Ukf2 is true if f2 is satisfied
within k time steps and f1 is true until that point.
Given an MDPM , the probability of a path from s satisfying path formula y under
the adversary A is denoted PAs (y) = ProbAs ({p 2 PathA(s)|M ,p ✏ y}).To formally
define the semantics of the PCTL formula P./p[y] a set of adversaries Adv is selected
and quantified over. It follows that the satisfaction relation is parameterised by Adv.
Therefore, a state s satisfies the formula P./p[y] if PAs (y) ./ p for all adversaries A 2
Adv. The semantics of PCTL are defined as follows.
Definition 7. The semantics of PCTL over MDPs is defined as follows:
• M ,s ✏Adv >
• M ,s ✏Adv a if a is true inM ,s
• M ,s ✏Adv ¬f iffM ,s 2Adv f
• M ,s ✏Adv f1^f2 iffM ,s ✏Adv f1 andM ,s ✏Adv f2
• M ,s ✏ P./p[y] iff PAs (y) ./ p for all A 2 Adv
• M ,p ✏Adv Xf iffM ,p1 ✏Adv f
• M ,p ✏Adv f1Ukf2 iff for some i  k, M ,pi ✏Adv f2 and M ,p j ✏Adv f1 for all
0 j < i
• M ,p ✏Adv f1Uf2 iff for some k   0,M ,p ✏Adv f1Ukf2
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3.5.1.2 PRISM Usage of PCTL
We use PCTL to specify various availability properties in our PRISM models. The
probabilistic model checker PRISM provides support for automated analysis of a wide
range of quantitative properties, such as “what is the probability of a failure causing
the satellite to stop working within 12 hours?”, “what is the worst-case probability
of the satellite on-board system terminating due to an error, over all possible initial
configurations?”, or “what is the worst-case expected time taken for the satellite signal
to be received?”.
One of the most important operators in PCTL is the P operator, which is used to
reason about the probability of an event’s occurrence. It is often useful to compute
the actual probability that some behaviour of a model is observed. Therefore, PRISM
allows a variation of the P operator to be used in a query, i.e., P=?[pathprop], which
returns a numerical rather than a Boolean value.
In MDP models, there are two types of branching, nondeterministic, determined by
a scheduler, and probabilistic, governed by the probability distribution. In order to in-
terpret this, the properties in PCTL consider under any scheduling of processes, yield-
ing the minimum or maximum over all the possible ways of resolving nondeterminism
instead of the exact probability. Simple examples of such properties are “the maximum
probability of an error occurring within T time steps”: Pmax=?[F  T 00error00]; and
“what is the worst-case expected time taken for a backup satellite to be launched?”:
Rtimemax=?[F 00launch00], where both ’0error00 and 00launch00 are labels on system states
specified in PRISM.
PRISM includes support for the specification and verification of properties based on
costs and rewards. This means that PRISM can be used to reason, for example, about
properties such as “expected time”, “expected number of lost messages” or “expected
energy consumption”. The basic idea is that probabilistic models developed in PRISM
can be augmented with costs (something bad) or rewards (something good): real values
associated with certain states or transitions of the model (the costs and rewards are nu-
merically identical). For MDPs, where time proceeds in discrete steps, the time interval
is simply an integer upper bound. In our study, we use rewards “steps” to calculate ex-
pected time “T”. Rewards are associated with models using the rewards...endrewards
construct.
rewards "time"
true : 1;
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endrewards
3.5.2 Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL)
3.5.2.1 Syntax and Semantics of CSL
We also use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [11, 13] to specify reliability, avail-
ability, and maintainability properties. CSL is inspired by the logic Computation Tree
Logic (CTL) [43], and its extensions to discrete-time stochastic systems (PCTL) [53],
and continuous-time non-stochastic systems (TCTL) [4]. There are two types of for-
mulae in CSL: state formulae, which are true or false in a specific state, and path
formulae, which are true or false along a specific path.
Definition 8. Let a 2 AP be an atomic proposition, p 2 [0,1] be a real number, ./ 2
{,<,>, } be a comparison operator, and I ✓ R 0 be a non-empty interval. The
syntax of CSL formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is defined inductively
as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a 2 AP is a state formula.
• If f and y are state formulas, then so are ¬f and f^y.
• If f is state formula, then so is S./p(f).
• If j is a path formula, then P./p(j).
• If f and y are state formulas, then Xf, fUy, and fUky are path formulas.
Formula S./p(f) asserts that the steady-state probability for a state satisfying f
meets the bound ./ p. Similarly, formula P./p(j) asserts that the probability measure of
the paths satisfying jmeets the bound given by ./ p. The operator P./p(.) replaces the
usual CTL path quantifiers 9 and 8. Intuitively, 9j represents that there exists a path
for which j holds and corresponds to AP>0(j), and 8j represents that for all paths j
holds and corresponds to P>=1(j). The temporal operator X is the timed variant of the
standard next operator in CTL; the path formula Xf asserts that a transition is made to
a f state at some time point t 2 I. Operator U is the timed variant of the until operator
of CTL; the path formula fUIy asserts that y is satisfied at some time instant in the
interval I and that at all preceding time instants f holds.
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Definition 9. The semantics of CSL over CTMCs is defined here. The satisfaction
relation for the state formulas is defined as follows:
• C ,s ✏ true for all s 2 S
• C ,s ✏ a iff a 2 L(s)
• C ,s ✏ ¬f iff C ,s 2 f
• C ,s ✏ f^y iff C ,s ✏ f and C ,s ✏ y
• C ,s ✏ S./p(f) iff pSat(f)(s) 2 I./p, where Sat(f) = {s 2 S | s ✏ f}
• C ,s ✏ P./p(j) iff Prob(s,j) 2 I./p
For each state s, the set {s 2 Path(s)|s ✏ f} is measurable. The satisfaction rela-
tion for the path formulas is defined as follows:
• C ,s ✏ Xf iffM ,s1 ✏ f
• M ,s ✏ fUky iff for some i k,M ,si ✏ y andM ,s j ✏ f for all 0 j < i
• M ,s ✏ fUy iff for some k   0,M ,s ✏ fUky
3.5.2.2 PRISM Usage of CSL
One of the most important operators is the P operator, which is used to reason about
the probability of an event. This operator was originally proposed for use in the logic
PCTL but also features in the other logics supported by PRISM, such as CSL. The P
operator is applicable to all types of models supported by PRISM.
It is often useful to compute the actual probability that some behaviour of a model
is observed. Therefore, PRISM allows a variation of the P operator to be used in a
query, i.e., P=?[pathprop], which returns a numerical rather than a Boolean value (i.e.,
the probability that pathprop is true). In our thesis, we are interested in directly spec-
ifying reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety properties which evaluate to
a numerical value. For example, we might wish to calculate the probability that x is
eventually equal to 5, and that x remains less than 5 up until that point. This can be
specified as P=?[z< 5 U z= 5], where U is the “until” temporal operator.
Another important operator we use is the R operator, which specifies a cumulative
reward property that associate a reward with each path of a model, but only up to a
given time bound. The property R=?[C <= t] corresponds to the reward cumulated
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along a path until t time units have elapsed. For CTMCs, the bound t can evaluate to a
real value. Some typical examples of properties using P and R operators can be found
on the Property Specification section of the PRISM website.
3.5.3 Modelling PTAs in PRISM
pta
const int M;
module sender
state : [0..3] init 0;
try : [0..M] init 0;
t : clock;
invariant
(state = 0 => t <= 3) & (state = 3 => t <= 6)
endinvariant
[transmit] state = 0 & t >= 1 & try < M -> 0.95 : (state’ = 1) +
0.05 : (state’ = 2) & (try’ = try+1) & (t’ = 0);
[retransmit] state = 3 & t >= 4 -> (state’ = 0) & (t’ = 0);
[terminate] state = 0 & try == M -> (state’ = 3);
endmodule
rewards ’’energy’’
(state=0) : 3.5;
endrewards
Figure 3.12: The PRISM code of the PTA in Figure 3.10.
PTAs can be enhanced with rewards and costs, which allow us to track the num-
ber of occurrences of a transition. This might correspond to energy used or goals
achieved. The corresponding model is known as a priced PTA and it allows us to mea-
sure accumulated rewards (reflected in properties expressing the expected value of the
rewards/costs). A further extension is linearly priced PTAs, where costs or rewards are
accumulated linearly (with respect to the elapsed time) [78]. Finally, parallel composi-
tion can be modelled by PTAs as well, which is the same feature of other probabilistic
models supported by PRISM. Thus, multiple probabilistic timed automaton are able to
work in parallel, and synchronise by taking transitions with the help of labels that can
be matched [79].
The PRISM model checker employs a popular modelling language to specify all the
probabilistic models, which include DTMCs, CTMCs, MDPs, and PTAs. In particular,
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PTAs is a textual language, based on guarded command notation. A clock variable has
been added in PTAs that PRISM can then recognise. Clock variables can be placed
in guards, which is located on the left-hand side of a command. Like other regular
variables in the model, clock variables can also be reset, which results in an update on
the right-hand side of the command. There is an additional keyword “invariant” for
the purpose of specifying invariants [78]. Figure 3.12 shows a PRISM modelling lan-
guage description for the example PTA described in Figure 3.10. It further illustrates
a case of including a PRISM reward structure, labelled “energy”, to generate a priced
probabilistic timed automata, which assigns a reward rate of 3.5 when s = 0 (during
message transmission).
Part II
Modelling, Specification and
Verification
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Chapter 4
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
Analysis of The Space Segment
This chapter is based on the papers [117, 115]. We present formal models of both a
single satellite and a navigation satellite constellation and logical specification of their
reliability, availability and maintainability properties respectively. The model checker
PRISM has been used to perform automated analysis of these quantitative properties.
4.1 Introduction
The space segment is a core component of satellite systems. Satellites in the space
segment are designed for operating on orbit to perform tasks and have lifetimes of
10 years or more. Before formally introducing this technique and discussing the role
of formal verification, we briefly review some traditional verification techniques that
can be applied to analysing satellite systems, which are prototype testing and model
simulation.
Prototype testing is a dynamic verification technique that involves actually running
prototype of a system. Correctness is thus verified by running the prototype to traverse
a set of execution paths. Based on the results during execution, the actual output of
the prototype is compared to the system specification which is usually in the form of
documents. Model simulation is similar to prototype testing, but is applied to system
models. Models are usually described using hardware description languages. A sim-
ulator is used to examine execution paths of the model based on configuration inputs.
These inputs can be provided by a user, or by automated approaches such as using a
random generator. A mismatch between the simulator’s result and the specification of
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the system exhibits the incorrect behaviours.
Both verification techniques are limited in that they only allow exploration of a
small subset of many possible scenarios. Formal methods is the application of mathe-
matical modelling and reasoning to prove that an implementation coincides with pre-
cisely expressed notion of formal specification. In this context, the purpose of formal
analysis and verification is to analyse the performance and reliability properties and
to verify the correctness of satellite systems in such a way that faults and failures can
be identified. Model checking and theorem proving are formal techniques that can be
used to detect faults and failures in a formal specification.
Although historically these forms of verification were used to prove correctness
of explicit software and hardware designs, these days they are also used for failure
analysis. They are generally applied during the design phase, where they are arguably
most effective, for verifying correctness and other essential properties such as safety,
liveness and fairness. Model checking is an automated analysis technique that requires
expert knowledge to use. The user must provide an initial specification of the system
itself, as well as logical properties describing its desired behaviour.
One strength of model checking to traditional analysis techniques is that it is not
sensitive to the probability that a fault or failure is exposed; this contrasts with proto-
type testing and model simulation that are aimed at tracing the most probable faults
or failures. Moreover, it allows one to precisely analyse results of checking desired
properties. Model checking is a general analysis technique that is applicable to a wide
range of applications such as embedded systems, software engineering, and hardware
design. It also supports analysing properties individually, thus allowing one to focus
essential properties first. This enables incomplete formal models to be specified and
verified.
The formal model of systems can be defined using a high-level formalism or ex-
tracted directly form software using methods such as abstract interpretation. Verifica-
tion involves checking paths of the state transition graph (or state-space) of the model.
Traditionally this involves either exhaustive or on-the-fly search of the state-space in
which states are stored explicitly. Another method, which is symbolic model checking
[30], involves search of a symbolic representation of the state space, in which groups
of states and transitions are explored in a single step.
Quantitative verification is a analysis technique for establishing quantitative prop-
erties of a system model. Models analysed through this method are typically vari-
ants of Markov chains, annotated with costs and rewards that describe resources and
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their usage during execution. Properties are expressed in temporal logic extended with
probabilistic and reward operators. Quantitative verification involves a combination of
a traversal of the state transition system of the model and numerical computation. In
this chapter, we employ the power of probabilistic model checking, which is a leading
quantitative verification and analysis technique for a wide variety of systems.
In this chapter, our models are Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs), and we
verify reliability, availability and maintainability properties using probabilistic model
checking. RAM analysis of systems has been indispensable in the design phase of
space segment in order to achieve minimum failures or to increase mean time between
failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintenance strategies, optimise reliability and max-
imise availability. For example, a typical reliability property that can be checked is
what is the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a new one in a certain
years, while a typical maintainability property could be what is the number (reward) of
times that satellites need to be repaired on orbit in 15 years. Finally, a classical avail-
ability property that can be checked is what is the availability (reward) of the satellite
in a certain of years.
Our chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the underlying
space segment. In Section 4.3 we present our formal specifications of a single satellite
and constellation systems and their associated continuous-time Markov chain models
respectively. Then, we analyse reliability, availability, and maintainability using the
probabilistic model checker PRISM for a single satellite and a satellite constellation
in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5 we conclude and outline directions for future
research.
4.2 The Space Segment
As an important application of satellite constellation, navigation satellite systems con-
sist of three major segments: a space segment, a control segment, and a user segment
(see Chapter 2). The space segment is made up of a number of satellites, and is re-
sponsible for sending the navigation signal on the specific frequency. It is constantly
orbiting the surface at an altitude of approximate three earth radii, and emitting signals
that travel at approximately the speed of light. The control segment monitors the health
and status of the space segment and controls the state of satellites, and updates the data
of those satellites. The user segment consists antennas and receiver processors, which
receive the signals broadcasted by the satellites and decode them to provide precise
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information about the receiver’s position and velocity.
In a satellite constellation, fault or failure of more than one satellite will have a
direct impact on the stable state of the space geometry and temporal relationship, and
the performance of the constellation. So the performance of the constellation is a direct
consequence of the state of the constellation. Therefore, the state of the constellation
has a close relationship with the state of every satellite in the constellation. So each
satellite is critical to the constellation.
In this chapter, our task is to help the end users of satellite systems to evaluate the
probability and consequences of faults or failures. The terms of fault and failure in our
context can be defined according to [32] as follows:
• Fault: the condition of a satellite that occurs when one of its components or
assemblies degrades or exhibits abnormal behaviour;
• Failure: the termination of the ability of a satellite to perform a required function.
Failure is an event as distinguished from fault, which is a state. According to [32],
the failure mode is the result by which a failure is observed. After a failure, a satellite
in the constellation will be systematically examined in order to identify the failure
mode, and to determine the nature of the failure and its basic cause. There are three
kinds of failure mode of the satellite: long-term failure (unrecoverable failure), short-
term failure, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) failure. These failure modes are
described as follows:
• Long-term failure: this failure is vital to the satellite. If a long-time failure has
happened, it usually needs to launch another satellite to replace the failed one.
Practically, it indicates that the failed satellite is at the end of its life. It has also
been called wear out failure;
• Short-term failure: this refers to a failure that can be repaired in several hours or
days. This kind of failure mode means that there is usually no need to launch a
new satellite to replace the failed satellite;
• O&M failure: is due to planned maintenance operations, such as navigation
satellite orbit manoeuvre and atomic clock switching. We usually do not con-
sider the outage time that is induced by these operations as a failure. It is not
expected to impact the continuity of the constellation, but the performance of the
constellation.
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Whenever a satellite has a fault or fails, there is a chance to repair the satellite on
orbit by, for example, rebooting the satellite system, updating the satellite software, or
switching the orbit of the satellite. There are three satellite backup modes available
for maintenance strategies: on orbit backup, parking orbit backup, and Launch on
Need (LON). The on orbit backup mode and parking orbit backup mode are further
referred to as space backup. In this chapter, we consider both space backup and LON
backup. The main navigation satellite system to be modelled and analysed is depicted
in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: An overview of navigation satellite systems.
Satellites deployed at the parking orbit backup mode can also be used to work with
on orbit satellites. For LON backup mode, it usually takes several months to replace
failed satellite, while for space backup mode it only takes one or two days. Because of
the lower mean time to repair (MTTR) for the space backup mode, it has been widely
applied in most constellation projects. In the GPS project, the redundant satellites are
working with on orbit satellites, so failed satellites can be replaced in a short time.
4.3. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF SPACE SEGMENT 62
4.3 Formal Specification of Space Segment
In this section, we give an description of the basic formal models of both a single
satellite and a constellation of navigation satellites.
4.3.1 A Formal Model of a Single Satellite
The abstract model of a single satellite is illustrated in Figure 4.2, parameters are omit-
ted. We take a CTMC as our underlying PRISM model for our abstract model.
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Figure 4.2: A reference model of a single satellite.
We specify our CTMC model with states, a transition rate matrix, and a labelling
function. Initially, the satellite runs in the normal state. After a period of execution it
could be interrupted by an planned or unplanned interruption. Planned interruptions
are normally caused by certain types of Operations and Maintenance (O&M), which
could include manoeuvring the station, atomic clock maintenance, software updates,
and hardware maintenance. Unplanned interruptions can be caused by solar radiation,
the earth’s magnetic field cosmic rays, which result in a satellite Single Event Up-
set (SEU). However, both planned and unplanned interruptions are usually temporary,
lasting just several hours. An unplanned interruption usually disappears automatically.
The satellite can fail at any time during its lifetime due to End-of-Life (EOL) outage
or other vital failures.
When the satellite fails, staff on the ground must decide upon the best approach
to repair it. It may be possible that failures can be resolved on orbit by giving spe-
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cific software commands to the satellite. Otherwise it might be necessary to move a
redundant satellite into position to replace the failed satellite. If no redundant satellite
is available then a new satellite must be manufactured and launched. In the worst case
the new satellite does not launch successfully due to a known probability of satellite
launch failure.
Most of our parameter values correspond to those of the latest United States’ GPS
system, GPS Block III satellites. The GPS III series is the newest block of GPS satel-
lites. GPS III provides more powerful signals than previous versions in addition to
enhanced signal reliability, accuracy, and integrity. The key improvement is the 15
years’ design lifespan [108]. Due to privacy and secrecy reasons, NASA does not re-
lease all actual data of GPS III that we need in our analysis. Thus, in order to perform
the analysis convincingly, we use some generic data of some very similar satellites
instead. We believe this this will not result in a loss of generality since all data come
from real satellites.
Table 4.1: Parameters used in the model for the single satellite system.
r MTBF MTTR tu tp pb tr td te py tk
years hours hours hours hours hours hours hours
0.80 15 24 4320 4320 0.80 24 1440 4320 0.90 24
All parameters used in our CTMC model and properties are specified in Table 4.1,
and are described as follows. We use p to express probability and t for time, and the
reliability of the satellite is r. If the satellite fails, we say that it moves from a “normal”
state to a “failure” state. The mean time to unplanned interruption is tu, while the mean
time to planned interruption is tp. When the satellite fails, the probability of the failure
being resolved on orbit by moving a redundant satellite to replace the failed one is pb.
If on orbit repair is not possible, a new satellite is needed. The time taken to decide
to build a new satellite and for one to be manufactured are tr and td respectively. If a
new satellite is to be manufactured, the probability of successful launch is py. After
successful launch, the time taken for the satellite to move to the right position and a
normal signal sent from it to be received on the ground is tk. Our PRISM specification
is given as the following:
ctmc
const double r; //reliability of satellite
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const double MTBF; //life time of the satellite
const double life = MTBF*12*30*24; //mean time between
the unplanned interruption
const double tu = 180*24; //mean time between the
unplaned interruption
const double tp = 180*24; //failure rate of the satellite
const double lan = -life/log(r,2.71828183);
const double d = 1;
const double e = 1; //meant time to repair
const double MTTR = 24; //time to decide to build a new satellite
const double tr = 24; //time to launch if it is available
const double td = 2*30*24; //time to launch if it is unavailable
const double te = 6*30*24;
const double tj = 24;
const double ts = 24;
const double tk = 24;
const double tm = 24;
const double tn = 2; //time of the unplanned interruption
const double to = 2; //time of the planned interruption
const double a2 = 1; //probability of the failure can be
eliminated on orbit
const double pb = a2*4;
const double a3 = 1; //probability of the satellite can be
successfully carried to the orbit
const double py = a3*9;
module satellite
s : [0..15];
[a] s = 0 -> 1/tu : (s’ = 1); //Normal -> Unplaned
[b] s = 0 -> 1/tp : (s’ = 2); //Normal -> Planned
[c] s = 0 -> 1/lan : (s’ = 3); //Normal -> Failure
[d1] s = 3 -> 1/a2 : (s’ = 8); //Failure -> Software
[d2] s = 3 -> 1/pb : (s’ = 9);
[d] s = 8 -> 1/d : (s’ = 4); //Software -> On orbit
[e] s = 9 -> 1/e : (s’ = 5);
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[f1] s = 4 -> 1/a2 : (s’ = 10); //On orbit -> Move
[g1] s = 4 -> 1/pb : (s’ = 11); //On orbit -> On ground
[f] s = 10 -> 1/MTTR : (s’ = 0); //Move-> Normal
[g] s = 11 -> 1/tr : (s’ = 5); //On orbit -> On ground
[h] s = 5 -> 1/td : (s’ = 6); //On ground -> Launch
[i] s = 5 -> 1/te : (s’ = 7); //On ground -> Build
[j1] s = 6 -> 1/a3 : (s’ = 12); //Launch -> successful
[k1] s = 6 -> 1/py : (s’ =13); //Launch -> unsuccessful
[j] s = 12 -> 1/tj : (s’ = 0); //Launch -> Normal
[k] s = 13 -> 1/ts : (s’ = 5); //Launch-> On ground
[l1] s = 7 -> 1/a3 : (s’ = 14); //Build -> successful
[m1] s = 7 -> 1/py : (s’ = 15); //Build -> unsuccessful
[l] s = 14 -> 1/tk : (s’ = 0); //Build -> Normal
[m] s = 15 -> 1/tm : (s’ = 5); // -> On ground
[n] s = 1 -> 1/tn : (s’ = 0); //Unplaned->Normal
[o] s = 2 -> 1/to : (s’ = 0); //Planned->Normal
endmodule
Note that there are 15 states in our PRISM code, while only 10 states are specified in
Figure 4.2. This is due to that for the simplicity of the diagram we omit some activities
that can contribute to one state. For instance, the state of “Build a new one” actually
includes activities such as: making decision to build a new satellite, actually building
a new one.
Specifically, t j is the time from launching the satellite to moving it to the right
orbit when the satellite has been successfully carried to the orbit if there are no spare
satellites on the ground, and ts is the time from launching the satellite to moving it to
the right orbit when the satellite has not been carried to the right orbit if there are no
spare satellites on the ground, and tk the time from launching the satellite to moving
it to the right orbit when the satellite has been successfully carried to the orbit if any
spare satellite is available on the ground, and tm is the time from launching the satellite
to moving it to the right orbit when the satellite has not been carried to the right orbit
if any spare satellite is available on the ground.
4.3. FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF SPACE SEGMENT 66
4.3.2 A Formal Model of Satellite Constellations
We have modelled a single satellite as a CTMC, by specifying it in PRISM. However,
the RAM analysis of a single satellite appears insufficient for larger navigation satellite
systems. For a large global navigation system, at least 24 satellites are required. Even
for a regional navigation system, at least 4 satellites are required. Our PRISM model for
a satellite constellation is thus constructed using our specification for a single satellite,
with a number of modifications as follows:
• the number of satellites is declared as a global variable, and multiple satellite
modules are instantiated;
• the configuration of the satellite constellation is defined;
• redundant satellites that are usually called spare satellites are included.
Note that the last modification above is due to the fact that, in a real system, if an
on orbit satellite fails, redundant on orbit satellites are used to move and replace them,
to ensure the availability of the constellation.
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Figure 4.3: A reference model of a constellation of navigation satellites.
The reference model of the satellite constellation is depicted in Figure 4.3. The
constellation has n satellites on orbit, and m spare satellites. If the on orbit satellites
do not fail, the state of the constellation keeps n satellites available. Once an on orbit
satellite fails, one of the spare satellites will replace it immediately to keep n in working
condition. If any on orbit satellite fails and there is no spare satellite available to replace
it, the number of satellites in the constellation will be reduced to a number smaller
than n. Thus, spare satellites play a crucial effect on the availability of the satellite
constellation.
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In the reference model, if the number of satellites in the constellation is n and the
number of spare satellites is m, where m  0 and n  1, the launch on schedule (LOS)
strategy is to not launch a new satellite. At any time at most one satellite can be re-
paired. If any on orbit satellite fails, it is immediately replaced by a spare satellite, and
repair of the failed satellite commences. If there are no spare satellites, the constella-
tion must operate with fewer than n satellites.
Since the focus of our research is to apply the probabilistic model checking ap-
proach and to study its applicability to a satellite constellation, the object of our chap-
ter is not limited to any specific navigation satellite system. The system we study here
follows a standard configuration for global navigation system. Due to the fact that
the current United States’ GPS is the most widely used navigation system, parame-
ter values of the constellation also refer to the latest basic parameter settings of such
constellation. The parameter values are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Parameters for the navigation satellite systems.
r MTBF(T ) MTTR n m
0.80 15 years 5 months 24 3
Our PRISM specification is given as follows. Assume that the failure and repair
rates of a satellite are l and µ respectively. When the constellation is operating with
n usable satellites, the state transfer rate of the constellation is nl. When there are no
spare satellites and satellites begin to fail, the transfer rate reduces accordingly to nl,
where n is the number of functioning satellites.
ctmc
const double r; //reliability of satellite system
const double MTBF;
const double life = MTBF*12*30*24; //life time of the satellite
const double lan = -life/log(r,2.71828183); //failure rate of
the satellite
const double m = 3; //the number of the spare satellites
const double n = 24; //the number of the on orbit satellites
const double a = lan/n;
const double ai = lan/(n-(i-3)); //where 4<=i<=27
const double MTTR; //the mean time to repair
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module constellation
s:[0..27];
[ai1] s = i -> 1/a : (s’ = i+1); //where 0<=i<=3
[ai2] s = i -> 1/ai : (s’ = i+1); //where 4<=i<=26
[bi] s = i -> 1/MTTR : (s’ = i-1); //where 1<=i<=27
endmodule
4.4 Quantitative Properties and Automated Analysis
4.4.1 Desired Properties
We have identified the need to analyse reliability, availability, and maintainability prop-
erties of navigation satellite systems. In the GPS standard proposed in [34], there are
two definitions of availability. The first one is the probability that the slots in the
constellation will be occupied by a satellite transmitting a trackable and healthy Stan-
dard Positioning Service (SPS) Signal in Space (SIS). The second definition is the
percentage of time that the SPS SIS is available to a SPS receiver. According to the
same standard, there are two kinds of availability of satellites. The first is the per-slot
availability, and the second is the constellation availability, which can be described as
follows,
• Per-slot availability: The time that a slot in the constellation will be occupied by
a satellite that is transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS SIS;
• Constellation availability: the time that a specified number of slots in the con-
stellation are occupied by satellites that are transmitting a trackable and healthy
SPS SIS.
In our research, we do not consider the environmental effect of the signal for the
availability analysis. We only consider fault or failure of satellites. In our context,
availability means the ratio of running time for normal satellites to total running time
for both normal and failed satellites. The availabilities that we have analysed are:
single satellite availability and satellite constellation availability.
The reliability of a satellite depends on planned interruptions, unplanned interrup-
tions, and failure states in the system. The probability of successful launch is the
reliability of the satellite, and the maintainability of the satellite is the probability that
a satellite can be repaired on orbit. Generally, both reliability and maintainability can
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be considered as availability properties of the satellite. Reliability must be sufficient to
support the mission capability needed in its expected operating environment.
If reliability and maintainability are not adequately designed into satellite systems,
there is risk that the design will breach desired availability requirements. Therefore,
such system availability baseline is determined by the threshold of design or develop-
ment costs, which is significantly higher due to resulting corrective action costs. This
will cost more than anticipated to use and operate, or will fail to provide the expected
availability.
Satellites will deteriorate with time due to failure mechanisms. We assume that
time delay is a random variable selected from an exponential distribution, which is an
assumption used in PRISM. According to system reliability theory [124], the reliability
of a satellite R(t) can be defined as:
R(t) = Pr{T > t}= e lt , (4.1)
from which we obtain:
l=  lnR(t)
E(si)
. (4.2)
As defined in Section 3.3.1.2, E(si) =Âs j2S R(si,s j) denotes the total rate at which
any transition outgoing from state si is taken. More precisely, E(si) specifies that
the probability of taking a transition outgoing from the state si within t time units is
1  e E(Si)·t
Satellite failures typically occur at some constant failure rate l, and failure prob-
ability depends on the rate l and the exposure time t. According to [32], typically
failure rates are carefully derived from substantiated historical data such as mean time
between failure (MTBF). We have:
l=  lnR
T
=) l=  lnR
MTBF
, (4.3)
where t = T =MTBF , and MTBF is the design parameter or the statistics parameter.
Referring to the latest characteristics of satellites used for Global Positioning Systems
(GPSs), we assume theMTBF of the satellite to be 15 years. As a result, R= 0.80 and
MTBF is 15 years. Further, the mean time to repair (MTTR) is 24 hours.
µ=
1
MTTR
. (4.4)
For the evaluation of the availability of the constellation, we focus on long-term
failure effects to the constellation. The long term reflect the lifetime of the satellite,
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and can be described by the MTBF and MTTR. The MTBF is used to get the param-
eter failure rate l according to the Equation 4.3. The MTTR is used to calculate the
parameter repair rate µ according to the Equation 4.4.
4.4.2 Formal Analysis of a Single Satellite
In this section we describe the parameters used in our model and their values. We
then use the PRISM probabilistic model checker to analyse some important properties
of the single satellite system. The properties include reliability, maintainability, and
availability. The temporal logic CSL is used to analyse the navigation systems because
PRISM supports the use of CSL to verify properties of a CTMC. We then present and
analyse our model checking results.
4.4.2.1 Reliability Properties
Reliability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. when r = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a new
one in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T s= 5]; T = 129600
2. when r = 0.80, the probability that a satellite will need to be replaced by a new
one due to complete failure in 15 years over time T:
P=?[F <= T s= 5]; r = 0.80; T = 0 : 129600 : 8640
3. when r= 0.80, how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by a new one
in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in the PRISM model is the following:
rewards 00num replace00
[g] true : 1;
[e] true : 1;
endrewards
4. how many times a satellite will need to be replaced by a new one over different
reliabilities, in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05
The reward expression is the same as that for reliability property 3.
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In the properties above (and in all other contexts henceforth), 129600 is the lifetime
of a satellite in hours (evaluating to approximately 15 years). Parameter r denotes
reliability and proposition s = 5 asserts that there is a spare satellite on the ground.
The expression r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05 indicates that the reliability ranges from 0.01 to
0.99 with interval size 0.05.
(a) Reliability property 2 (b) Reliability property 4
Figure 4.4: Results of reliability properties of a single satellite.
The analysis results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM are as
follows. The result of the property 1 is 0.0771; the result of property 2 is shown in
Figure 4.4(a); the result of property 3 is 0.08; the result of property 4 is shown in Fig-
ure 4.4(b). From Figure 4.4(b), we can see that the number of times the satellite will
have a failure and be unable to be repaired in 15 years is 0.08, under the precondition
that the reliability is 0.80. If the reliability is set to 0.5, the number of vital failures
will be smaller than 0.25 during 15 years. The number of times of unplanned interrup-
tions can be also obtained from the PRISM by checking the rewards of the unplanned
interruption, which is 29.95 times unplanned interruption for the satellite in 15 years.
4.4.2.2 Maintainability Properties
Maintainability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM include:
1. when r= 0.80, the number of times that satellites need to be repaired on orbit in
15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in PRISM model is the following:
rewards 00num repair00
[d] true : 1;
endrewards
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2. the number of times that the satellite needs maintenance when the reliability is
from 0.01 to 0.99 in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01
3. the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired when theMTBF is from
1st year to 15th years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01;MTBF = 1 : 129600 : 8640
The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property 1.
4. when r = 0.80, the number of cases that a satellite needs to be repaired on orbit,
but not eventually succeed in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression is the same as that for maintainability property 1.
The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from PRISM are
as follows. The result of the property 1 is 0.18; the result of property 2 is shown
in Figure 4.5(a); the result of the property 3 is shown in Figure 4.5(b); the result of
property 4 is 0.036. The number of times the satellite needs to be repaired on orbit
over time is shown in Figure 4.5(a). When the reliability of the satellite is increased
to 0.5, the number of times the satellite needs to be repaired will decrease to 0.5.
Figure 4.5(b) illustrates that the number of times that the satellite needs to be repaired
is below 1 when theMTBF is 2 years.
(a) Maintainability property 2 (b) Maintainability property 3
Figure 4.5: Results of maintainability properties of a single satellite.
4.4.2.3 Availability Properties
Availability properties of a single satellite that we can analyse using PRISM includes:
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1. when r = 0.80, the availability of the satellite in 15 years:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; r = 0.80
The reward expression in PRISM model is as the following:
rewards 00availability00
s= 0 : 1;
endrewards
2. the availability of a satellite over the satellite reliability in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; T = 129600; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.01
The reward expression is the same as that for availability property 1.
3. the relationship between satellite availability and its maintenance time taken for
planned interruption:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; T = 129600; r = 0.80, o= 1 : 48 : 3
The reward expression is the same as that for availability property 1.
The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM are as
follows. The result of property 1 is 129378 hours; the result of property 2 is shown in
Figure 4.6(a); the result of property 3 is shown in Figure 4.6(b). From Figure 4.6(a) we
see that if the reliability increases to 0.4, the availability of the satellite reaches 0.995.
So if the required probability of the available satellite is 0.995, the reliability must have
minimum value 0.4. Figure 4.6(b) indicates that if the required availability is 0.995,
the time taken for planned interruption for the satellite will be smaller than 16 hours.
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Figure 4.6: Results of availability properties of a single satellite.
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4.4.3 Formal Analysis of a Constellation of Satellites
In this section, we analyse the properties of the satellite system that is made up of
a constellation of navigation satellites. Similar to the case of the single satellite, we
use PRISM to check the reliability, maintainability, and availability of the navigation
system. We first present properties and their corresponding CSL, and then present and
analyse the results of verifying these properties.
4.4.3.1 Reliability Properties
Reliability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can analyse using
PRISM include:
1. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability that the number of the useable satel-
lites in the constellation is smaller than 24 in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T (s= 4)]; T = 129600
2. when the reliability is 0.80, the probability that the number of the useable satel-
lites in the constellation is smaller than 22 in 15 years:
P=?[F <= T (s= 6)]; T = 129600
3. the number of times that all redundant satellites fail in 15 years over the reliabil-
ity and time:
R=?[C <= T ]
The reward expression in PRISM model is the following:
rewards 00num f ail00
[a2] true : 1;
endrewards
The proposition s = n states that n satellites in the constellation fail. The analysis
results of reliability properties which we obtain from PRISM are as follows. The result
of property 1 is 0.01171; the result of property 2 is 0.0796; the result of property 3 is
shown in Figure 4.7.
From Figure 4.7(a), when the reliability is between 0 and 0.25, the number of times
that all redundant satellites need to be repaired is proportional to the reliability. As the
reliability increases so does the number of required repairs, until the number of repairs
reaches 4.76. However when the reliability is between 0.25 and 1, the number of times
that all redundant satellite need to be repaired is inversely proportional to reliability.
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This is due to the fact that when the reliability decreases to below a specific value,
redundant satellites can no longer be repaired. According to Figure 4.7(b), the number
of times that all redundant satellites need to be repaired is between 0 and 0.095 in 15
years.
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Figure 4.7: Results of reliability properties of satellite constellations.
4.4.3.2 Maintainability Properties
Maintainability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can analyse using
PRISM include:
1. the average number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation in 15
years:
R=?[C <= T ]
The reward expression in PRISM model is shown as the following:
rewards 00num repair00
[bi] true : 1;
f or all i,1<= i<= 27
endrewards
2. The number of times to repair all satellites in the constellation over the reliability
in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ]; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05
The reward expression in PRISM model is the same as that for maintainability
property 1.
3. The probability of the case that the number of useable satellites in the constella-
tion is smaller than 22 in 15 years over the number of times for repairing satel-
lites:
P=?[F <= T (s= 6)]; T = 129600; MTTR= 0.1 : 3600 : 72
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The analysis results of maintainability properties which we obtain from PRISM
are as follows. The result of property 1 is 5.18; the result of property 2 is shown in
Figure 4.8(a) and the result of the property 3 is shown in Figure 4.8(b).
From Figure 4.8(a) we see that as reliability increases, the number of times that all
satellites in the constellation need to be repaired over 15 years decreases from 35 to 2.5
when the reliability reaches 0.90. As depicted in Figure 4.8(b), the probability that the
constellation consisting of n satellites with n is smaller than 22 in 15 years is 0.0225.
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Figure 4.8: Results of maintainability properties of satellite constellation.
4.4.3.3 Availability Properties
Availability properties of the navigation satellite system that we can analyse using
PRISM include:
1. the period of time that the constellation consisting of 24 satellites in 15 years:
R=?[C <= T ];,
and reward expression in the PRISM model is shown as below:
rewards 00reward00
s= i : 1; where 0<= i<= 3
endrewards
2. the availability of the constellation consisting of 24 satellites in 15 years:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ;,
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1;
3. the availability of the constellation consisting of 24 satellites in 15 years over the
reliability:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; r = 0.01 : 0.99 : 0.05,
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1;
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4. the availability of the constellation consisting of 24 satellites in 15 years over the
repair time:
(R=?[C <= T ])/T ; MTTR= 0.1 : 3600 : 72
and reward expression is the same as the availability property 1.
The analysis results of availability properties which we obtain from PRISM are as
follows. The result of property 1 is 129545 hours; the result of property 2 is 0.99958;
the results of properties 3 and 4 are shown in Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) respectively.
The availability of the satellite constellation as the reliability and time taken to
repair satellites increases is shown in Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) respectively. According
to Figure 4.9(a), if the availability of the constellation is 0.9999 and the time taken to
repair a satellite is 5 months, the reliability is at least 0.86. When the reliability is 0.80 ,
for the same availability requirement of the constellation, when the satellite has a fault
or fails, the time taken to repair a satellite is at most 2520 hours (3.5 months).
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Figure 4.9: Results of availability properties of satellite constellations.
4.4.4 Discussion of results
Since parameter settings of our formal models are based on GPS Block III which is
the newest generation of GPS systems, our analysis results can be compared to exist-
ing GPS statistical analysis. According to a report of Lockheed Martin [65], a leading
global security and aerospace company, the availability of the GPS Block III is given
as 99.9%. The availability we evaluate in this chapter is close to the actual data. Ac-
cording to a further Lockheed Martin report [129], the constellation availability of the
GPS Block III is given as 99.88%.
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In this chapter, the availability we evaluate for two scenarios is in each case close
to the actual data. This has proved to be both useful and efficient to use probabilistic
model checking approach for the modelling and analysis of a singe satellite and a
constellation of navigation satellites. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to use the formal technique of probabilistic model checking to perform RAM analysis
of satellite systems. These results indicates that our approach can also be applied to a
wider range of quantitative properties of formal models taken from many application
domains for satellite systems.
4.4.5 Benefits of the approach
To address the performance of satellite systems, it is essential to accurately quantify as-
pects such as reliability, availability and maintainability. There are two common tech-
niques can be used for evaluating these features. One is the reliability block diagrams
(RBDs) [37], and the other is the fault trees (FTs) [92, 116]. RBDs and FTs are both
symbolic analytical logical techniques that can be applied to analyse complex system
reliability and availability, and related properties. However, neither technique is suit-
able to evaluate probabilistic properties, due to the fact that they are static techniques.
In a fault tree or reliability block formalism, it is necessary to assume the probabilities
of each fault or failure are independent, while this is not the case in reality.
Other benefits of applying probabilistic model checking with PRISM for the spec-
ification and analysis of satellite systems is that the results can be plotted as graphs
that can be inspected for trends and anomalies. Furthermore, we are able to compute
exact quantities, rather than approximations based on a large number of simulations,
thus enabling us to obtain complete and exhaustive conclusions for all possible pa-
rameter values. In addition, PRISM enables automated analysis. This helps manual
analysis with automatic analysis support, thus making development more efficient and
minimising human errors during the design phase.
There are also some disadvantages to using Markov models, not least that their
specification, and the specification of useful properties, requires a high degree of math-
ematical skill. Markov models may be large and cumbersome in some cases, and the
specification can be error-prone. In addition, as a system increases in complexity, so
does the size of the state-space associated with a corresponding model. This results in
a longer (possibly intractable) search.
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4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM) analysis of systems has been indis-
pensable in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum failures or to
increase mean time between failures (MTBF) and thus to plan maintainability strate-
gies, optimise reliability and maximise availability. Traditional approaches are not
suitable for performing RAM analysis of navigation satellite systems. We present for-
mal models of both a single satellite system and a constellation of navigation satellites
and logical specification of reliability, availability and maintainability properties. We
have analysed a set of properties using PRISM.
There are many technical and theoretical challenges that remain to be addressed.
In particular, satellite failure often forms part of more complex problems that show
through different aspects of the engineering of space based systems. The technical
challenges also include basic issues with the representation of safety and space mis-
sion critical characteristics of satellite telecommunications due to a group of satellites
working together given the limitations of classical modelling approach.
In order to fully explore satellite behaviour, it will be necessary to exploit fur-
ther formal techniques. For instance, if we want to model the mobility of connection
between satellites it may be necessary to express behaviour via an extension to the p-
calculus, and model check using PRISM (a technique identified in [110]). This kind of
issue must be addressed in order to identify the causes of satellite system failure and
to support the development of satellite systems.
As PRISM assumes events to occur according to an exponential distribution, we
are limited to making the same assumption about the events in our systems. In fact,
many types of satellite failure follow a different distribution. In particular, a number of
failures of satellites have a Weibull distribution [17], which follows the conventional
three-component bathtub curve which models a burn-in and wear-out phase for failure
prediction. For future work, we will look at how to represent arbitrary distributions
in probabilistic models, and to what extent such kind of distributions are able to be
supported by the probabilistic model checking approach.
Chapter 5
Reliability Approximations of Satellite
Subsystems with Weibull Failures
This chapter is based on previously published work [89, 90]. Satellite systems are
complex due to the fact that they consist of a large number of subsystems. Each sub-
system may itself have complex and different failure modes. For example, A satel-
lite subsystem can suffer whole or partial failures, which may belong to a variety of
failure classes. It has been shown that Weibull distributions can be used to properly
model on-orbit failure behaviours of satellite subsystems. Markov chains have been
used extensively to model reliability and performance of engineering systems or ap-
plications. However, the exponentially distributed sojourn time of CTMCs can some-
times be unrealistic for satellite systems that exhibit Weibull failures. In this chapter,
we develop novel semi-Markov models that characterise failure behaviours, based on
Weibull failure modes inferred from realistic data sources. A semi-Markov chain is
a model in which state holding times are governed by general distributions, which is
a natural extension of CTMCs. We approximate and encode these new models with
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) and use the PRISM probabilistic model
checker to answer meaningful questions concerning the reliability and performance of
satellite subsystems. The key benefit of this integration is that CTMC-based model
checking tools allow us to automatically and efficiently verify reliability properties
relevant to industrial critical systems.
80
5.1. INTRODUCTION 81
5.1 Introduction
Satellite systems are complex due to the fact that they consist of a large number of
interacting subsystems (e.g., gyro / sensor / reaction wheels; control processors (CPs);
and telemetry, tracking, and command (TTC)), which ensure redundancy without an
unnecessary increase in power or mass requirements. Each subsystem may itself have
complex and different failure modes. The failure modes are more complex than for
conventional systems because of the limited opportunities for repair except through
reconfiguration. A satellite subsystem can suffer whole or partial failures, which may
belong to a variety of failure classes.
Simulation is a widely used and powerful technique for analysing satellite systems.
Simulation is flexible since it allows us to use arbitrary normal distributions (such as
Pareto, Weibull, or Lognormal distributions) in reliability studies. However, simula-
tions may take a long time to run as the events (e.g., failure) that we are trying to model
may be very rare. In addition, it involves complex design of valid simulation models
and interpretations of simulation results.
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique for the modelling
and analysis of complex systems that exhibit stochastic behaviours. The automation in
the probabilistic model checker PRISM is essential for analysing reasonably large and
non-trivial Markov models with exponential distributions. Continuous-time Markov
chain (CTMC) models have been used extensively to model reliability and perfor-
mance of engineering systems or applications. However, the exponentially distributed
sojourn time of CTMCs sometimes can be unrealistic to model satellite systems that
exhibit Weibull failures. PRISM is useful for analysing realistic satellite subsystems,
and we can obtain results with high accuracy if good approximations of Weibull distri-
butions are possible without resulting in a state space that is too large to yield to model
checking.
Model checking of semi-Markov chains is more complicated than that of Markov
chains. Techniques for model checking semi-Markov chains have been developed
[86, 80], whereas the methods are practically negative or infeasible. In recent years,
applying practical probabilistic model checking tools to analyse non-Markov models
has attracted a lot of attention. In [51], the authors analyse disk reliability of rea-
sonable sized systems (such as RAID4/5/6) based on non-exponential distributions in
PRISM [73]. Approximations of Weibull models are considered in [94], using an M-
stage Erlang model, and in [141] where 3-state Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are
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used. In both cases, results are validated via simulation. In [125], a stochastic per-
formance model is constructed and the hyper Erlang distribution of real-world data is
used in PRISM to analyse a public bus transportation network in Edinburgh. In [27],
phase-type distributions are used to analyse a collaborative editing system in PRISM.
It has been shown that Weibull distributions are able to properly model on-orbit
failure behaviours of satellite subsystems [22, 21, 23]. It has also been shown that it is
possible to approximate many common distributions using a sum of many exponential
distributions, although this has proved computationally difficult. Given the maturity of
a CTMC solver such as PRISM, and its focus on minimising state spaces, this difficulty
is less of an issue as we show below. To show the effectiveness of this approach, we
first show how the reliability of satellite systems can be computed more efficiently
than by using simulation where satellite subsystems failure is modelled by Weibull
distributions.
This chapter describes novel phase-type approximations to Weibull distributions,
specifically approximating them by either Erlang or hyper-exponential distributions.
This technique allows models containing Weibull distributions, which commonly oc-
cur in reliability modelling, to be approximately analysed using traditional CTMC
model checkers such as PRISM. We also demonstrate our approximations on several
Weibull-distributed failure times of satellite components inferred from realistic data
sources, and investigate the goodness of such approximation and implementation.
5.2 Satellite Subsystems and Multi-state Failure
We propose an approach to building semi-Markov models for reliability analysis of
satellite subsystems using a real-world database. The main data source consists of 1584
Earth-orbiting satellites launched between January 1990 and October 2008, which are
provided by the SpaceTrak database1. The SpaceTrak launch and satellite analytical
system and its database are used by most global key launch providers, satellite man-
ufacturers, insurance companies, and satellite operators. It provides a variety of data
and important information about satellite on-orbit failures and anomalies, as well as
launch attempts since 1957. This has enabled us to predict and analyse failure rates.
One of the problems with stochastic approaches on-orbit is the prior validation
given the specialised nature of many designs. Common core components e.g. NOAH
and the DoD have a core platform that is then configured but many components and
1http://www.seradata.com/
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Figure 5.1: Satellite subsystems.
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Figure 5.2: Multi-state and transition for satellite subsystems failure behaviour.
architectures are unique. The database used here is likely to provide a conservative
base case but is not tailored to specific missions.
Several satellite subsystems are contained in the database. In this chapter, we
use the following 11 subsystems (as shown in Figure 5.1): (1) Gyro/sensor / reaction
wheel; (2) thruster / fuel; (3) beam / antenna operation / deployment; (4) control pro-
cessor (CP); (5) mechanisms / structures / thermal; (6) payload instrument / amplifier
/ on-board data / computer / transponder; (7) battery / cell; (8) electrical distribution;
(9) solar array deployment (SAD); (10) solar array operating (SAO); and (11) teleme-
try, tracking and command (TTC). In addition, we use the category of “unknown”to
classify a satellite failure due to an unidentifiable accountable subsystem.
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Instead of traditional binary models of reliability analysis for which satellite sub-
systems are considered to be either fully operational or suffering a complete failure, ad-
ditional intermediate states which characterise partial failures are introduced (as shown
in Figure 5.2). This multi-state modelling approach provides more insights into the
failure behaviours of a satellite system and their relationship to the total failure through
a finer level abstraction. These states are also defined in the SpaceTrak database, and
are shown as follows:
• State 1: a satellite subsystem is fully operational;
• State 2: minor, temporary, or repairable failure that does not have a significant
permanent impact on the operation of the satellite subsystem;
• State 3: major non-repairable failure that causes loss of redundancy to the oper-
ation of the satellite subsystem on a permanent basis;
• State 4: major non-repairable failure that affects operation of the satellite sub-
systems on a permanent basis;
• State 5: subsystem failure causing satellite retirement, which implies total failure
of the satellite.
We approximate the semi-Markov chains in Figure 5.3 using the underlying se-
mantics of continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs). In CTMCs, the state space is
discrete but time is continuous.
5.3 Approximation of Weibull Models
5.3.1 Weibull Distributions
In systems engineering, the Weibull distribution [140] is one of the most extensively
used lifetime distributions for reliability analysis. It includes two parameters: (1) the
shape parameter g and (2) the scale parameter a, together with key formulas such as
cumulative density function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF). A Weibull
PDF is expressed as:
f (g,a, t) = g
a
(
t
a
)g 1e (
t
a )
g
, t   0,g,a> 0 (5.1)
and a Weibull CDF as:
F(g,a, t) = 1  e ( ta )g (5.2)
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Figure 5.3: Multi-state and transitions for satellite subsystems failure behaviour.
We abbreviate f(t) and F(t) as the PDF and CDF of the Weibull distribution respec-
tively, then the instantaneous failure rate is f (t)1 F(t) . The failure rate is proportional to a
power of time t. The shape parameter, g, is equal to this power plus one.
The semantics of the Weibull distributions (also known as the bathtub curve) with
different g can be shown in Fig. 5.4 and explained as follows: (1) g < 1 means that
the failure rate decreases over time (decreasing failure rates). This occurs whenever a
clear infant mortality 2 exists, and the failure rate decreases over time as the failure is
discovered and the subsystem removed; (2) g= 1 means that the failure rate is constant
at any time. This is the useful life of the satellite ; (3) g> 1 means that the failure rate
2infant mortality: a subsystem fails early due to defects designed into or built into it.
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Figure 5.4: Semantics of the Weibull distribution (the bathtub curve).
increases with time (increasing failure rates). It occurs whenever a wear out exists, or
a subsystem failure becomes more likely over time.
Generally, the ways to approximate the Weibull distributions is non-trivial. The
simple technique of phase-type distributions is useful in some cases. Thus, we follow
this line of work that Weibull IFR approximated by a M-stage Erlang distribution and
Weibull DFR by a hyper-exponential distribution since there are intuitive and strong
justifications for the model [94, 47]. Further, these general distributions provide sim-
ple mathematical structures such that the their underlying semi-Markov chains can be
included in the Markov model framework.
5.3.2 Increasing Failure Rates (IFR)
A simple technique for the realisation of approximations to the Weibull distribution
models is matching moments, where the mean is the first moment and the variance
the second moment. We first consider the approximation of a Weibull distribution
modelling increasing failure rates (IFR) using an M-stage Erlang distribution. The
M-stage Erlang probability density function (PDF) can be expressed as:
f (M,l, t) = l
M
G(M)
xM 1e lx, t   0,l> 0 (5.3)
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Table 5.1: Approximations of Weibull Distributions (IFR) using Erlang Distributions.
Pix,y
Weibull Distributions IFR Erlang Distributions
g a k l
P134 1.1593 17 2 0.1239
P413 1.1229 664 2 0.0031
P435 1.0366 15 2 0.1353
P634 1.2452 16 5 0.3352
P73,5 28.6487 9 20 2.2652
P112,4 2.8232 23 3 0.1464
The Erlang cumulative density function (CDF) can be expressed as:
F(M,l, t) = 1  e lx
M 1
Â
n=0
(lt)n
n!
(5.4)
According to [94], we have the first two moments of the M-Erlang:
m1 =
M
l
, m2 =
M(M+1)
l2
(5.5)
As a result, we have:
M =
m21
m2 m21
, l= m1
m2 m21
(5.6)
where m1 and m2 are equated with the first two moments of the Weibull distribution
with IFR, which are given as follows:
m1 = aG(
g+1
g
), m2 = a2G(
g+2
g
) (5.7)
The value of M is rounded to the nearest integer and the value of l is recalculated
depending on this rounded value, so that the mean is matched.
For example, we consider Weibull parameters for one of the satellite subsystems,
which is the control processor. The Weibull parameters for the reliability of the control
processor are given by: g = 1.4560, a = 408 (years). Then, according to equations
(6)-(8), we obtain thatM = 2 and l= 0.0054 for the M-Erlang distribution. Using the
Erlang distribution, the approximation result of theWeibull distribution with increasing
failure rate for the relevant satellite subsystems is given in Table 5.1.
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5.3.3 Decreasing Failure Rates (DFR)
The procedure for approximating Weibull distributions with decreasing failure rates
(DFR) by hyper-exponential distributions can be summarised as follows, for details
see [47].
First, we choose the number k of exponential components and k arguments: m1 >
... >mi >mi+1 > ... >mk, for which the ratios mimi+1 have to be sufficiently small (e.g.,
mi
mi+1
  10).
Second, we choose the number n such that for all i, 1< n< mimi+1 .
Then, regarding the cumulative density function (CDF) of the Weibull distribution
(see equation (3)), we have a complementary CDF (CCDF) given by:
Fc(g,a, t) = 1 F(t;g,a) = e ( ta )g (5.8)
and we choose l and p1 to match the CCDF Fc(t;g,a) (we abbreviate Fc(t;g,a) as
Fc(t)) at the arguments m1 and nm1, so we solve the two equations:
p1e l1m1 = Fc(m1) (5.9)
and:
p1e l1nm1 = Fc(nm1) (5.10)
for p1 and l1. As a result, we obtain:
l1 =
1
(n 1)m1 ln
✓
Fc(m1)
Fc(nm1)
◆
(5.11)
and
p1 = Fc(m1)el1m1 (5.12)
Then, for 2 i k, we have:
Fci (mi) = F
c(mi) 
i 1
Â
j=1
p je l jmi (5.13)
and:
Fci (nmi;) = F
c(nmi) 
i 1
Â
j=1
p je l jnmi (5.14)
and similarly, we solve further two equations:
pie limi = Fci (mi) (5.15)
and:
pie linmi = Fci (nmi) (5.16)
5.4. ENCODING WEIBULL MODELS WITH CTMCS IN PRISM 89
for pi and li when 2 i k 1. As a result, we obtain:
li =
1
(n 1)mi ln
✓
Fci (mi)
Fci (nmi)
◆
(5.17)
and:
pi = Fci (mi)e
limi (5.18)
Finally, for i= k, we can have:
pk = 1 
k 1
Â
j=1
p j (5.19)
and
pke lkmk = Fck (mk) (5.20)
We have:
lk =
1
mk
ln
✓
pk
Fck (mk)
◆
(5.21)
Using the hyper-exponential distribution, the approximation result of the Weibull
distribution with decreasing failure rate for the relevant satellite subsystems is given in
Table 5.2.
5.4 Encoding Weibull Models with CTMCs in PRISM
5.4.1 Encoding the Weibull distribution with IFR
A B C E F
λ λ
Figure 5.5: Modelling the Weibull distribution (IFR) with a CTMC.
Non-exponential holding time distributions can be approximated by inserting mul-
tiple intermediate states between any two conventional degradation states. We approx-
imate a Weibull IFR with an Erlang distribution, which is a special case of a phase-type
distribution. In Figure 5.5, kl is the total transition interval between A and F, and the
total number of intermediate stages used to approximate it, is k 1. The transition rate
is proportional to k which ensures a constant total transition time.
In the PRISM model in Figure 5.6, the occurrence of the labelled action sync occurs
with an Erlang distribution with scale µ and shape k. The special case of k = 1 is
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Table 5.2: Approximations of Weibull distributions (DFR) using hyper-exponential distri-
butions
Pix,y
Weibull Distributions DFR Hyper-exponential Distributions
g a p1 l1 p2 l2 p3 l3 p4 l4
P112 0.4482 12,526 0.8149 0.000117 0.1258 0.0038 0.0384 0.0433 0.0210 0.8802
P113 0.4334 80,050 0.9074 0.000052 0.0630 0.0037 0.0189 0.0434 0.0108 0.9015
P114 0.3815 210,126 0.9133 0.000039 0.0548 0.0038 0.0188 0.0444 0.0131 0.9903
P115 0.5635 65,647 0.9518 0.000045 0.0377 0.0034 0.0077 0.0408 0.0028 0.7348
P123 0.8229 59 0.0933 0.007895 0.6383 0.0132 0.2326 0.0458 0.0359 0.5320
P124 0.5600 4,003 0.7852 0.000218 0.1631 0.0037 0.0378 0.0411 0.0139 0.7382
P135 0.7115 221 0.3461 0.001866 0.5000 0.0058 0.1258 0.0404 0.0281 0.6022
P145 0.4703 135 0.2068 0.000988 0.4133 0.0058 0.2396 0.0466 0.1404 0.8653
P212 0.2724 531,935,049 0.9784 0.000006 0.0112 0.0039 0.0049 0.0467 0.0055 1.2407
P213 0.4449 138,315 0.9312 0.000040 0.0477 0.0036 0.0136 0.0431 0.0074 0.8836
P214 0.4763 8,591 0.8037 0.000140 0.1376 0.0038 0.0393 0.0427 0.0194 0.8398
P215 0.3114 29,975,117 0.9698 0.000010 0.0170 0.0038 0.0068 0.0459 0.0063 1.1378
P223 0.8867 46 0.0986 0.013020 0.6729 0.0181 0.2285 0.0608 n/a n/a
P234 0.6810 18 0.0022 0.009304 0.2842 0.0198 0.5152 0.0622 0.1984 0.6389
P245 0.2632 589,301 0.8614 0.000037 0.0676 0.0041 0.0322 0.0473 0.0389 1.2775
P314 0.2468 436,409,190 0.9675 0.000008 0.0156 0.0040 0.0074 0.0474 0.0095 1.3202
P412 0.4785 127,433 0.9421 0.000039 0.0418 0.0035 0.0108 0.0424 0.0052 0.8357
P425 0.3822 1,832 0.5754 0.000241 0.2423 0.0043 0.1046 0.0456 0.0778 1.0019
P434 0.5808 218 0.2948 0.001201 0.4651 0.0055 0.1765 0.0430 0.0636 0.7168
P512 0.3840 4,952,368 0.9739 0.000012 0.0168 0.0037 0.0055 0.0442 0.0038 0.9840
P515 0.3572 19,794,952 0.9792 0.000008 0.0128 0.0037 0.0045 0.0448 0.0034 1.0356
P612 0.4135 24,908 0.8380 0.000088 0.1057 0.0038 0.0348 0.0439 0.0216 0.9353
P613 0.4278 86,653 0.9075 0.000051 0.0625 0.0037 0.0190 0.0435 0.0111 0.9104
P614 0.4691 3,170 0.6988 0.000224 0.2040 0.0040 0.0643 0.0432 0.0329 0.8512
P615 0.6701 119,172 0.9835 0.000024 0.0139 0.0031 0.0026 0.0623 n/a n/a
P623 0.2483 534,535 0.8431 0.000039 0.0729 0.0041 0.0363 0.0477 0.0478 1.3272
P624 0.4607 131 0.2037 0.000960 0.4062 0.0058 0.2419 0.0469 0.1482 0.8814
P645 0.2513 169,438,854 0.9615 0.000009 0.0187 0.0040 0.0088 0.0473 0.0110 1.3062
P712 0.6109 332,145 0.9865 0.000015 0.0110 0.0032 0.0025 0.0672 n/a n/a
P713 0.3233 536,957,969 0.9895 0.000004 0.0061 0.0038 0.0023 0.0455 0.0021 1.1086
P714 0.4134 357,357 0.9429 0.000029 0.0381 0.0037 0.0118 0.0437 0.0072 0.9332
P715 0.9239 4,431 0.9744 0.000227 0.0256 0.0036 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P745 0.2355 1,915 0.4936 0.000152 0.1903 0.0045 0.1206 0.0496 0.1955 1.4244
P812 0.4277 6,358,947 0.9846 0.000008 0.0105 0.0036 0.0031 0.0433 0.0018 0.9093
P813 0.3064 3,760,000,000 0.9926 0.000002 0.0041 0.0038 0.0017 0.0459 0.0016 1.1489
P814 0.3526 11,894,073 0.9739 0.000010 0.0160 0.0037 0.0057 0.0449 0.0044 1.0452
P815 0.5215 144,569 0.9587 0.000033 0.0312 0.0034 0.0071 0.0415 0.0030 0.7814
P834 0.9574 25 0.1368 0.032194 0.6978 0.0368 0.1654 0.0755 n/a n/a
P845 0.4618 376 0.3759 0.000593 0.3686 0.0048 0.1635 0.0449 0.0920 0.8698
P1012 0.3397 27,344,009 0.9774 0.000008 0.0135 0.0038 0.0050 0.0452 0.0041 1.0724
P1013 0.3117 29,510,906 0.9698 0.000010 0.0171 0.0038 0.0068 0.0459 0.0063 1.1371
P1014 0.4734 4,393 0.7382 0.000193 0.1801 0.0039 0.0544 0.0430 0.0273 0.8446
P1015 0.2527 34,600,000,000 0.9900 0.000002 0.0049 0.0040 0.0023 0.0472 0.0028 1.2993
P1024 0.9160 63 0.2409 0.011160 0.6328 0.0152 0.1263 0.0563 n/a n/a
P1034 0.7384 9 0.0000 0.021656 0.1410 0.0396 0.5920 0.0885 0.2670 0.6213
P1035 0.5980 206 0.2862 0.001321 0.4775 0.0056 0.1765 0.0427 0.0597 0.6988
P1045 0.4301 3,802 0.6925 0.000196 0.1975 0.0040 0.0690 0.0440 0.0411 0.9111
P1112 0.4765 12,078 0.8305 0.000119 0.1195 0.0037 0.0335 0.0427 0.0165 0.8393
P1113 0.3816 3,795,383 0.9704 0.000013 0.0190 0.0037 0.0063 0.0443 0.0043 0.9885
P1114 0.9676 180 0.7918 0.005022 0.2082 0.0086 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P1115 0.3111 30,621,064 0.9699 0.000010 0.0170 0.0038 0.0068 0.0459 0.0063 1.1385
P1123 0.6046 1,541 0.6913 0.000401 0.2388 0.0039 0.0530 0.0405 0.0169 0.6930
P1134 0.1417 28,879,780 0.8112 0.000024 0.0553 0.0043 0.0359 0.0505 0.0976 1.8264
P1145 0.3662 1,310 0.5251 0.000262 0.2571 0.0044 0.1203 0.0462 0.0975 1.0380
P1214 0.3766 1,471,383 0.9560 0.000019 0.0279 0.0037 0.0094 0.0444 0.0067 0.9983
P1215 0.4020 5,578,316 0.9791 0.000010 0.0139 0.0036 0.0043 0.0439 0.0028 0.9518
an exponential distribution. In Figure 5.7, we show the probability distribution of the
delay, i.e. of P=?[F  T x= 1] for different values of k, where k = 1,2,5,10,100.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the results of implementing the CTMC of Figure 5.5 in PRISM
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ctmc
const int k; const double mu = 10/k;
module weibull_ifr1
i : [1..k+1];
[] i < k -> 1/mu : (i’ = i + 1);
[sync] i = k -> 1/mu : (i’ = i + 1);
endmodule
module weibull_ifr2
x : [0..1];
[sync] x = 0 -> (x’ = 1);
endmodule
Figure 5.6: Encoding the Weibull distribution (IFR) in PRISM.
(a) T=100 (b) T=15
Figure 5.7: Results of encoding the Weibull distribution (IFR) in PRISM.
to show the approximation of a probability distribution with a constant delay (i.e. of
P=?[F  T x = 1] for different values of k, where k = 1,2,5,10,100) of both 100
years and 15 years. This is useful for modelling failure rates with multi-state, while
preserving the Markov property. There is a clear and obvious trade-off here between
the accuracy and the resulting expansion in the size of the model. For example, when
k = 100, we can see from Figure 5.7(a), that the approximation is very close to the
actual distribution. However, increasing k from 1 to 100 increases the size of the
underlying model by 100.
To understand the differences better, we compare the CDF of the original Weibull
IFR distribution with its approximation as an Erlang distribution and its implementa-
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Figure 5.8: Comparative analysis of Weibull IFR, its approximation, and its implemen-
tation.
tion as a CTMC model in PRISM. As shown in Figure 5.8(a), the difference between
Weibull and the other two curves apparently tends to zero, indicating the approxima-
tion and implementation both to be accurate for right long tail probabilities. In Fig-
ure 5.8(b), we see that the difference is at most 0.05, this is due to the fact that we lose
a little accuracy in order to reduce the size of the state space associated with our PRISM
model.
5.4.2 Encoding the Weibull distribution with DFR
A
B
C
D
E
F
p1
p2
p3
p4
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
Figure 5.9: Modelling the Weibull distribution (DFR) with a CTMC.
We approximate a Weibull DFR with an hyper-exponential distribution, which is
a mixture of exponential distributions. The hyper-Erlang distribution is also a gener-
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alisation of the hyper-exponential distribution, and the hyper-exponential is a special
case of the hyper-Erlang. So, the hyper-exponential distribution is a phase-type distri-
bution, and it can be described in terms of the time until absorption in a CTMC. An
example of an hyper-exponential distribution having four branches ((p1,l1), (p2,l2),
(p3,l3),(p4,l4)) represented by a CTMC model is illustrated in Figure 6. Dotted ar-
rows indicate instantaneous probabilistic transitions, and solid arrows transitions with
exponentially distributed durations.
ctmc
const double p1, p2, p3, p4, lambda1, lambda2, lambda3, lambda4;
module weibull_dfr
s : [0..5] init 0;
[] s = 0 -> p1 : (s’ = 1) + p2 : (s’ = 2) +
p3 : (s’ = 3) + p4 : (s’ = 4);
[] s = 1 -> lambda1 : (s’ = 5);
[] s = 2 -> lambda2 : (s’ = 5);
[] s = 3 -> lambda3 : (s’ = 5);
[] s = 4 -> lambda4 : (s’ = 5);
endmodule
Figure 5.10: Encoding the Weibull distribution (DFR) in PRISM.
Figure 5.11 illustrates the results of implementing the associated CTMC as shown
in Figure 5.9 to give an approximation of the probability distribution of a constant delay
(i.e. of P=?[F  T x = 1] for k = 2,3,4,5 of both 100 years and 15 years. Although
there is trade-off between the accuracy and the size of the resulting state space between
k = 2 and k = 4, the difference is not so obvious between k = 4 and k = 5. Therefore,
we consider k = 4 to be a good approximation parameter for the implementation of
Weibull DFR in PRISM.
For the same purpose, we compare the CDF of the original Weibull DFR distribu-
tion with its approximation in a hyper-exponential distribution and its implementation
with a CTMC in PRISM. As shown in Figures 5.12(a) and 5.12(b), for a time scale
(a = 5000 years), the difference between the Weibull DFR and the other two curves
in the left short head is at most 0.01, and in the right long tails apparently becomes
zero, indicating the approximation and implementation both to be accurate for a short
scale for both left short head and right long tail probabilities. Though for a large scale
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(a) T=100 (b) T=15
Figure 5.11: Results of encoding the Weibull distribution (DFR) in PRISM.
(a = 50000 years) in Figure 5.12(c), we can see that the difference can be very large
in the right long tails. However, in Figure 5.12(d), for T  15 years, the approxi-
mation and implementation both to be accurate for large scale and for left short head
probabilities.
5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we have shown that difficulties in modelling Weibull distributions for
satellite failures can be handled if appropriate approximations and modelling methods
are considered. We have also proposed novel non-exponential models that characterise
failure behaviours, based on Weibull failure modes (both increasing failure rates and
decreasing failure rates) inferred from real-world datasets. We have approximated and
encoded these new models with CTMCs in the probabilistic model checker PRISM, and
proved the goodness of such approximation and implementation.
The key contribution of this chapter is that the CTMCs-based formalisms come
equipped with mature model checking tools, such as PRISM, allow a wide range of
analyses relevant to industrial critical systems to be performed automatically and effi-
ciently. In future work, we will specify essential properties in the continuous stochastic
logic (CSL) for CTMCs, and analyse desired satellite subsystems reliability and per-
formance using PRISM. Another research direction is to use various techniques such
as symmetry reduction [103, 74] for reducing the state space of the satellite system.
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of the Weibull distribution (DFR) and its approximation and
implementation.
Chapter 6
Availability Analysis of Satellite
Navigation for Aircraft Guidance
This chapter is based on the papers [93, 91]. We highlight the promising application
of probabilistic model checking for civil aviation missions. Whereas in Chapter 4 we
used CTMCs model to analyse the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the
standalone space segment, in this chapter we use MDPs to model the space, control,
user segments.
We prove that it is able and suitable to analyse GNSS based positioning in aviation
sectors for aircraft guidance. In particular, the focus is a widely used formalism called
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), and its generalisation to the analysis of quantita-
tive aspects of a specific civil flight. We construct a formal model of the GNSS based
positioning system for this application in the probabilistic p-calculus, a process alge-
bra which supports modelling of concurrency, uncertainty, and mobility. After that, we
encode our model in language of the PRISM. We then formalise and analyse the logical
properties that relate to the dependability of the underlying system to check the system
reliability and availability. We demonstrate how model specification and verification
techniques can be successfully applied to the reliability and availability analysis of our
case study.
6.1 Introduction
Satellite positioning systems are used within the transport industries such as marine,
rail, and aviation sectors extensively. For example, in aviation, a three-dimensional
global navigation satellite system (GNSS) enables an aircraft to determine its position
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(latitude, longitude, and altitude) anywhere on or above the earth. Data transmitted
from a navigation and communication satellite provides the user with the time, the
precise orbital position of the satellite and the position of other satellites in the system.
In the past, satellites were only deployed for military purposes. However nowadays
they are used for a wide range of civil aviation applications, including navigation,
communication, tracking, and flight management.
Our work has been inspired by a number of previous European Commission (EC)
projects such as GADEROS, GRAIL, LOCASYS, and SATLOC. These projects have
proved the feasibility of introducing GNSS in non-critical systems by means of the-
oretical studies and demonstrations. The current EC project EATS [10] proposes a
novel positioning system based on different techniques that have proved useful from
other industry viewpoints such as using information sources from GNSS, UMTS, and
GSM. Furthermore, reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) anal-
ysis [67] is used to study the dependability properties of the technical solution in the
critical applications, which aims to verify the proposed solution.
Availability requirements are identified as the most challenging obstacles towards
GNSS aided positioning systems in [67]. Many approaches [87, 16, 134, 88] can be
used to analyse availability properties. Among them, simulation, analytical analysis,
and quantitative analysis are popular and practical. Each approach has its advantages
and disadvantages that we have already discussed in Chapter 3. Since probabilistic
model checking is a formal verification technique for analysing and verifying quanti-
tative properties of a system’s design, such as time, stochastic behaviour or resources.
It is therefore highly suitable for modelling characteristics of our underlying system.
The mobility of an aircraft and satellites is universally recognised as an essential
parameter for analysing the availability of satellite navigation systems. Our first task
is to specify the communication between the airplane and satellites and their com-
bined mobility. The second task is rendering these two models independently, in order
to study the availability of the system in terms of different mobility models without
changing the communication models.
In an example illustrated in Figure 6.1 (a), some cars are on the road, and each is
connected by a unique wavelength to a single transmitter. The transmitters have fixed
connections to a central control. On some events such as signal fading, a car may be
switched to another transmitter. We distinguish two types of movement: the physical
movement of vehicles and virtual movement of communication links between vehi-
cles and transmitters. The two types of movements are independent, but the physical
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movement of a vehicle may give rise to the virtual movement of its link to a transmitter
(Figure 6.1 (b)).
Central
Control
(a)
Central
Control
(b)
Figure 6.1: Component mobility
In our study, we mainly deal with this kind of relationship between movement
of satellites and aircraft, and we study how the physical movement of both satellites
and aircraft give rise to the mobility of links between them. As well as mobility, the
p-calculus can be used to model parallel composition, alternative composition and
sequential composition. Properties of the modelled system can be verified by studying
the underlying labelled transition system. For this purpose, we specify the underlying
models using the probabilistic p-calculus, an extension of the p-calculus [105, 106] for
modelling mobile systems.
Therefore, we first specify the communication between an aircraft and the associ-
ated satellites, taking into account their combined mobility. We then analyse the mod-
els of the aircraft and satellite set independently before the combined system. Note
that behaviour of the system contains a high level of uncertainty (e.g., in signal trans-
mission unreliability due to solar radiation, etc.). Since PRISM only model checks
expressions in the reactive modules language, and this does not allow for component
mobility, it is not currently possible to model check the underlying process algebraic
models directly. In order to allow for automatic verification using PRISM, the underly-
ing Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) semantic models of our specification are first
constructed using rules presented in [109].
The basic idea is to first build a Markov models that captures the behaviour of
the system, and then to use the model to analyse precisely specified properties using
temporal logics. This analysis is automatically performed using the model checker
PRISM [77], using a combination of a traversal of the state transition system of the
model and numerical computation. A PRISM specification can be generated directly
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via a Markov chain variant described using the PRISM reactive modules language [6].
Alternatively, a high level model (using timed automata, or a process algebra, say)
can be translated into the PRISM language. According to PRISM’s manual, the latter
approach can be more efficient than the former. This is due to the fact that PRISM is a
symbolic model checker and the underlying data structures used to represent the system
specification may function better when there is a high-level structure and regularity to
exploit.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the underlying
satellite navigation systems. In Section 6.3 the application of probabilistic verification
is introduced. In Section 6.4 we present our formal specifications of a satellite navi-
gation system for a specific navigation mission and their associated Markov decision
processes respectively. Then, we verify availability properties using PRISM in Sec-
tion 6.5. In Section 6.6 we discuss related work on analysing availability of satellite
systems. Finally, in Section 6.7 we conclude the chapter.
6.2 Reference Models
6.2.1 GNSS-based Navigation Systems for Aviation
A GNSS-based navigation system consists of three major parts: the space segment,
control segment and user segment. Recent theoretical research and standards have
added a fourth environment segment to the satellite navigation system. The Galileo
navigation system includes the environment segment in the composition of its naviga-
tion system. Although not explicitly mentioned, the environment segment is implied
in the GPS system. To be conservative, the three traditional segments were used in this
chapter as the components of the study, and the environmental segment was treated as
an influencing factor on the system. Failure of any subsystem will lead to errors in the
final positioning. Figure 6.2 is a schematic diagram of GNSS segments.
First, the monitor stations measure the pseudo-range of visible satellites every 6
seconds, correct them with ionospheric and meteorological data, smooth the measure-
ment to generate data with a time interval of 15 seconds, perform smoothing again to
generate data with a 15 minutes’ time interval, and finally send the data to the master
control station. The master control station is responsible for collecting and tracking
data from each monitor station and calculating the satellite orbit and clock parameters
using a Kalman estimator [52]. The results are transmitted to ground antennas and then
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Space Segment
User Segment
Control Segment
Master Control Station (MCS) Monitor Stations (MS) Ground Antennas (GA)
Figure 6.2: Three segments of a GNSS system.
to the satellite. Under the control of the master control station, the clock error, satellite
ephemeris, navigation data, etc., are calculated and then transmitted to the correspond-
ing satellite, and at the same time, the information is verified. The satellites transmit
data associated with their current states to the users. The users need to use the position
information provided by the satellites for positioning during navigation. According to
[84], in general, at least four satellites are required to determine the user’s position.
The accuracy of the information that each subsystem provides is critical and de-
pends directly on the navigation accuracy. From the monitor station to the master
control station, from the master control station to the ground antenna, from the ground
antenna to the satellite, and from the satellite to the user, the entire process is imple-
mented by information transmission. Errors may exist in the process of information
transmission, and if these errors are passed on all the way to the user, the position
provided by the navigation system is unusable.
6.2.2 Reference Models
In our study, commercial aircraft is considered to be the user, and the analysis considers
the impact of navigation satellites’ availability on aircraft navigation throughout the
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mission of the specific flight from Beijing to Guangzhou. Figure 6.3 shows a schema of
satellite navigation. At least four satellites are required for satellite navigation. In the
schematic diagram, the user receives navigation signals from satellites with the serial
numbers A, B, C, and D. However, both users and navigation satellites are constantly
moving as the users are processing the information. Thus, the information that the
users receive from the navigation satellites is also constantly changing.
GPS satellites to be used
SVN57 (E) SVN51 (F) SVN36 (G)
GPS satellites in use
SVN55 (C) SVN39 (B) SVN49 (A) SVN58 (D)
Receive navigation signal
Switch of signal
Switch of GPS satellites
Figure 6.3: GNSS (GPS) based navigation for an air line.
A particular flight was studied in this chapter. The flight was from Beijing to
Guangzhou, and the entire flight time was 2 hours 35 minutes. The specific time was
January 2, 2012 (Beijing time); the flight departed at 12:00 and arrived in Guangzhou
at 14:39. The entire flight was guided sequentially by 17 navigation satellites.
Although the airplane could generally receive satellite signals from more than 4
satellites at a time, usually only the signals from the four satellites with the best signals
were used by the receiver for calculating the position. Therefore, 7 out of 17 satellites
were determined to be the navigation satellites to be analysed in this study based on
their navigation times and the task of the flight.
The space segment of the satellite system is a mix of old and new satellites. The
7 satellites of the space segment used are based on 3 models as shown in Figure 6.4,
including Block IIA (2nd generation, “advanced”), Block IIR (“replenishment”), and
Block IIR-M (“modernised”). The model GPS III in Figure 6.4 is still in production,
and will be available for launch to replace the old satellites in 2016. The SVNs (Space
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IIA IIR
IIR-M III
Figure 6.4: Satellite models used (reproduced from [85]).
Vehicle Numbers) of these satellites were SVN49, SVN39, SVN55, SVN58, SVN57,
SVN51 and SVN36. The parameters of navigation satellites are shown in Table 6.1.
The life of satellite is given in “years (y)”, and the duration is given in “minutes (m)”.
The system comprises 5 components: the satellite, monitor station, master control
station, ground antenna and user. Each subsystem transmits information to objects
to which it is connected. The user receives a satellite signal. The satellite receives
information from the ground antenna which it then transmits to the monitor station and
the user. The monitor station receives information from the satellite and transmits it
to the master control station. The master station analyses the data from the monitor
station and transmits it to the ground antenna. The ground antenna receives the control
commands from the master control station and sends them to the satellite.
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Table 6.1: Parameters of navigation satellites.
No SVN Launch date Model Life (y) Reliability Navi. interval Duration (m)
A 49 24 Mar 2009 Block IIRM 10 0.8 12:00-14:29 149
B 39 26 Jan 1993 Block IIA 7.5 0.7 12:00-13:55 115
C 55 17 Oct 2007 Block IIRM 10 0.8 12:00-13:15 75
D 58 17 Nov 2006 Block IIRM 10 0.8 12:00-14:35 155
E 57 20 Dec 2007 Block IIRM 10 0.8 13:15-14:35 80
F 51 11 May 2000 Block IIR 7.5 0.75 13:55-14:35 40
G 36 10 Mar 1994 Block IIA 7.5 0.7 14:29-14:35 6
The US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) provides GPS satellites’
status data available daily1. The space segment consists of 7 satellites due to the fact
that the navigation mission requires a minimum of 7 satellites, which are identified as
A, B, C, D, E, F and G. They receive information from ground stations and transmit
navigation information to the user.
6.3 The Formal Approach
Generally, simulation is the common testing and validation approach used for verifi-
cation of such systems. Given a system, a finite subset of the possible scenarios are
selected in a specific simulation environment, and then statistical analysis techniques
are applied to obtain probabilistic results on that system. Simulation based verification
has been unable to keep pace with the growth in design complexity. As simulation
requires the number of scenarios and simulation environments to be restricted, and so
one cannot ensure that all conditions have been covered. Formal verification, on the
other hand, can be applied to model and verify all scenarios. One automated method of
verification is model checking. In particular, probabilistic model checking has proved
to be a suitable formal verification technique for exposing errors in satellite systems,
mainly due to classical concurrency errors.
Our formal approach mainly consists of four stages as illustrated in Figure 6.5.
First, we model in the probabilistic p-calculus the behaviour of the whole mission.
This model is composed of two separate models characterising the communication
between different segments and their mobility. The latter must be able to be modified
without changing the former. Second, the global model is translated into PRISM, and is
1http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=constellationStatus
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then internally generated into an MDP (stage 1). The availability requirements that the
system must satisfy are formalised in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL)
[53] properties (stage 2). These formal quantitative properties are then checked with
PRISM (stage 3). They can be checked according to our specific flight (from Beijing to
Guangzhou) navigation mission. Finally, we analyse the results given by PRISM (stage
4).
STAGE 3
Probabilistic Model
Checking
STAGE 4
Qualitative result
(true or false)
Quantitative results
(e.g. probability, reward)
Counter example
Verification
STAGE 1
!
Probability
Nondeterminism
Mobility
Satellite Navigation
Systems
Probabilistic
π-Calculus Models
Markov Decision
Process (MDP)
Probabilities
Nondeterminism
STAGE 2
Reliability & Availability
Probabilistic temporal
logic specification
(e.g. PCTL, LTL)
P<0.1 [ F fail ] 
!"# [ F $i%& ] 
Properties Logical Specification
Figure 6.5: Stages in probabilistic verification.
6.3.1 Overview of the Probabilistic p-Calculus
The probabilistic p-calculus is a probabilistic extension of the p-calculus, which is a
process algebra. p-calculus are used to model communicating, distributed, and mobile
systems, and it provides strong techniques to reason about systems with concurrency
at the modelling level. Communication, either inside the system or between the sys-
tem and its environment, are modelled by synchronous actions on shared channels. It
allows channel names to be sent along the channels themselves, thereby enabling one
to model dynamically changing networks. Mobility is of central importance in the p-
calculus. To appreciate the definition of the probabilistic p-calculus and the mobility
our case study in satellite navigation for aviation, we illustrate what kind of mobility
that the p-calculus is suitable for.
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6.3.1.1 The Probabilistic p-Calculus
For some classes of concurrent and mobile systems, probabilistic behaviours can be
key ingredients. Satellite navigation systems, for instance, can exhibit probabilistic
behaviours due to either unreliable communication or component failures. We can
model such behaviours with the probabilistic p-calculus (pprob). The basic component
of probabilistic p-calculus is its syntax as determined by the well-formed combination
of operators and more elementary terms. We use “terms” to describe systems, and
these are then mapped to labelled transition systems (LTSs). More explicitly, the states
of a LTS are just “terms” of the probabilistic p-calculus while the labels of transitions
between states represent the actions or the interactions that are possible from a given
state and the state that is reached after the action is performed by means of actions.
The probabilistic p-calculus adds a discrete probabilistic choice operator to the
classical p-calculus (only non-deterministic choice operator exists). This probabilistic
operator associates internal actions with probabilities.
Definition 10. (Syntax). We assume P and Pi range over terms and a ranges over
actions. We assume a countable set of names N that range over x,y,xi, where i 2
{1,2, ...,n}. A process P is defined in pprob using the following syntax:
• a ::= t | x(y) | xhyi
• P ::= 0 | a.P | Â
i2I
Pi |  Â
i2I
pit.Pi | P|P | vxP | [x= y]P | A(x1,x2, ...,xi, ...,xn),
where I is an index set, pi 2 (0,1] with Âi2I pi = 1, and A is a process identifier. We
now informally describe the calculus.
The inactive process 0 can perform no actions. The process a.P performs action
a and then evolves into process P, where a is one of three types: t is the silent (in-
visible) action that corresponds to an internal interaction between sub-processes, x(y)
is an input action in which a process receives a name y on channel x, and xhyi is an
output action, in which a process sends a name y on channel x. There are two types of
summation: nondeterministic choice Â
i2I
Pi and probabilistic choice  Â
i2I
pit.Pi. The first
is common in the standard p-calculus, and the second is a new operator in pprob. As
for pprob, branches of the probabilistic choice operator are normally prefixed with t
actions. Thus, the process  Â
i2I
pit.Pi randomly selects an index i 2 I with probability pi,
performs a t action, and then evolves to Pi. The process ptP1  (1  p)tP2 is a special
case of the process  Â
i2I
pit.Pi that only consists 2 branches, such as 0.5t.0 0.5t.0.
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The parallel composition of processes Pi and Pj is Pi|Pj, and it can either proceed
in an asynchronous manner or synchronise between Pi and Pj via matching input and
output actions. The restriction vxP locally sets the scope of x in process P, so x is
treated as a new and unique name within P. The match [x= y] checks whether names x
and y are identical, so the process [x= y]P can evolve into process P only if the match
[x = y] is satisfied. Finally, A(x1,x2, ...,xi, ...,xn) corresponds to a process definition
clause and is used in the context P= A(x1,x2, ...,xi, ...,xn).
Figure 6.6: The symbolic semantics for pprob (reproduced from [109]).
The operational semantics of pprob are typically expressed in terms of Markov De-
cision Processes (MDPs) or Probabilistic Automata (PAs). The symbolic semantics of
pprob is expressed in terms of probabilistic symbolic transition graphs (PSTGs). These
are a simple probabilistic extension of the symbolic transition graphs introduced in
[56].
Definition 11. Let P be a pprob process. The probabilistic symbolic transition graph
(PSTG) representing the semantics of the process P is a tuple (S,sinit ,Tprob) where:
• S is a finite set of symbolic states, each of which is a term of the probabilistic
p-calculus;
• sinit 2 S, the initial state, is the term P;
• Tprob✓ S⇥Cond⇥Act⇥Dist(S) is the probabilistic symbolic transition relation
and is the least relation given by the rules in Figure 6.6.
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In the above,Cond denotes the set of all conditions (finite conjunctions of matches)
over the set of names N . Act is a set of actions of basic types: t, x(y), xhyi, where
x, y 2 N . Dist(S) is the set of probability distributions over S. The notation Qi M,a !
{|pi : Rii|} is used for the probabilistic symbolic transition (Q,M,a,µ) 2 Tprob, where
µ(R) = ÂQi=R pi for any pprob term R. The multi-sets [109] are used to ensure that
processes with duplicate components such as Q = 0.5t.0  0.5t.0 have transition of
the form Qi
t ! {|0.5 : 0,0.5 : 0|}.
6.3.1.2 An Example of pprob Processes
To illustrate the idea of probabilistic models, we specify a simple pprob model of a set
of traffic lights and drivers example. The description of the example is based on paper
[123]. The process Plight models the traffic lights signalling to drivers, which are are
probabilistically red, yellow, or green.
Plight , 0.45t.ahRedi.Plight 0.1t.ahYellowi.Plight 0.45t.ahGreeni.Plight
Here, the traffic light is red with probability 0.45, yellow with probability 0.1, and
green with probability 0.45. We distinguish drivers according to how they behave
depending on the colours of the lights they see. A cautious driver is modelled by the
process Pc driver as follows:
Pc driver , a(x).([x= red]Pc red +[x= yellow]Pc yellow+[x= green]Pc green)
Pc red , 0.2t.bhbrakingi.0 0.8t.bhstoppedi.0
Pc yellow , 0.9t.bhbrakingi.0 0.1t.bhdrivingi.0
Pc green , bhdrivingi.0
A cautious driver sees what colour the light is (through the form of match [x= y]) and
behaves accordingly (through the probabilistic choice:  Â
i2I
pit.Pi). If it is red, he brakes
or stops. If it is yellow, mostly likely he brakes. If it is green, he drives on. Similarly,
an aggressive driver can be modelled by the process Pa driver as follows:
Pa driver , a(x).([x= red]Pa red +[x= yellow]Pa yellow+[x= green]Pa green)
Pa red , 0.3t.bhbrakingi.0 0.6t.bhstoppedi..0 0.1t.bhdrivingi.0
Pa yellow , 0.1t.bhbrakingi..0 0.9t.bhdrivingi.0
Pa green , bhdrivingi.0
Therefore, the aggressive driver is more likely to drive on at red and yellow. We may
analyse what is the probability of a crash if two different drivers go through a single
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traffic light from different streets. The behave process Pa driver is as the following:
Pbehave , b(y).([y= braking]0+[y= stopped]0+[y= driving]0)
6.3.2 Translation of a pprob Model into the PRISM Language
We show that for closed and finite processes (i.e., which do not replicate themselves),
the semantics of a probabilistic p-calculus process can be represented by an MDP.
6.3.2.1 Translation rules
We assume that the set of all names in the system is N , which is partitioned into dis-
joint subsets: N f n, the set of all free names appearing in processes P1,P2, ...,Pi, ...,Pn,
andN bn1 ,N bn2 , ...,N bni , ...,N bnn , and P1,P2, ...,Pi, ...,Pn (the sets of input-bound names
for processes). A match is an equality test on names from N and a condition M is
a finite conjunction of matches, i.e., M is of the form [x1 = y1]^ ...[xn = yn]. The
translation rules of a pprob model into the PRISM language, defined in [109], can be
summarised as follows,
• Rule 1. Each of the n sub-processes Pi becomes a PRISM module with the same
name.
• Rule 2. Each element Qij of the finite set of terms Si = {Qi1, ...,Qik}, which is
the set of the states of process Pi after each of its transitions (In [109], the set of
all these states is called the PSTG of Pi), becomes an integer variable si whose
values vary from 1 to k.
• Rule 3. Module Pi has |N bni |+1 local variables. Each bound name xij of process
Pi has a corresponding variable xij with range 0, ..., |N f n| and it is initialised to
0.
• Rule 4. The model includes |N f n| integer constants, one for each free name,
which are assigned distinct, consecutive non-zero values. If the value of variable
xij is equal to one of these constants, then the corresponding bound name has
been assigned the appropriate free name (by an input action). On the contrary,
xij = 0 means that no input to the bound name has occurred yet.
• Rule 5 (Probabilistic internal transition). For Qi M,t ! {|p1 : Ri1, ..., pm : Rim|},
which a transition, we add the command:
[] (si = Qi) & M! p1 : (s01 = Ri1)+ ...+ pm : (s0i = Rim).
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• Rule 6 (Output on free name). Process Pi outputs y on free name x to Pj. For
a transition Qi
M,xhyi ! Ri, where x 2N f n, we add, for each j 2 {1, ...,n}\{i}, the
command:
[x Pi Pj y] (si = Qi) & M ! (s0i = Ri).
The channel x, sender Pi, receiver Pj, and sent name y are all encoded in the
action label. See [109] for details.
• Rule 7 (Output on bound name). Process Pi outputs y on bound name x to
Pj. For a transition Qi
M,xhyi ! Ri, where x 2 N bni , we add, for each a 2 N f n and
j 2 {1, ...,n}\{i}, the command:
[a Pi Pj y] (si = Qi) & M & (x= a)! (s0i = Ri).
This is similar to Rule 6 except that it includes a command for each possible
value a of x.
• Rule 8 (Input on free name). Process Pj inputs z on free name x from Pi.
For a transition Qi
M,x(z) ! Ri, where x 2 N f n, we add, for each y 2 N \N bni and
j 2 {1, ...,n}\{i}, the command:
[x Pj Pi y] (si = Qi) & M! (s0i = Ri) & (z0 = y).
For input actions, an extra assignment (z0 = y) is added to consider each possible
received name y. It models the update of the bound name z to y.
• Rule 9 (Input on bound name). Process Pj inputs z on bound name x from
Pi. For a transition Qi
M,x(z) ! Ri, where x 2 N bni , we add, for each a 2 N f n,
y 2N \N bni and j 2 {1, ...,n}\{i}, the command:
[a Pj Pi y] (si = Qi) & M & (x= a)! (s0i = Ri) & (z0 = y).
This rule combines elements of Rules 8 and 9, since a command is added to
consider each possible pairing of channel a that x may represent and name y that
may be received.
In addition, some incorrect commands added in Rules 8 and 9 need to be removed.
This is due to that these commands correspond to input actions which will never occur.
Particularly, the action label x Pi Pj y appears on a command of each module Pj, but
does not appear in any of the commands in module Pi. Therefore, according to [109],
commands with such action labels are removed from Pj.
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6.3.2.2 Translation of the example
In Figure 6.7, we show an example translation for the traffic light example in Section
3.3.2. The intermediate PTSG is illustrated in Figure 6.7 (a), and the PRISM model is
shown in Figure 6.7 (b).
3.3.2. Example Translation
Now we give a simple example translation, in which the  prob models come
from the example of tra c light and drivers in section 3.3.2. Its corresponding
PTSG and PRISM model are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Model transformation example of tra c light and driver.
4. System specification
4.1. Reference models
In our study, commercial aircraft were considered to be the users, and the
analysis considered the impact of navigation satellites’ availability on aircraft
navigation throughout the flight. Figure 8 is a schema of satellite navigation.
At least four satellites are required for satellite navigation. In the schematic
diagram, the user receives navigation signals from satellites with the serial
24
Figure 6.7: Model transformation example of traffic light and a cautious driver.
6.4 Specification
6.4.1 The pprob Models
The formal models of the system consist of 12 pprob processes (PA, PB, PC, PD, PE ,
PF , PG,MS,MCS, GA,User, Switch) for different subsystems: each of 7 processes for
each of 7 satellites, 1 process for the monitor station, 1 process for the master control
station, 1 process for the ground antenna, 1 process for the user, and 1 process for the
mobility model. There are also 5 types of channels: a, b, c, d, e, which are used for
transmitting messages between subsystems. Table 6.2 below provides the meanings of
main variables used in the model.
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Table 6.2: Meanings of variables used in the model.
Variables Meaning
rc reliability of transmission from satellite C to the monitor station
mj the information sent by a satellite to the monitor station
rms reliability of transmission from the monitor to the master control station
pe f probability of the message is corrupted
v j the message has been verified
n j the message is corrupted
6.4.1.1 The pprob Models of the Space Segment
The model of the space segment consists of 7 pprob processes of 7 satellites, referred
to PA, PB, PC, PD, PE , PF and PG. These satellites receive information from the ground
antenna simultaneously and then transmit the navigation information to the user via
the monitor station. In this chapter, the user and the monitor station are assumed to
receive navigation signals from the satellites simultaneously.
There are 3 types of channels for each of the 7 satellites, in which di (where i 2
{1,2, ...,7}) is the channel between the ground antenna and each individual satellite j
(where j 2 {A,B,C,D,E,F,G} for all following denotations), ei is the channel between
the satellite and the aircraft, and ai the channel between the satellite and the monitor
station. The pprob model of satellite C, D, and E of the space segment are given as
below, and the pprob models of other satellites can be derived similarly.
PC , rct.a3hmci.d3(xc).([xc = vc]P0C+[xc = no]PC)  (1  rc)t.PC
P
0
C , rct.e3hmci.outc(yc).0  (1  rc)t.P
0
C
PD , rdt.a4hmdi.d4(xd).([xd = vd]P0D+[xd = no]PD)  (1  rd)t.PD
P
0
D , rdt.e4hmdi.0  (1  rd)t.P
0
D
PE , ine(ye).P
0
E
P
0
E , ret.a5hmei.d5(xe).([xe = ve]E
00
+[xe = no]P
0
E)  (1  re)t.P
0
E
P
00
E , ret.yehmei.0  (1  re)t.P
00
E
In the above, r j denotes the reliability of transmission from the corresponding satel-
lite to the monitor station, which is represented by reliability (probability) as shown in
Table 6.1. For communication, mj is the information sent by a satellite to the monitor
station via channel ai. Afterwards this message is relayed to the master control station
and verified there, so, v j denotes that the message has been verified, otherwise it will
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be no for the message that has been corrupted due to the influence of environmental
factors. The satellite then sends the verified message to the aircraft via channel ei for
the purpose of continuous navigation.
6.4.1.2 The pprob Models of the Control Segment
Here, navigation information mainly refers to the data of the on-orbit state of satel-
lites that are transmitted by the navigation satellites. Satellites in this system do not
exchange information with one another. In the real world, all GPS satellites are mon-
itored by a set of 6 monitor stations. In this chapter, we make the simplifying as-
sumption that there is a single monitor station, which is essentially a combination of
the 6 stations. As a result, each satellite transmits information to the monitor station
independently and simultaneously. The pprob model of the monitor stations isMS.
MS , a1(x).MS1+a2(x).MS2+a3(x).MS3+a4(x).MS4
+a5(x).MS5+a6(x).MS6+a7(x).MS7
MSi , rmst.bhxi.MS  (1  rms)t.MSi (1 i 7)
In the above, MSi denotes the processes for communication between satellites A,
B, C, D, E, F , and G and the monitor station respectively. The direct summation
+ is used due to the fact that in our assumption the single monitor station (MS) is
unable receive simultaneous transmissions, so there will be a nondeterministic choice
between simultaneous transmissions from different satellites to the monitor station.
Then, rms denotes reliability of transmission from the monitor station to the master
control station, which is a probability (rms = 0.99999 as default) as shown in Table 6.5.
For communication, x is the message received from the satellite and relayed to the
master control station via channel b.
The master control station receives information from the monitor station via chan-
nel b, then transmits it to the ground antenna via channel c. Further, MCSi represents
the sub-process for verifying the relayed message from a satellite via the monitor sta-
tion. Its pprob model is MCS, defined as the following process:
MCS , b(x).([x= ma]MCS1+[x= mb]MCS2+[x= mc]MCS3
+[x= md]MCS4+[x= me]MCS5+[x= mf ]MCS6+[x= mg]MCS7)
MCSi , rmcs · pe f t.chv ji.MCS  rmcs · (1  pe f )t.chn ji.MCS  (1  rmcs)t.MCSi
((i, j) 2 {(1,a),(2,b),(3,c),(4,d),(5,e),(6, f ),(7,g)})
In the above, rmcs denotes the reliability of transmission from the master control
station to the ground antenna, which is a probability (rmcs = 0.99999 as default) as
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shown in Table 6.5. pe f is the probability of whether the message is corrupted due to
the influence of environmental factors. For communication, the master control station
sends the verified result back to the corresponding satellite through the ground antenna
via channel c. The nondeterministic choice + is used for name matching of messages
sent from the monitor station to the master control station.
Similar to the monitor station, the ground antenna communicates with the 7 satel-
lites simultaneously. There are 4 ground antennas worldwide that perform the daily
routine of transmitting commands to each satellite. We also make a similar abstraction
that we use a single ground antenna instead of the 4 original ground antennas. The
pprob model of the ground antenna is GA, defined as the following process:
GA , c(y).([y= va]GA1+[y= na]GA1+[y= vb]GA2
+[y= nb]GA2+[y= vc]GA3+[y= nc]GA3+[y= vd]GA4
+[y= nd]GA4+[y= ve]GA5+[y= ne]GA5+[y= v f ]GA6
+[y= n f ]GA6+[y= vg]GA7)+ [y= ng]GA7
GAi , rgat.dihyi.GA  (1  rga)t.GAi (1 i 7)
In the above,GAi denotes the processes for communication between the ground an-
tenna and a satellite. Then, rga denotes the reliability of transmission from the ground
antenna to the corresponding satellite, which is a probability (rga = 0.99999 as default)
as shown in Table 6.5. For communication, the ground antenna receives the verified
result from the master control station via channel c, and then sends the message to the
different satellites based on the verified result via channel di respectively. Similarly,
the nondeterministic choice + is used for name matching of messages sent from the
master control station to the ground antenna.
6.4.1.3 The pprob Models of the User Segment
The user segment usually refers to the “GNSS receivers” that capture, process and
track L-band signals from visible satellites to calculate the airplane’s PVT (see Sec-
tion 2.3). The navigation mission of the specific flight from Beijing to Guangzhou
was used to study the availability of navigation satellites to accomplish the mission
during a specific segment of the flight. The 7 satellites were used for navigation dur-
ing the flight. Due to the coverage limitation of satellites, the aircraft needs to switch
to different satellites for navigation guidance during the flight. Figure 6.8 gives the
schema of the satellite navigation switching that occurred during the entire flight. As
a result, there are 4 satellite groups available for navigation during the entire flight:
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{A,B,C,D}, {A,B,D,E}, {A,D,E,F} and {D,E,F,G}.
There are two kinds of independent movement: the physical movement of satellites
A, B,..., G and the aircraft Usr, and the virtual movement of communication links
between them. Their combined physical movement gives rise to the virtual movement
of the link between them2.
A B D E F
MCS
a2a1
C G
MSGA
a3
a4 a5 a6 a7
d1 d2
d3 d4
d5 d6 d7
c b
(a) Reference Model of Control and Space Segments
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U U
e2e2
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e3
A G
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(b) Reference Model of User and Space Segments.
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(c) Switch Satellite C with E
C B A D E F G
U U
e4 e3
switch
e2e1 e1
(e) Switch Satellite A with G
Figure 6.8: Reference Model of GNSS Segments.
For mobility models, switching occurred between satellite pairs: C and E, B and F,
and A and G. The switch from C to E occurs at 13:15, as shown in Figure 6.8 (c). The
switch from B to F occurs at 13:55, as shown in Figure 6.8 (d). The switch from A to G
occurs at 14:29, as shown in Figure 6.8 (e). In Figure 6.8 (c), the airplane sequentially
uses satellite groups {A,B,C,D} and {A,B,D,E} for navigation. First, the aircraft uses
satellites C, B, A and D; the linking channels between these 4 satellites and the airplane
are e1, e2, e3 and e4. When the aircraft uses satellites B, A, D and E for navigation, E
replaces C at the last stage and the channel of C is replaced by that of E. Figure 6.8 (d)
shows the scenario when the aircraft changes from using satellite group {A,B,D,E}
to group {A,D,E,F}, and in Figure 6.8 (e), the aircraft changes from using satellite
group {A,D,E,F} to group {D,E,F,G}. Similarly, when satellites {A,D,E,F} or
{D,E,F,G} are used.
Usr , e1(z).Usr+ e2(z).Usr+ e3(z).Usr+ e4(z).Usr
+e5(z).Usr+ e6(z).Usr+ e7(z).Usr
Switch , outche3i.inehe3i.outbhe2i.in f he2i.outahe1i.inahe1i.0
2The links and their movement are obtained using the modelling, simulation, analysis, and operations
software Satellite Tool Kit (STK).
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6.4.2 Translation from pprob Models to PRISM Language
The pprob processes must be translated to PRISM in order to perform probabilistic ver-
ification using the model checker. Translation from pprob models of the satellite nav-
igation system to their representation in PRISM follows the translation rules given in
Section 3.3.1. We use the process PA of satellite A to illustrate the procedure of the
translation. The pprob model of the communication between satellite A and the monitor
station is:
PA , rat.a1hmai.d1(xa).([xa = va]P0A+[xa = no]PA)  (1  ra)t.PA
P
0
A , rat.e1hmai.outa(ya).0  (1  ra)t.P
0
A
Then, the process is converted into a graphical representation, namely a PSTG. For
comparison, the converted PSTGs of processes PA and PE are both shown in Figure 6.9.
Finally, the PSTG of the system is translated into the PRISM modules according to
the transition rules, and the corresponding module of pprob model of satellite A can be
derived, as shown in Figure 6.10.
The translation of pprob models of the remaining 6 satellites, the monitor station,
the master control station, the ground antenna, the aircraft, and the mobility model can
be derived similarly using the translation rules. The entire PRISM code is shown in
Appendix.
We built a small, but detailed, model of the system. The satellite navigation sys-
tems exhibit both probabilistic behaviour (re-transmission due to unreliability of space
segment and control segment) and nondeterministic behaviour (scheduling of transmis-
sion of satellites by control segment within the mission) and can be naturally modelled
as an MDP. We translated a constructed process algebraic model based on the under-
lying reference model in PRISM. The state space for different number of satellites is
shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: State space for different number of satellites.
N States Transitions Time for constructing the MDP (s)
4 153,824 750,368 1.999
5 331,120 1,625,059 9.074
6 501,290 2,466,627 18.153
7 659,252 3,249,969 33.051
8 724,230 3,554,991 61.741
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Figure 6.9: PTSGs of pprob process of satellites A and E.
Because of the detailed nature of the model and the corresponding state space size,
we first consider a small number of satellites (N=4, 5, 6, 7, 8). It is possible, though,
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Figure 6.10: The PRISM module of satellite A.
that availability properties analysed in these small models will also be exhibited by
a more large size (e.g., 17 satellites). With regards to the initial configuration of the
model, we assume that the control segment and the user segment communicate with
one satellite at a time. This configuration is suitably realistic and ensures that the
mobility is possible. For N=7, the model has 659,252 states and 3,249,969 transitions;
for N=8, it has 724,230 states and 3,554,991 transitions.
These MDPs are constructed by PRISM on a 2.4GHz Mac with 8GB RAM in
33.051 seconds and 61.741 seconds respectively. Note that the increase of states and
transitions between N=7 and N=8 is much lower than the other increases. This is be-
cause the flight navigation mission typically requires a minimum of 7 satellites, and
the 8th satellite is only used as backup satellite, so there is much less communication
between the satellite and the other segments, reducing the transitions accordingly.
6.5 Verification
6.5.1 Availability Parameters
During signal transmission from the monitor station to the master control station and
from the master control station to the ground antenna, abnormal signal transmission
may occur, resulting in errors in information and corresponding anomalies in the sub-
sequent update information for the satellites. This can affect the navigation safety of
users if the situation is severe. If anomalies occur in signal transmission, the master
control station can correct the signal after a certain period of time. The reliability of
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space and control segments based on MTBF and MTTR is given in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Reliability of space and control segments.
Systems MTBF (hours) MTTR
Satellite model 6 months
Monitor Station 156000 25.2 minutes
Master Control Station 1248 52.3 minutes
Ground Antenna 2310 4.2 hours
Furthermore, we propose a modified concept for the GNSS availability properties
associated with the underlying specification. The current approach involves prediction
of the “mean” availability over the system lifetime, assuming that the system is in a
steady state. This approach is not suited to the specification of GNSS positioning sys-
tems, where the objective is to guarantee what can be obtained from the system during
short periods of time that are meaningful to users, and that this short term availability
will be maintained during the lifetime of the system. This requires a modification of
the availability concept, as it is currently understood.
Based on a preliminary investigation, it is assumed in our analysis that the informa-
tion exchange among the satellites, monitor station and ground antenna does not itself
generate information anomalies, but its reliability is a direct consequence of the relia-
bilities of the satellites and ground antenna. It is additionally assumed that information
anomalies can occur in the signal transmission between satellites, master control sta-
tion, monitor station, and ground antenna, and environmental factors as well. These
assumptions and related data are based on relevant reports3 on GPS, as summarised in
Table 6.5.
Where available, the data used for quantitative analysis in this study were collected
from the official published data [129, 65]. In other cases we used data for similar
systems. The satellite models involved in the navigation satellite availability analysis
of this section are Block-IIA, Block-IIR and Block-IIRM.
6.5.2 Best and Worst Case Availability
In this section, we perform quantitative analysis of satellite availability and channel
availability of the satellite navigation system using PRISM respectively. Some typical
3Global Positioning System (GPS) Performance Quarterly Report
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Table 6.5: Transmission reliability of satellite navigation systems.
Systems Transmission reliability
Satellite!MS reliability of satellites
MS!MCS 0.99999
MCS!GA 0.99999
GA!Satellite 0.99999
environmental factors 0.9
examples of availability properties formalised with PCTL are given in Table 6.6 and
Table 6.7.
Table 6.6: Summary of PRISM properties used in the chapter (Part I).
No. Name PRISM notation
1 “available satellite” Pmin 1[F (sc= 7)]
2 “minimum available satellite” Rmin=?[F (sc= 6)]
3 “maximum available satellite” Rmax=?[F (s4= 4)]
4 “minimum unavailable channel” Rmin=?[F (s5= 3)] Rmin=?[F (s5= 2)]
5 “maximum unavailable channel” Rmax=?[F (s5= 6)] Rmax=?[F (s5= 5)]
6 “minimum available time bound satellite” Pmin=?[F  T (sc= 6)]
7 “maximum available time bound satellite” Pmax=?[F  T (se= 7)]
Table 6.7: Summary of PRISM properties used in the chapter (Part II).
No. Meaning
1 Whether satellite C is available during the navigation?
2 The minimum available time of satellite C
3 The maximum expected time of navigation mission
4 The minimum unavailable time of channel e3
5 The maximum unavailable time of channel e1
6 The min. probability that C done transmission with U within T
7 The minimum probability that E done transmission with U within T
We first study how the longest expected time of satellite navigation mission for air-
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craft varies over the execution of the mission. To consider the probability of some be-
haviour of our MDP, the nondeterministic choices need to be resolved first. PRISM pro-
vides us an exhaustive search and exact quantitative results of all possible behaviours of
the system, including both best case and worst case scenarios. This is done using PCTL
properties of the form: R{00time00}min=?[F (s4 = 4)] and R{00time00}max=?[F (s4 = 4)],
which represent the minimum (best case) and maximum (worst case) expected value
of time that is from the beginning until the end of the mission (at the time instant
F (s4= 4)). Since we have added a reward structure called “time” to the PRISM model,
it associates with each state of the MDP a value representing the longest expected time
between any two components at that point. The obtained result of the minimum and
maximum expected time that depends on reliability of different components is depicted
in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: Expected time results for different reliability of components.
We see that as reliability increases, the expected time decreases. In Figure 6.11(a)
for best case scenario, if the reliability of satellites is larger than 0.65, it will have less
influence for satellites than different components of control segment (MS, MCS, and
GA) on finishing the navigation mission. However, it is clear that the environmental
factor has greatest influence on the total execution time. The reliability of environment
is to what extent the environmental factors can jeopardise the transmission reliability
between satellites and the control segment, so higher reliability means more reliable
transmission. The default value of environmental factors is considered to be 0.9, but
we can see that it has less influence on mission time when it is larger than 0.95. So,
we should design the course of movement of satellites in the environment as gentle
and stable (e.g., less solar radiation) as possible. From Figure 6.11(b), we see that
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the curves of satellites and control segment are similar for worst case scenario. But,
when the reliability of environment is larger than 0.9 (which is compared with 0.95 in
minimum case), the environment influence on mission time can be neglected.
The properties Pmin=?[F  T (sc = 6)] and Pmax=?[F  T (sc = 6)] enable us to
compute the minimum and maximum probability that satellite C finishes signal trans-
mission with the aircraft within T time steps. The form of “ t” or “< t” (where t
is a PRISM expression evaluating to a constant, non-negative value) is the upper time
bound.
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Figure 6.12: Probability of for satellite C within time T.
As shown in Figure 6.12, we have t = T in our case, where T is a constant value
between 0 and 100. We see that the probability increases as T increases after the prob-
ability equals to 0 and before it reaches to 1. For both cases, the satellite C eventually
sent signal to the aircraft. However, for the minimum case, it takes much less time for
the probability to reach 0.9 from 0 (about 10 time steps), compared to the maximum
case (about 55 time units). We should be aware of that in realistic cases, the probability
distribution is between the two of them.
The minimum availability of satellite C varies on time, and it can be derived by the
following formula, where R{00time00}min=?[F (sc = 5)] R{00time00}min=?[F (sc = 4)]) is
the unavailable time of satellite C in the minimum case.
AvailCmin(T )=
8>><>>:
1 C1
R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 4)]/T C2
T   (R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 5)] R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 4)])/T C3
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Figure 6.13: Minimum and maximum availability of satellites.
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Figure 6.14: Availability of satellite D.
Table 6.8: Conditions (Part I).
Conditions Meaning
C1 0 T < R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 4)]
C2 R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 4)] T  R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 5)]
C3 R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 5)]< T  R{00time00}min=?[F (sc= 7)]
The maximum availability of satellite C and minimum/maximum availability of all
other satellites can be derived similarly. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.13 and
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Figure 6.14 respectively.
From above figures, we see that satellites of the same model have the same avail-
ability distribution. For instance, both the minimum and maximum probability of satel-
lites A, C, and D are all same, except that their individual online duration are differ-
ence. They are online at the same time, but satellite D has a long tail than satellites
A and C, and satellite A has longer tail than C. This is due to the fact that satellites
D is never offline (never being switched) during the mission later than both A and C,
and A gets offline (switching to G) later than C. Model Block IIRM (Satellites A, C,
D, and E) had the largest satellite availability for navigation, followed by Block IIR
(satellite F) and then Block IIA (satellites B and G). The availability curve indicates
that the satellite online and offline time instant and the duration of use of a satellite do
not have very significant impact on the satellite’s availability. Rather, the factor that
had the greatest effect on navigation was the design life and reliability of the navigation
satellites.
Similar to the definition of satellite availability, we define channel availability. The
minimum availability of channel e3 also varies on time, and it can be derived by the
following formula, where R{00time00}min=?[F (s5 = 3)] R{00time00}min=?[F (s5 = 2)]) is
the unavailable time of channel e3 in the minimum case.
Availe3min(T )=
8>><>>:
1 C4
R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 2)]/T C5
T   (R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 3)] R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 2)])/T C6
Table 6.9: Conditions (Part II).
Conditions Meaning
C4 0 T < R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 2)]
C5 R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 2)] T  R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 3)]
C6 R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 3)]< T  R{00time00}min=?[F (s5= 7)]
The maximum availability of channel e3 and minimum/maximum availability of
all other channels can be derived similarly. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.15.
The backup satellite of a channel were not considered in this study. Neglecting backup
satellite may cause the channel availability to be slightly greater than when it is consid-
ered. An actual mission will involve multiple satellites, and each channel has multiple
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backup satellites. Thus, once a failure occurs, the channel will be switched to a backup
satellite.
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Figure 6.15: Minimum and maximum availability of channels.
Other than using high cost backup satellite for a navigation, a way to improve
the channel availability is the addition of new signals. These signals complement the
existing signal for navigation service. This additional signal will make GNSS a more
robust navigation system for various aviation applications. Thus, the availability of
additional signals means that errors that occur in the signals due to disturbances in the
ionosphere can be significantly reduced through the simultaneous use of more signals.
This will improve the overall system reliability, to increase accuracy and availability,
and will allow a robust approach with little or no ground infrastructure.
Therefore, the availability of navigation satellites in the actual process is greater
than this value. In general, the impact of environmental factors is small, and thus
the availability of satellites for navigation could be larger than 98.5%. Moreover, the
presence of multiple satellites will potentially increase the overall availability along
an air line, but the increase of available satellites does not necessarily guarantee an
improved user-satellites geometry due to the similar orbital arrangement of most GNSS
satellites.
The SPS SIS availability is the probability that the slots in the GPS constellation
will be occupied by satellites transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS SIS. For this
SPS Performance Standard, there are two components of availability as follows: (1)
per-slot availability: the fraction of time that a slot in the GPS constellation will be
occupied by a satellite that is transmitting a trackable and healthy SPS SIS; (2) con-
stellation availability: the fraction of time that a specified number of slots in the GPS
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constellation.
SPS SIS availability is assessed through analysis of the broadcast navigation mes-
sages. To evaluate the usefulness of our results for SPS SIS availability, we referred to
some official reports from the civil aviation sector. The U.S. Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) releases quarterly reports on the performance analysis of the system
based on the operation of the GPS in each quarter to ensure the navigation safety of
global aviation. According to the monitoring reports released by the FAA [45] for the
period of 1 January 2013 to 31 March 2013, the average service availability of each in-
dividual GPS satellite is approximately 99%, and the worst-case service availability is
approximately 90%. These numbers approximately are close to those obtained in our
study, which are between 88% and 98% for minimum availability and between 97.5%
and 98.5% for maximum availability. This supports that, from one line of evidence,
the feasibility and applicability of our approach.
6.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we have shown that probabilistic verification can be used to analyse
interesting and important reliability and availability properties of GNSS based aircraft
guidance systems that would be difficult to discover using alternative analysis tech-
niques such as simulation. We have demonstrated the successful application of prob-
abilistic model checking to the analysis of reliability and availability properties that
relate to the dependability and overall performance of the underlying system of satel-
lite navigation for aviation. To do this, we have went through the theory of Markov
decision processes (MDPs), process algebras, and probabilistic model checking.
Although using probabilistic model checking limits the number of the satellites in
the navigation system that can be analysed, these representative systems can highlight
interesting behaviour that may also occur in more realistic configurations for aviation
navigation. We have modelled essential aspects (e.g., unreliable signal transmission,
component movement, concurrency, nondeterminism) of satellite system for navigat-
ing the specific flight (from Beijing to Guangzhou). The results we have obtained
demonstrate that modelling unknown choices with randomness causes a variation on
the mission execution time and availability: the actual scenario may be different from
the best or worst scenarios. The introduction of nondeterminism shows that these mea-
sures can take a range of values. As a result, we compute minimum and maximum
values, representing both the best case and worst case of mission execution time and
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satellite and channel availability under any scheduling of simultaneous transmission
between different satellites and control segment.
Although nowadays satellite positioning is commonly used in the aviation sector,
it is still to gain a foothold in other industries such as the rail industry. Up to now
availability analysis is non-trivial because difficult situations exist on the railways due
to the limitations of the GNSS coverage in urban canyons, tunnels, and forest areas.
For future work, we plan to add a fourth environment segment that simulates such
difficult situations to the GNSS.
Chapter 7
Safety Analysis of Path Planning for
Satellite Surveillance
This chapter is based on the paper [114]. We use probabilistic model checking for
analysing and verifying satellite surveillance missions. Whereas in Chapter 4 we used
CTMCs model to analyse the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the stan-
dalone space segment, in Chapter 5 we consider satellite subsystems failures using
CTMCs, and in Chapter 6 we model satellite navigation for aviation missions using
MDPs. In this chapter, we use PTAs to model the real-time behaviours of the space
segment such as a single satellite, and perform safety analysis based on the behaviour
models.
In this chapter, we consider three essential parameters have to be taken into consid-
eration simultaneously in path planning, which are: (1) the minimum path following
time (2) the maximum observation coverage time, and (3) the minimum path following
fuel cost, respectively. We model both classical global and local path planning prob-
lems in a single satellite settings in the formalism of probabilistic timed automata, and
verify them with some quantitative properties about these parameters using PRISM.
Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is to formally verify three local path planning
behaviours (orbit change, high speed, and low speed) that involve a mobile satellite
and an aircraft. The paths of the satellite and aircraft cross each other, and their move-
ments have both probabilistic and real-time properties, which is very suitable for using
probabilistic timed automata. Thus, the probabilistic models and the logical formulae
are first built, and then PRISM is applied again to verify the underlying three strategies.
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7.1 Introduction
The operation of a satellite mission of surveillance of an emergency often involves sev-
eral different phases that must be accomplished in sequence meanwhile continuously.
As a result, the whole satellite system involved in surveillance mission can be referred
as a phased mission system. During each mission phase, the satellite has to accomplish
a specified task and may be subject to different RAMS requirements. Therefore, satel-
lite configuration and component failure behaviour may change from phase to phase
[142]. When a satellite follows its whole path, the dynamic behaviour of the satellite
usually requires a distinct but continuous-time model for each phase of the mission.
This continuous-time model can be used to analyse RAMS properties of the mission.
“On May 12, 2008, an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale occurred at
Wenchuan City, Sichuan Province, China. It was confirmed that 69,197 people were
dead, and 374,176 injured, with 18,222 listed as missing. In this emergency, a sig-
nificant amount of observation information and pictures about the disaster area were
urgently needed. Sufficiently reliable and available satellite surveillance would ensure
the successful accomplishment of the rescue and aid mission. In general, path with
repeated ground tracks are selected in the design of path planning for the surveillance
mission. These paths proved to have better partial coverage properties than those with
unrepeated ground tracks” [146]. In general, only the repetition periods of the repeated
paths are required in the design and analysis of satellite planning for surveillance mis-
sion.
In case of emergencies such as earthquake, forest fire, or railway collision, it is
impossible to observe a given target on earth by immediately launching new satellites.
Since there is an urgent need for efficient satellite scheduling within a limited time
period, existing satellites have to be effectively and efficiently employed to rapidly and
continuously cover and monitor the affected area during a short time period.
The main purpose of satellite’s path planning for an emergency surveillance is to
complete each phase of the mission, and each phase may be very different. In partic-
ular, in a phase of the mission, the environment of the mission is also different from
the other phases, which leads to the reliability and safety of the satellite in this task is
different from others. In order to adapt to the environment and complete the task, the
satellite needs to change its configuration according to the actual situation to increase
the reliability to complete the task.
The addition to these dynamics and dependencies, phased missions pose unique
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challenges to existing analysis techniques. In traditional approaches, the occurrence of
the sequence of events has been determined in accordance with advanced planning, but
in the actual operation, the different results of events will cause different events, and
the events caused may be uncertain to designers. It depends on the specific situation.
Another problem is the uncertainty of the time at which an event occurs. Occurrence
time of the event is not a fixed value, on the other hand, it may be an interval. As a
result, the event will take place at any time in the internal.
In this chapter, we propose a formal analysis technique based on probabilistic timed
automata (PTAs), utilising PRISM to evaluate the quantitative properties of the satel-
lite path planning problem. Emphasis will be placed on the uncertainty and real-time
natures of satellite global and local path planning during the whole mission. More-
over, the uncertainty includes two aspects: the uncertainty of events sequence, and
uncertainty of the time at which events occur.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2, we present the
related work on path planning approaches for satellites. In Section 7.3 we introduce
satellite surveillance missions. We consider the global path path problem for a single
satellite in a surveillance mission of a earthquake in Section 7.4, while in Section 7.5
the local path planning problem and three behaviours for a single satellite is modelled
and analysed. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.6.
7.2 Related Work
This formal technique is able to solve phased missions problems that can not be solved
using other analysis techniques. In recent years, formal verification has already been
used to verify the global path planning problem for autonomous vehicles ([122, 46]).
However, there is little work that applied in verifying the local path planning problem
in the same domain.
In recent years, several researchers have studied optimal path planning approaches
for satellite systems for surveillance missions. In [1], the authors employ a genetic
algorithm to solve several path planning problems that are characterised by many local
minima, such as space surveillance of a few specified sites. Two types of constraint
conditions are considered: (1) the maximum resolution of each observation point with
a given imaging sensor; (2) the maximum observation time in the total flight time.
Satellite constellations in circular paths are widely used in many applications, and a
number of path planning scenarios for satellite constellations have been studied for
7.3. SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS 130
local and global coverage of the Earth’s surface [138, 82, 28].
A novel approximation approach is developed in [135] for analysing the coverage
locations of real time communication systems based on low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite
constellations for path planning. The geometric analytic technique is used to pro-
cess the statistical parameters of the coverage locations of LEO satellite constellations.
Ulybyshev [136] further extends the simple coverage case to a more complex situa-
tion associated with full or partial visibility of a geographic area by a satellite from
the constellation and proposes an approach. It aims to aid path planning of satellite
constellations that search for the solution only in the two-dimensional space missions
by combining maps of satellite constellations and the coverage requirements.
Configurations of satellite constellations is studied in [121], aiming to maximise
the availability of a specific site and satisfy different mission requirements. A novel
approach is developed in order to optimise the constellation configurations of LEO
satellites for local observation. The approach is able to satisfy 4 requirements: (1) to
minimise the maximum gap (MGap); (2) to maximise the maximum coverage (MCov);
(3) to minimise the MGap with a lower bound on the MCov; (4) to maximise the MCov
with an upper bound on the MGap.
In [146], the problem of path planning for realising optimal disaster rescue and aid
are considered. It considers sun-synchronous path and analyses the results of different
parameters in the path planning. The optimal fuel cost is obtained by comparing the
primer vector theory with Hohmann transfer, and utilised the results to plan paths for
multiple satellites.
7.3 Surveillance Missions
“The paths of space remote sensing platforms usually control the ground resolution,
area coverage, and the frequency of coverage parameters. The path altitude affects
the resolution and the swath width 1. The higher the spacecraft moves, the wider the
affected area covered and correspondingly the lower the resolution. Although lower al-
titudes enable a satellite to get higher resolution, path perturbations due to atmospheric
drag should not be overlooked. Ground surveillance can be viewed as the observation
of multiple discrete locations (sites) on the surface of the earth. These kinds of mis-
sions require that the satellite visits all of the given sites within a given period” [146].
1Swath width: the strip of the Earth’s surface from which geographic data are collected by a satellite
in the course of swath mapping.
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Here we consider a single satellite from the China’s Beidou satellite system [99].
This set of satellites is Chinese orbiting satellites, which is mainly used for space explo-
ration for science and technology, earth observation, and weather forecasting. These
satellites can be scheduled among the low earth orbits, and the range of the semi-major
axis is from 6951 to 7182 km. Emergency satellites prove extremely helpful in the
Wenchuan earthquake. Satellite terminals were carried by the military units entering
the area, providing a desperately needed communications and image capability, in ad-
dition to navigation and positioning support. The Satellite Navigation and Positioning
Main Station provided 24-hour emergency support during the Wenchuan earthquake.
Path planning of a single satellite must also consider the satellite movement, from
the initial site to the target site during a limited time with minimum fuel cost, which is
very critical to the entire mission. Many space scientists have considered the optimisa-
tion of path planning of multiple satellites [126, 7, 128]. This problem is approximately
considered as “a cooperative rendezvous in which both satellites take an active role in
order to further reduce propellant consumption considering the common active and
passive cases” [146].
(a) Affected earthquake area (the red area). (b) Distribution of 11 observation sites
Figure 7.1: Affected area in the Wenchuan earthquake and distribution of observation
sites.
In order to save the fuel consumption of movement, the operational path must be
close to the given sites on condition that the designed path must meet the mission
requirements. Along the path at an optimal altitude, the coverage area of the earth’s
surface can include the whole region. The entire disaster area can be surveilled in one
coverage rectangle as shown in Figure 7.1(a), and we can look on the area as a point
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for the purpose of path planning.
Generally, satellite path planning must include “an accurate coverage analysis for
fixing an optimal set of parameters, such as the number of observed sites and their spa-
tial distribution, according to the required operational purposes. On the other hand, the
motion relative to the Earth’s surface creates more difficulties because good numerical
techniques for calculating and analysing the characteristics of the path coverage are
needed in order to obtain the generalised analytical solutions more easily” [146].
7.4 Global Path Planning for a Single Satellite
In this section, we present an illustrative case study of global path planning for a single
satellite, analysed using PTAs and probabilistic model checking.
7.4.1 Formal Models
7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
+0.2 +0.4 +0.7 +1
+1.3 +0.9 +0.2
+1.2 +0.1 +0.2
Figure 7.2: Fuel consumption in different area.
We use a case study to illustrate the role of PTAs for the analysis of satellite for
surveillance. In this case, a satellite addresses destination by command. The affected
area is divided into 12 observation sites, from 0 to 10 (as shown in Figure 7.1(b)). One
of the areas is shaded, which denotes a static obstacle area expressing this area cannot
be passed by the satellite. The obstacle area is established due to that there maybe a
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geostationary satellite2 in that area.
Assuming a satellite starts to travel from site 0 to site 10, during this process, the
satellite operators need to evaluate the condition and environment of the sites, and
decide the optimal route to the site 10. Staff control the satellite transfer to the target
site along the route. Because of the uncertainty of the control (e.g., solar radiation,
human error, etc.) and loss of signal transmission, the satellite does not always transfer
to the intended direction. There is a probability of 20% that the satellite will transfer
in the wrong direction or remain in the same site. Furthermore, there is a probability
of 10% of the deviation to the left site and similarly to the right site.
Table 7.1: Intervals of time-consumption in each area.
Direction 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
East 3⇠ 5 5⇠ 6 7⇠ 8 3⇠ 5 6⇠ 7     7⇠ 8 5⇠ 5 2⇠ 6
South         4⇠ 7 6⇠ 8 3⇠ 5 5⇠ 8 4⇠ 8  
West   4⇠ 6 7⇠ 8     5⇠ 8     4⇠ 5 4⇠ 6
North 2⇠ 5 3⇠ 6   4⇠ 5 5⇠ 7 6⇠ 8 4⇠ 5      
When the satellite does not move according to the planned route, it will have to
re-select the path of the route. For example, when the satellite gets the command that
it should move ahead to site 4 from site 0, it has 80% probability of completing the
mission, 10% probability of remaining in site 0, and 10% probability of moving to site
1.
In this case, there are two other parameters: path following time and path following
fuel cost. The time the satellite spends in each observation site transferring to each
direction varies. The energy the satellite uses in each site also varies. Figure 7.2 shows
the fuel cost in each site. Table 7.1 shows the time spent by the satellite to move
between each part of sites.
Figure 7.4 shows a PRISM modelling language description for the PTA models
shown in Figure 7.3. It includes a PRISM reward structure, labelled “energy”, to create
a priced PTA which assigns different cost rates to states.
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Figure 7.3: Probabilistic timed automata (PTAs) model.
7.4.2 Real Time Verification
Model checking using PRISM shows that the probability of the satellite completing the
mission within 30 minutes is 0.84134. The satellite will have 5.184% moving to the
area 10 within 15 minutes, and 84.134% within 30 minutes. Figure 7.5 illustrates the
relationship between the probability and time to complete the mission.
We models a simple single satellite scheduling in case of theWenchuan earthquake.
The satellite starts in the initial site 0; after between 3 and 5 time units, the satellite
attempts to move to site 4:
• with a probability of 0.8, the satellite receives the signal correctly, and starts to
2Geostationary satellite: a kind of earth-orbiting satellite that revolves in the same direction and rate
the earth rotates.
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pta
module satellite
s : [0..10] init 0;
x : clock;
invariant
(s=0 => x<=5) & (s=1 => x<=6) & (s=2 => x<=8) & (s=3 => x<=5) &
(s=4 => x<=7) & (s=5 => x<=8) & (s=6 => x<=5) & (s=7 => x<=8) &
(s=8 => x<=5) & (s=9 => x<=6) & (s=10 => true)
endinvariant
[] s=0 & x>=3 -> 0.8:(s’=4)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=0)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=1)&(x’=0);
[] s=4 & x>=6 -> 0.05:(s’=4)&(x’=0) + 0.05:(s’=0)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=5)&(x’=0) + 0.8:(s’=7)&(x’=0);
[] s=1 & x>=5 -> 0.05:(s’=1)&(x’=0) + 0.05:(s’=0)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=2)&(x’=0) + 0.8:(s’=5)&(x’=0);
[] s=2 & x>=7 -> 0.8:(s’=3)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=2)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=1)&(x’=0);
[] s=3 & x>=4 -> 0.8:(s’=6)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=3)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=6)&(x’=0);
[] s=5 & x>=6 -> 0.05:(s’=5)&(x’=0) + 0.05:(s’=1)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=4)&(x’=0) + 0.8:(s’=8)&(x’=0);
[] s=6 & x>=4 -> 0.8:(s’=10)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=6)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=3)&(x’=0);
[] s=7 & x>=7 -> 0.8:(s’=8)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=7)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=4)&(x’=0);
[] s=8 & x>=4 -> 0.05:(s’=5)&(x’=0) + 0.05:(s’=8)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=7)&(x’=0) + 0.8:(s’=9)&(x’=0);
[] s=9 & x>=4 -> 0.8:(s’=10)&(x’=0) + 0.1:(s’=9)&(x’=0) +
0.1:(s’=8)&(x’=0);
endmodule
reward ’’energy’’
(s=0):0.2; (s=1):0.4; (s=2):0.7; (s=3):1.0; (s=4):1.3;
(s=5):0.9; (s=6):0.2; (s=7):1.2; (s=8):0.1; (s=9):0.2;
endreward
Figure 7.4: The PRISM module for the satellite.
move to site 4, via location 4;
• with a probability of 0.1, data is lost, and the satellite stays in site 0;
• with a probability of 0.1, the satellite receives the signal incorrectly, and starts to
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Figure 7.5: The probability curve w.r.t. mission time.
move to the site 1 instead, via location 1.
7 8 9
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(a) Minimum fuel consumption.
7 8 9
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0 1 2 3
4 5 6
(b) Minimum time
Figure 7.6: Results of a satellite to reach a given target.
The minimum energy consumption requirement of the satellite moving from site 0
to site 10 is 1.8. The route of the satellite is as shown in Figure 7.6(a) for minimum
energy consumption. The best route is: 0! 1! 5! 8! 9! 10. Thus, the minimum
energy consumption can be calculated as: 0.2+0.4+0.9+0.1+0.2=1.8. If the direction
of satellite deviates, the satellite should take the best route of each area as shown in
Figure 7.6(a), for which the energy consumption is the least.
Similarly, the time the satellite spends transferring from site 0 to site 10 is at least
22.8 minutes. The shortest path is shown in Figure 7.6(b). The best route is: 0! 4!
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7! 8! 9! 10. There is one best direction from each area. Once the satellite enters
into an area, the satellite will take the least time if the satellite takes the given path.
7.5 Local Path Planning for a Single Satellite
Local path planning (obstacle avoidance) is a key safety requirement for a satellite.
However, sometimes its experimental verification is non-trivial, due to the stochas-
tic behaviours of both the satellites and the obstacles. Thus, this section presents a
PTA based formalism for three local path planning behaviours of satellites in uncer-
tain dynamic environments, namely orbit change, high speed, and low speed. The
PRISM model checker is applied to analyse the underlying models. This work pro-
vides a practical application of the probabilistic model checking for decision makings
of complicated local path planning behaviours for satellites.
7.5.1 Local Path Planning
Local path planning is a central component for the design, development, and appli-
cations of mobile satellites, due to the fact that static or even dynamic obstacles fre-
quently exist in their paths. When several satellites and spacecrafts or other aircrafts
move in the same region, they act in fact as obstacles to one another. Research on
local path planning has become an active topic in the area of satellite and space sys-
tems, and numerous algorithms have been proposed to realise the avoidance of static
or dynamic obstacles [126, 98, 97]. In the past, dynamic satellite environments may be
known in advance, since obstacles are assumed to have predefined or predicted moving
behaviours. However, today’s satellites commonly have to work in uncertain circum-
stances, where the movements of obstacles can not easily to be predicted accurately.
Consequently, a number of probabilistic local path planning algorithms have been pro-
posed, in which both the movement of the obstacles and the operations of the satellites
are modelled as probabilistic events.
The correctness of local path planning behaviours for satellites is crucial. Simu-
lation and testing have been the most frequently used analysis approach for verifying
satellites’ behaviours. However, neither of them is by any means the best solution.
Their weaknesses are mainly due to two aspects: (1) the results are incomplete, due to
the fact that only a subset of all the possible cases can be examined by physical sys-
tem testing or software simulations; (2) the results are generally obtained from small
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sample data that are unsuitable for complex probabilistic analysis.
Formal verification now becomes a very useful alternative approach to traditional
analysis approaches such as simulation and testing, because it is not only complete
in logic and rigorous in mathematics but adaptable for the description and analysis of
probabilistic events. In recent years, formal verification has been used to verify the
global path planning problem for satellite and autonomous systems. However, there
is little work that applies to verifying the local path planning problem in the same
domain.
7.5.2 Probabilistic Behaviours
Satellite
Airplane
A0 A1 A2 A3 A4
S0
S1
S2
S3
C
Figure 7.7: The paths of a mobile satellite and an aircraft.
In this section, we assume the dynamic obstacle is an aircraft, in the same region of
the satellite. We have also made some assumptions on the movement of the aircraft: (1)
the whole moving process of the aircraft can be divided into n steps; (2) the aircraft has
a stepwise uniform motion, that is, it has different velocity at different time step, and
the minimum and maximum velocities are denoted by vmin and vmax; (3) the aircraft
changes the velocity at every same time interval4T ; (4) the velocity for a time interval
is constant, and independently and randomly selected within the range of [vmin,vmax].
Based on [107], the probability distribution p(x;n) for the aircraft to reach the
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position x after n steps can be expressed as:
p(x,n) =
1q
2ps2i
e
 ( (x x¯i)2
2s2i
)g
, t   0,g,a> 0 (7.1)
where s2 = s20 + ns2step, x¯i = x0 + nv¯4T , and s2step = (vmax  vmin)2/12. Here,
x0, s, and v¯ are the initial position, variance, average velocity, respectively. Integrat-
ing p(x;n) along the practical path of the obstacle, one can obtain the probability of
reaching the position x.
In this thesis, three local path planning algorithms are given for a satellite with
only a single dynamic obstacle. As shown in Figure 7.7, the former and the latter are
represented by a satellite and an aircraft, respectively. Assume that the paths of the
satellite and the aircraft intersect at region C with angle q (0  < q< 180 ). A1 and S1
represent their positions when they begin to enter region C, while A4 and S3 stand for
those when they just leave such a region completely. S0 is a reference position of the
satellite, which can be specified at an arbitrary point not over S2. A0 and A1 are two
reference positions of the aircraft. S1 is an undetermined position of the satellite.
Under these conditions, we consider three local path planning behaviours: high
speed, low speed, and orbit change. For the high speed behaviour, the satellite crosses
region C before the aircraft does by increasing its velocity; for the low speed case, it
passes region C later than the aircraft by decreasing its velocity; for the orbit change
case, the satellite avoids the aircraft by changing its movement direction as shown in
Figure 7.8. According to its probabilistic behaviours, the satellite may choose either
S0 S4 or S0 S5. We represent S0 S4 as the expected path, while S0 S5 as the unexpected
path. In Figure 7.8, S4 represents the position where the aircraft begins to enter the
path intersection region in the expected orbit change behaviour.
7.5.3 Formal Models
In this section, we give the probabilistic timed automaton (PTA) models for both the
aircraft and the satellite with respect to three local path planning behaviours. We make
an assumption that all satellites only move in horizontal directions in space relative to
the Earth. This is for two reasons: (1) it simplifies the state space when modelling the
behaviours, as a result it will reduce the complexity of model checking the underlying
models; (2) when the satellite moves, the number of sites that a satellite needs to
monitor can be changed.
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Figure 7.8: Orbit change behaviour of the satellite.
The aim is to formally verify three local path planning algorithms (orbit change,
high speed, and low speed) that involves a satellite and an aircraft. The paths of the
satellite and aircraft cross each other, and their movements have both probabilistic and
real-time properties, which is appropriate for using probabilistic timed automata. The
probabilistic models and the logical formulae are built first, and then PRISM is applied
to analyse the underlying three local path planning behaviours.
7.5.3.1 PTA Model of the Aircraft
Assume that the aircraft moves along its path from the initial location AS to the target
location AT . During the process of movement, it passes locations A0, A1, A2, A3, and
A4 in turn. There are seven corresponding states, and this can be modelled as shown in
Figure 7.9. According to the local path planning behaviours, we consider A0 A1 to be
the dangerous region. As a result, if the aircraft is in state A0 A2 or A2 A1, the satellite
should make a decision on a specific behaviour to avoid collision.
For the purpose of understanding the model, we elaborate three labels for different
state transitions: (1) A0 A2
tA<TA0 A1 ! A0 A1, which means when the clock tA is less than
TA0 A1, the aircraft stays in the state A0 A1. It indicates that the aircraft is moving
between the position A0 and position A1 (see Figure 7.7). (2) A0 A1
tA=TA0 A1,reach,tA:=0 !
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Figure 7.9: Probabilistic timed automaton of the aircraft.
A1 A2,which means when the clock tA is equal to TA0 A1, the aircraft is in the state
A1 A2. It indicates that the aircraft reaches the region between the position A1 and
position A2 from the region between the position A0 and position A1 (see Figure 7.7).
(3) AT AT
stop ! AT AT which means the aircraft stays in the state AT AT . It indicates
that the aircraft reaches the terminal location.
7.5.3.2 PTA Modelling of the Satellite
In this subsection, we provide the formal representation for the state transitions of the
satellite (see Figures 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12). We assume that each local path planning
behaviour can be performed by the satellite with a certain probability.
By dividing each region in Figures, 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12 into several equal discrete
durations in time, we are able to calculate the probability for the aircraft and satellite
to reach the location by considering the probability density function in (7.1).
7.5.4 Real Time Verification
In this section, we use a case study to apply probabilistic verification of local path
planning behaviours for satellites. Then, probabilistic model checking is performed
using PRISM to get the probability for the three local path planning behaviours.
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Figure 7.10: Probabilistic timed automaton of orbit change of of the satellite.
7.5.4.1 Expected Behaviour
We consider the cases of the satellite moving through the states S0 S5 for orbit change
behaviour, S0 S3 for acceleration behaviour, and S0 S1 for deceleration behaviour. It is
assumed that p1= p2= p3= 1.
To obtain the probability of local path planning of the satellite using PRISM, we
construct the following CSL formula:
Pmax=?[F(ST ST & (success 1= 1))]
where the value 1 of parameter “success 1” means that the satellite succeeds in avoid-
ing the aircraft. The verification results corresponding to the three local path planning
behaviours are shown in Figure 7.13.
For orbit change behaviour, if the time for the satellite to pass the region S0 S4
is less than or equal to 7s, the aircraft will be successfully avoided. For acceleration
behaviour, if the time to go across the region does not exceed 4s, the satellite is able
to avoid the aircraft. For deceleration behaviour, if the time to pass the region is more
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Figure 7.11: Probabilistic timed automaton of the satellite in high speed.
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Figure 7.12: Probabilistic timed automaton of the satellite in low speed.
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Figure 7.13: The Probability of the local path planning behaviours.
than or equal to 21s, the collision with the aircraft can be prevented.
7.5.4.2 Unexpected Behaviour
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Figure 7.14: The probability of the orbit change behaviour for local path planning.
Due to the probabilistic behaviours of the satellite, it is possible that it may choose
the unexpected path S0 S5 instead of the expected path S0 S4. In this subsection, we
consider the cases of the satellite moving through the states S0 S5 in orbit change
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Figure 7.15: The probability of the high speed behaviour for local path planning.
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Figure 7.16: The probability of the low speed behaviour for local path planning.
behaviour, S0 S3 in acceleration behaviour, and S0 S1 in deceleration case. The CSL
formula is:
Pmax=?[F(ST ST & (success 2= 1))]
where the value 1 of “success 2” means that the satellite succeeds in finally avoiding
the aircraft, even if it goes through the unexpected state. The probability curves of
the three local path planning algorithms are shown in Figures 7.14, 7.15, and 7.16,
7.6. CONCLUSION 146
respectively.
For orbit change behaviour, we assume that the expected heading angle is 45 , but
the actual one is only 15  or 30 . Under this condition, the satellite will adjust its
movement to avoid the aircraft. Figure 7.14 demonstrates that when the actual heading
angle is 15  or 30 , the maximum time to successfully avoid the aircraft is 5s or 6s,
respectively. For acceleration behaviour, if the time for the satellite to reach S3 is less
than or equal to 4s, the aircraft will be avoided (see Figure 7.15). For deceleration
behaviour, if the time to arrive at S1 is longer than 21s, the satellite is able to avoid the
aircraft (see Figure 7.16).
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have successfully demonstrated how probabilistic model checking
and Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTAs) can be used to verify safety properties via
two case studies. Both global and local path planning problems of a single surveillance
satellite have been considered in an uncertain dynamic environment. We first build
PTAs models of the underlying behaviours. We then apply the PRISM model checker
to analyse the models. We believe that this work can provide a foundation for the
safety analysis and verification of complex decision makings behaviours such as path
planning for satellites.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Challenge
Satellites are highly valuable and may fail during their life cycle. They are designed to
work reliably and safely in very demanding situations with a very low probability of
failure. Failures depend on the characteristics of the infrastructure, application scenar-
ios, and the maintenance strategies used. Maintenance strategies must be planned, and
the probability of failure is required in order to ensure that satellite systems achieve an
acceptable level of reliability. Maintenance actions associated with the repair of these
failures such as rebooting, updating, or the replacement of satellites imply unavailabil-
ity which is difficult to predict. Therefore, feasible approaches for predicting satellite
failure are urgently needed.
Because of the mission critical nature of satellite systems, it is essential to guar-
antee not just qualitative correctness but also a variety of quantitative characteristics,
such as reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS), and to check if
these systems meet the design requirements. RAMS parameters which may be pre-
dicted are reliability, availability, failure rate, Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF),
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), among others. RAMS analysis has been indispensable
in the design phase of satellites in order to achieve minimum failure rates or to increase
MTBF and thus to plan maintainability strategies, optimise reliability, maximise avail-
ability, and guarantee safety.
However, using probabilistic model checking poses a unique challenge for the
RAMS analysis of satellite systems. In the past, RAMS analysis has been extensively
applied to the field of electrical and electronics engineering. It has a high potential for
application in the field of space science and engineering. However, it currently lacks
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standardisation and suitable procedures for the correct study of RAMS characteristics
for satellite systems. RAMS analysis allows system designers and reliability engineers
of satellite systems to predict the likelihood of failures from the indication of historical
or current operational data.
Verification is a process of analysing whether a system satisfies its specifications.
Verification of RAMS requirements for computerised systems has been an active re-
search area for decades. In the context of satellite systems, the verification problem
appears to be difficult and not able to be tackled completely by current state of the art
verification techniques (e.g., simulation, testing). Simulation may be relatively cheap
and easy to implement, but rigorous analysis is not possible without exhaustive simula-
tion and physical experiments. For the scenarios we examined, exhaustive simulation
and experimental testing can sometimes be very difficult.
8.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we have presented a quantitative approach using probabilistic verifica-
tion techniques for the analysis of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
(RAMS) properties of satellite systems for mission critical industrial applications. A
strong case for using probabilistic model checking to support RAMS analysis of satel-
lite systems has been made by our verification results. Specifically, we have demon-
strated that it is feasible, useful, and efficient to apply probabilistic verification, par-
ticularly probabilistic model checking, during the design phase, to perform predictive
analysis of RAMS properties of mission critical systems that are reliant on satellites.
We make two major contributions. One of these is the approach of RAMS analysis
to satellite systems. In the past, RAMS analysis has been extensively applied to the
field of electrical and electronics engineering. It allows system designers and reliability
engineers to predict the likelihood of failures from the indication of historical or cur-
rent operational data. There is a high potential for the application of RAMS analysis in
the field of space science and engineering. However, there is a lack of standardisation
and suitable procedures for the correct study of RAMS characteristics for satellite sys-
tems. This thesis has considered the promising application of RAMS analysis to the
case of satellite design, use, and maintenance, focusing on its system segments. Data
collection and verification procedures are discussed, and a number of considerations
have also been presented on how to use predict the probability of failure.
Our second contribution is leveraging the power of probabilistic model checking to
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analyse satellite systems. We have presented techniques for analysing satellite systems
that differ from the more common quantitative approaches based on traditional simu-
lation and testing. These techniques have not been applied in this context before. We
have demonstrated the use of probabilistic techniques via a suite of detailed examples,
together with their analysis. Our presentation has been done in an incremental man-
ner: in terms of complexity of application domains and system models, and presented
a highly detailed PRISM model of each scenario. We have also provided results from
practical work together with a discussion about future improvements.
We have presented quantitative verification of various probabilistic models for ap-
plying probabilistic model checking and PRISM to satellite based systems. In Chapter
4, CTMC based formal models are constructed for two different kinds of space seg-
ment: a single satellite and a constellation of satellites, in an uncertain dynamic envi-
ronment. In Chapter 5, we have developed novel semi-Markov models that characterise
failure behaviours, based onWeibull failure modes inferred from realistic data sources,
then we have approximated and encoded these models using CTMCs. In Chapter 6,
we have modelled a satellite positioning system for the mission of aircraft guidance
in the probabilistic p-calculus, and encoded our model using MDPs. In Chapter 7, we
have constructed different PTAs of a single satellite in both cases of global and local
path planning. In summary, we have provided an alternative to the current approaches
of simulation and testing for analysing RAMS properties of satellite systems.
8.3 Results
The results from the research are useful to system engineers working on the design of
satellite systems and similar complex aerospace engineering systems. The key result
of our work is the integration of the probabilistic model checking approach into RAMS
analysis, which provides a methodology for system engineers to assess and refine their
designs to meet strict or complex operational requirements of reliability and safety.
We have learned several important lessons from applying this methodology to different
mission-critical scenarios. These include: (1) the ability to automate the definition of
RAMS properties from mission perspectives using probabilistic model checkers and
the ability to abstract and examine these perspectives in probabilistic models, which
provides the methodology significant values with respect to its feasibility and usability
for system engineers.
Moreover, we believe our methodology and the associated techniques are success-
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ful based on two following reasons. First, the expression of reliability, availability,
maintainability, and safety requirements can be made easily through formal specifica-
tion and re-applied automatically when system models are changed or refined. Second,
scenarios in how these requirements are met can be demonstrated visually and com-
prehensively using probabilistic model checkers. These aspects of the methodology
provide a highly usable and automated way, in which the RAMS properties of satellite
systems in complex and realistic missions can be assessed.
Appendix A
Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations, and
Acronyms
Abbreviations Definition
BDD Binary Decision Diagram
TTC Telemetry, Tracking, and Command
CSL Continuous Stochastic Logic
CTL Computation Tree Logic
CTMCs Continuous Time Markov Chains
DTMCs Discrete Time Markov Chains
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LON Launch On Need
LOS Launch On Schedule
LOS Line Of Sight
LTL Linear Temporal Logic
LTS Labelled Transition System
MDPs Markov Decision Processes
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCSS Navigation-Communication Satellite System
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PCTL Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
PTAs Probabilistic Timed Automata
PVT Position, Velocity, and Time
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety
SIS Signal In Space
STK Satellite Tool Kit
SPS Standard Positioning Service
SVN Space Vehicle Number
Appendix B
Reactive Modules in PRISM for Chapter
6
mdp //Makov Decision Processes
const double ra=0.8; const double rb=0.7; const double rc=0.8;
const double rd=0.8; const double re=0.8; const double rf=0.75;
const double rg=0.7;
const double rms=0.99999; const double rmcs=0.99999;
const double pef=0.9; const double rga=0.99999;
const int ma=1; const int mb=2; const int mc=3; const int md=4;
const int me=5; const int mf=6; const int mg=7;
const int va=8; const int vb=9; const int vc=10; const int vd=11;
const int ve=12; const int vf=13; const int vg=14; const int no=15;
const int e1=16; const int e2=17; const int e3=18;
module SC // module for satellite C
sc : [1..7] init 1;
xc : [0..18] init 0;
[] (sc=1) -> rc : (sc’=2) + (1-rc) : (sc’=1);
[a3_SC_MS_mc] (sc=2) -> (sc’=3);
[d3_GA_SC_z] (sc=3) & (z=vc) -> (sc’=4) & (xc’=z);
[d3_GA_SC_z] (sc=3) & (z!=vc) -> (sc’=1) & (xc’=z);
[] (sc=4) -> rc : (sc’=5) + (1-rc) : (sc’=4);
[e3_SC_Usr_mc] (sc=5) -> (sc’=6);
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[outc_S_SC_e3] (sc=6) -> (sc’=7);
endmodule
// add further processes through renaming
// module for satellite B
module SB = SC[ sc=sb, xc=xb, rc=rb, vc=vb, a3_SC_MS_mc=a2_SB_MS_mb,
d3_GA_SC_z=d2_GA_SB_z, e3_SC_Usr_mc=e2_SB_Usr_mb,
outc_S_SC_e3=outb_S_SB_e2 ]
endmodule
// module for satellite A
module SA = SC[ sc=sa, xc=xa, rc=ra, vc=va, a3_SC_MS_mc=a1_SA_MS_ma,
d3_GA_SC_z=d1_GA_SA_z, e3_SC_Usr_mc=e1_SA_Usr_ma,
outc_S_SC_e3=outa_S_SA_e1 ]
endmodule
module SD // module for satellite D
sd : [1..6] init 1;
xd : [0..18] init 0;
[] (sd=1) -> rd : (sd’=2) + (1-rd) : (sd’=1);
[a4_SD_MS_md] (sd=2) -> (sd’=3);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (sd=3) & (z=vd) -> (sd’=4) & (xd’=z);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (sd=3) & (z!=vd) -> (sd’=1) & (xd’=z);
[] (sd=4) -> rd : (sd’=5) + (1-rd) : (sd’=4);
[e4_SD_Usr_md] (sd=5) -> (sd’=6);
endmodule
// module for satellite E
module SE
se : [1..7] init 1;
xe : [0..18] init 0;
ye : [0..18] init 0;
[ine_S_SE_e3] (se=1) -> (se’=2) & (ye’=e3);
[] (se=2) -> re : (se’=3) + (1-re) : (se’=2);
[a5_SE_MS_me] (se=3) -> (se’=4);
155
[d5_GA_SE_z] (se=4) & (z=ve) -> (se’=5) & (xe’=z);
[d5_GA_SE_z] (se=4) & (z!=ve) -> (se’=2) & (xe’=z);
[] (se=5) -> re : (se’=6) + (1-re) : (se’=5);
[ye_SE_Usr_me] (se=6) -> (se’=7);
endmodule
// module for satellite F
module SF = SE[ se=sf, xe=xf, ye=yf, re=rf, ve=vf, e3=e2,
ine_S_SE_e3=inf_S_SF_e2, a5_SE_MS_me=a6_SF_MS_mf,
d5_GA_SE_z=d6_GA_SF_z, ye_SE_Usr_me=yf_SF_Usr_mf ]
endmodule
// module for satellite G
module SG = SE[ se=sg, xe=xg, ye=yg, re=rg, ve=vg, e3=e1,
ine_S_SE_e3=ing_S_SG_e1, a5_SE_MS_me=a7_SG_MS_mg,
d5_GA_SE_z=d7_GA_SG_z, ye_SE_Usr_me=yg_SG_Usr_mg ]
endmodule
module MS // module for the monitor station MS
s1 : [1..15] init 1;
x : [0..18] init 0;
[a1_SA_MS_ma] (s1=1) -> (s1’=2) & (x’=ma);
[a2_SB_MS_mb] (s1=1) -> (s1’=3) & (x’=mb);
[a3_SC_MS_mc] (s1=1) -> (s1’=4) & (x’=mc);
[a4_SD_MS_md] (s1=1) -> (s1’=5) & (x’=md);
[a5_SE_MS_me] (s1=1) -> (s1’=6) & (x’=me);
[a6_SF_MS_mf] (s1=1) -> (s1’=7) & (x’=mf);
[a7_SG_MS_mg] (s1=1) -> (s1’=8) & (x’=mg);
[] (s1=2) -> rms : (s1’=9) + (1-rms) : (s1’=2);
[] (s1=3) -> rms : (s1’=10) + (1-rms) : (s1’=3);
[] (s1=4) -> rms : (s1’=11) + (1-rms) : (s1’=4);
[] (s1=5) -> rms : (s1’=12) + (1-rms) : (s1’=5);
[] (s1=6) -> rms : (s1’=13) + (1-rms) : (s1’=6);
[] (s1=7) -> rms : (s1’=14) + (1-rms) : (s1’=7);
[] (s1=8) -> rms : (s1’=15) + (1-rms) : (s1’=8);
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[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=9) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=10) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=11) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=12) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=13) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=14) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=15) -> (s1’=1);
endmodule
module MCS // module for the master control station MCS
s2 : [1..22] init 1;
y : [0..18] init 0;
vj : [0..18] init 0;
nj : [0..18] init 0;
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=ma) -> (s2’=2) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mb) -> (s2’=3) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mc) -> (s2’=4) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=md) -> (s2’=5) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=me) -> (s2’=6) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mf) -> (s2’=7) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mg) -> (s2’=8) & (y’=x);
[] (s2=2) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=9) + rmcs*(1-pef) : (s2’=10)
+ (1-rmcs) : (s2’=2);
[] (s2=3) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=11) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=12)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=3);
[] (s2=4) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=13) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=14)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=4);
[] (s2=5) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=15) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=16)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=5);
[] (s2=6) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=17) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=18)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=6);
[] (s2=7) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=19) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=20)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=7);
[] (s2=8) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=21) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=22)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=8);
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[c_MCS_GA_va] (s2=9) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_na] (s2=10) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vb] (s2=11) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nb] (s2=12) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vc] (s2=13) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nc] (s2=14) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vd] (s2=15) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nd] (s2=16) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_ve] (s2=17) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_ne] (s2=18) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vf] (s2=19) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nf] (s2=20) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vg] (s2=21) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_ng] (s2=22) -> (s2’=1);
endmodule
module GA // module for the ground antenna GA
s3 : [1..15] init 1;
z : [0..18] init 0;
[c_MCS_GA_va] (s3=1) -> (s3’=2) & (z’=va);
[c_MCS_GA_na] (s3=1) -> (s3’=2) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vb] (s3=1) -> (s3’=3) & (z’=vb);
[c_MCS_GA_nb] (s3=1) -> (s3’=3) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vc] (s3=1) -> (s3’=4) & (z’=vc);
[c_MCS_GA_nc] (s3=1) -> (s3’=4) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vd] (s3=1) -> (s3’=5) & (z’=vd);
[c_MCS_GA_nd] (s3=1) -> (s3’=5) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_ve] (s3=1) -> (s3’=6) & (z’=ve);
[c_MCS_GA_ne] (s3=1) -> (s3’=6) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vf] (s3=1) -> (s3’=7) & (z’=vf);
[c_MCS_GA_nf] (s3=1) -> (s3’=7) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vg] (s3=1) -> (s3’=8) & (z’=vg);
[c_MCS_GA_ng] (s3=1) -> (s3’=8) & (z’=no);
[] (s3=2) -> rga : (s3’=9) + (1-rga) : (s3’=2);
[] (s3=3) -> rga : (s3’=10) + (1-rga) : (s3’=3);
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[] (s3=4) -> rga : (s3’=11) + (1-rga) : (s3’=4);
[] (s3=5) -> rga : (s3’=12) + (1-rga) : (s3’=5);
[] (s3=6) -> rga : (s3’=13) + (1-rga) : (s3’=6);
[] (s3=7) -> rga : (s3’=14) + (1-rga) : (s3’=7);
[] (s3=8) -> rga : (s3’=15) + (1-rga) : (s3’=8);
[d1_GA_SA_z] (s3=9) -> (s3’=1);
[d2_GA_SB_z] (s3=10) -> (s3’=1);
[d3_GA_SC_z] (s3=11) -> (s3’=1);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (s3=12) -> (s3’=1);
[d5_GA_SE_z] (s3=13) -> (s3’=1);
[d6_GA_SF_z] (s3=14) -> (s3’=1);
[d7_GA_SG_z] (s3=15) -> (s3’=1);
endmodule
module User // module for the aircraft (User segment) U
s4 : [1..8] init 1;
[e1_SA_Usr_ma] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e2_SB_Usr_mb] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e3_SC_Usr_mc] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e4_SD_Usr_md] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[ye_SE_Usr_me] (s4=1) -> (s4’=2);
[yf_SF_Usr_mf] (s4=2) -> (s4’=3);
[yg_SG_Usr_mg] (s4=3) -> (s4’=4);
endmodule
module Switch // module for the mobility model
s5 : [1..7] init 1;
[outc_S_SC_e3] (s5=1) -> (s5’=2);
[ine_S_SE_e3] (s5=2) -> (s5’=3);
[outb_S_SB_e2] (s5=3) -> (s5’=4);
[inf_S_SF_e2] (s5=4) -> (s5’=5);
[outa_S_SA_e1] (s5=5) -> (s5’=6);
[ing_S_SG_e1] (s5=6) -> (s5’=7);
endmodule
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// rewards (to calculate expected number of steps)
rewards "steps"
true : 1;
endrewardsdule SD // module for satellite D
sd : [1..6] init 1;
xd : [0..18] init 0;
[] (sd=1) -> rd : (sd’=2) + (1-rd) : (sd’=1);
[a4_SD_MS_md] (sd=2) -> (sd’=3);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (sd=3) & (z=vd) -> (sd’=4) & (xd’=z);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (sd=3) & (z!=vd) -> (sd’=1) & (xd’=z);
[] (sd=4) -> rd : (sd’=5) + (1-rd) : (sd’=4);
[e4_SD_Usr_md] (sd=5) -> (sd’=6);
endmodule
// module for satellite E
module SE
se : [1..7] init 1;
xe : [0..18] init 0;
ye : [0..18] init 0;
[ine_S_SE_e3] (se=1) -> (se’=2) & (ye’=e3);
[] (se=2) -> re : (se’=3) + (1-re) : (se’=2);
[a5_SE_MS_me] (se=3) -> (se’=4);
[d5_GA_SE_z] (se=4) & (z=ve) -> (se’=5) & (xe’=z);
[d5_GA_SE_z] (se=4) & (z!=ve) -> (se’=2) & (xe’=z);
[] (se=5) -> re : (se’=6) + (1-re) : (se’=5);
[ye_SE_Usr_me] (se=6) -> (se’=7);
endmodule
// module for satellite F
module SF = SE[ se=sf, xe=xf, ye=yf, re=rf, ve=vf, e3=e2,
ine_S_SE_e3=inf_S_SF_e2, a5_SE_MS_me=a6_SF_MS_mf,
d5_GA_SE_z=d6_GA_SF_z, ye_SE_Usr_me=yf_SF_Usr_mf ]
endmodule
// module for satellite G
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module SG = SE[ se=sg, xe=xg, ye=yg, re=rg, ve=vg, e3=e1,
ine_S_SE_e3=ing_S_SG_e1, a5_SE_MS_me=a7_SG_MS_mg,
d5_GA_SE_z=d7_GA_SG_z, _SE_Usr_me=yg_SG_Usr_mg ]
endmodule
module MS // module for the monitor station MS
s1 : [1..15] init 1;
x : [0..18] init 0;
[a1_SA_MS_ma] (s1=1) -> (s1’=2) & (x’=ma);
[a2_SB_MS_mb] (s1=1) -> (s1’=3) & (x’=mb);
[a3_SC_MS_mc] (s1=1) -> (s1’=4) & (x’=mc);
[a4_SD_MS_md] (s1=1) -> (s1’=5) & (x’=md);
[a5_SE_MS_me] (s1=1) -> (s1’=6) & (x’=me);
[a6_SF_MS_mf] (s1=1) -> (s1’=7) & (x’=mf);
[a7_SG_MS_mg] (s1=1) -> (s1’=8) & (x’=mg);
[] (s1=2) -> rms : (s1’=9) + (1-rms) : (s1’=2);
[] (s1=3) -> rms : (s1’=10) + (1-rms) : (s1’=3);
[] (s1=4) -> rms : (s1’=11) + (1-rms) : (s1’=4);
[] (s1=5) -> rms : (s1’=12) + (1-rms) : (s1’=5);
[] (s1=6) -> rms : (s1’=13) + (1-rms) : (s1’=6);
[] (s1=7) -> rms : (s1’=14) + (1-rms) : (s1’=7);
[] (s1=8) -> rms : (s1’=15) + (1-rms) : (s1’=8);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=9) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=10) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=11) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=12) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=13) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=14) -> (s1’=1);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s1=15) -> (s1’=1);
endmodule
module MCS // module for the master control station MCS
s2 : [1..22] init 1;
y : [0..18] init 0;
vj : [0..18] init 0;
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nj : [0..18] init 0;
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=ma) -> (s2’=2) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mb) -> (s2’=3) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mc) -> (s2’=4) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=md) -> (s2’=5) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=me) -> (s2’=6) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mf) -> (s2’=7) & (y’=x);
[b_MS_MCS_x] (s2=1) & (x=mg) -> (s2’=8) & (y’=x);
[] (s2=2) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=9) + rmcs*(1-pef) : (s2’=10)
+ (1-rmcs) : (s2’=2);
[] (s2=3) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=11) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=12)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=3);
[] (s2=4) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=13) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=14)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=4);
[] (s2=5) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=15) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=16)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=5);
[] (s2=6) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=17) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=18)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=6);
[] (s2=7) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=19) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=20)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=7);
[] (s2=8) -> rmcs*pef : (s2’=21) + rmcs*(1-pef):(s2’=22)
+ (1-rmcs):(s2’=8);
[c_MCS_GA_va] (s2=9) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_na] (s2=10) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vb] (s2=11) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nb] (s2=12) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vc] (s2=13) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nc] (s2=14) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vd] (s2=15) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nd] (s2=16) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_ve] (s2=17) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_ne] (s2=18) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vf] (s2=19) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_nf] (s2=20) -> (s2’=1);
[c_MCS_GA_vg] (s2=21) -> (s2’=1);
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[c_MCS_GA_ng] (s2=22) -> (s2’=1);
endmodule
module GA // module for the ground antenna GA
s3 : [1..15] init 1;
z : [0..18] init 0;
[c_MCS_GA_va] (s3=1) -> (s3’=2) & (z’=va);
[c_MCS_GA_na] (s3=1) -> (s3’=2) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vb] (s3=1) -> (s3’=3) & (z’=vb);
[c_MCS_GA_nb] (s3=1) -> (s3’=3) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vc] (s3=1) -> (s3’=4) & (z’=vc);
[c_MCS_GA_nc] (s3=1) -> (s3’=4) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vd] (s3=1) -> (s3’=5) & (z’=vd);
[c_MCS_GA_nd] (s3=1) -> (s3’=5) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_ve] (s3=1) -> (s3’=6) & (z’=ve);
[c_MCS_GA_ne] (s3=1) -> (s3’=6) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vf] (s3=1) -> (s3’=7) & (z’=vf);
[c_MCS_GA_nf] (s3=1) -> (s3’=7) & (z’=no);
[c_MCS_GA_vg] (s3=1) -> (s3’=8) & (z’=vg);
[c_MCS_GA_ng] (s3=1) -> (s3’=8) & (z’=no);
[] (s3=2) -> rga : (s3’=9) + (1-rga) : (s3’=2);
[] (s3=3) -> rga : (s3’=10) + (1-rga) : (s3’=3);
[] (s3=4) -> rga : (s3’=11) + (1-rga) : (s3’=4);
[] (s3=5) -> rga : (s3’=12) + (1-rga) : (s3’=5);
[] (s3=6) -> rga : (s3’=13) + (1-rga) : (s3’=6);
[] (s3=7) -> rga : (s3’=14) + (1-rga) : (s3’=7);
[] (s3=8) -> rga : (s3’=15) + (1-rga) : (s3’=8);
[d1_GA_SA_z] (s3=9) -> (s3’=1);
[d2_GA_SB_z] (s3=10) -> (s3’=1);
[d3_GA_SC_z] (s3=11) -> (s3’=1);
[d4_GA_SD_z] (s3=12) -> (s3’=1);
[d5_GA_SE_z] (s3=13) -> (s3’=1);
[d6_GA_SF_z] (s3=14) -> (s3’=1);
[d7_GA_SG_z] (s3=15) -> (s3’=1);
endmodule
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module User // module for the aircraft (User segment) U
s4 : [1..4] init 1;
[e1_SA_Usr_ma] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e2_SB_Usr_mb] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e3_SC_Usr_mc] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[e4_SD_Usr_md] (s4=1) -> (s4’=1);
[ye_SE_Usr_me] (s4=1) -> (s4’=2);
[yf_SF_Usr_mf] (s4=2) -> (s4’=3);
[yg_SG_Usr_mg] (s4=3) -> (s4’=4);
endmodule
module Switch // module for the mobility model
s5 : [1..7] init 1;
[outc_S_SC_e3] (s5=1) -> (s5’=2);
[ine_S_SE_e3] (s5=2) -> (s5’=3);
[outb_S_SB_e2] (s5=3) -> (s5’=4);
[inf_S_SF_e2] (s5=4) -> (s5’=5);
[outa_S_SA_e1] (s5=5) -> (s5’=6);
[ing_S_SG_e1] (s5=6) -> (s5’=7);
endmodule
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